A View of the Valley: The 1913 Flood in West Indianapolis by Germano, Nancy M.
 
 
 
 
 
A VIEW OF THE VALLEY: THE 1913 FLOOD 
 
IN WEST INDIANAPOLIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nancy M. Germano 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Master of Arts 
in the Department of History 
Indiana University 
 
January 2009 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
Accepted by the Faculty of Indiana University, in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Philip V. Scarpino, Ph.D., Chair 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Committee 
_________________________________ 
Annie Gilbert Coleman, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Jason M. Kelly, Ph.D. 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c 2009 
 
 
Nancy M. Germano 
 
 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 iv 
DEDICATION 
 
To Rick, with all my love.  Thank you for accompanying me on this journey. 
 
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
There are so many people who made this thesis possible.  I want to thank my 
family, friends, professors, and classmates who expressed encouragement along the way.  
I truly appreciate my professors and fellow students, who read the many evolutions of 
this project and offered feedback and guidance, and the staffs at the following 
institutions, who always showed interest in my research and provided expert assistance:  
Indiana State Library, Indiana Collection; the Commission on Public Records, Indiana 
State Archives; and the Indiana Historical Society.  The members of the Employee 
Benefits Group at Ice Miller LLP deserve recognition for fostering this opportunity with 
flexibility and words of support.  Special thanks to Professor Nancy M. Robertson for 
helping articulate this project in its incubation stage and continuing to think of me and 
share potential sources, Professor Robert G. Barrows for leading me to the Journals of the 
Common Council of Indianapolis, and Thomas R. Newby, Adjunct Professor of Law at 
Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis, for imparting his knowledge about case 
law research and introducing me to the Indiana Supreme Court Library.   
Finally, I want to thank and acknowledge my thesis committee: Professor Jason 
M. Kelly, for carefully reading and offering insightful suggestions; Professor Annie 
Gilbert Coleman, for her enthusiasm and inspiring guidance in the field of environmental 
history; and Professor Philip V. Scarpino, for introducing me to the International Water 
History Association, encouraging and believing in my topic, and patiently and wisely 
advising on this endeavor.   
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES......................................................................................................... viii 
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 1: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ................................................................ 19 
Regionalism........................................................................................................... 23 
The Wabash River Basin....................................................................................... 27 
Rivers in the Basin ................................................................................................ 40 
Regional Comparisons .......................................................................................... 45 
Summary ............................................................................................................... 51 
CHAPTER 2: THE COMMUNITY OF WEST INDIANAPOLIS .................................. 55 
Places in History.................................................................................................... 57 
The People and Businesses ................................................................................... 60 
The Relationship with the River ........................................................................... 79 
CHAPTER 3: THE 1913 FLOOD .................................................................................... 85 
The Topography .................................................................................................... 95 
Flood Prevention ................................................................................................... 99 
The Modern City ................................................................................................. 101 
Flooding in West Indianapolis ............................................................................ 106 
CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT................................ 115 
Historical Studies ................................................................................................ 116 
Political Ecology ................................................................................................. 125 
Municipal Powers................................................................................................ 129 
State Powers ........................................................................................................ 136 
Federal Powers .................................................................................................... 139 
 vii 
Powers of Citizens and Place .............................................................................. 141 
CONCLUSION: WEST INDIANAPOLIS TODAY...................................................... 152 
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................... 165 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.    Map of Wabash River Basin. ...........................................................................  2 
Figure 2.    Steamboat Governor Morton ............................................................................ 4 
Figure 3.    West Indianapolis in 1913 .............................................................................. 11 
Figure 4.    Soil Map of Marion County in 1907............................................................... 12 
Figure 5.    Location of the Wabash River Basin .............................................................. 22 
Figure 6.    Future Site of West Indianapolis .................................................................... 62 
Figure 7.    1898 Sanborn Map.......................................................................................... 63 
Figure 8.    West Indianapolis Fire Department and Police Station .................................. 69 
Figure 9.    Church of the Assumption .............................................................................. 71 
Figure 10.  “The New City Limits”................................................................................... 73  
Figure 11a. 1910 U. S. Census (Claghorn Family) ........................................................... 77 
Figure 11b. 1910 U. S. Census (Longemire Family) ........................................................ 78 
Figure 12a. Washington Street Bridge One Hour Before Collapse .................................. 87 
Figure 12b. Washington Street Bridge, Flood Damage .................................................... 88 
Figure 13.  West Indianapolis in 1913 .............................................................................. 90 
Figure 14a. Abandoned Street Car .................................................................................... 92 
Figure 14b. Silver Avenue in West Indianapolis .............................................................. 93 
Figure 15.  Topographical Map of Marion County........................................................... 96 
Figure 16.  Map Showing Principal Sewers of Indianapolis........................................... 103 
Figure 17.  Looking North on Coffey from Ray Street, 1913......................................... 109 
Figure 18.  “A Reason Sanitary Measures are Necessary” ............................................. 111 
Figure 19.  1915 Sanborn Map of West Indianapolis ..................................................... 132 
Figure 20.  523 Coffey Street in West Indianapolis ........................................................ 156 
 ix 
Figure 21.  805 and 807 River Avenue in West Indianapolis ......................................... 157 
Figure 22.  810 River Avenue in West Indianapolis ....................................................... 158 
Figure 23.  Looking Across White River ........................................................................ 159 
Figure 24.  Looking East on Oliver Street ...................................................................... 160 
  
INTRODUCTION 
There is a river in Indianapolis, although it is not one of the better known, 
navigable rivers.  The White River is a tributary of the Wabash River, with its West Fork 
meandering through the city.  (See Figure 1.)  Indianapolis is today one of a few state 
capitals in the United States that is not situated on a commercially navigable body of 
water.  This simple fact has held significance for Indianapolis and its inhabitants 
throughout the city’s existence.  In 1821, when the commissioners to the legislature 
selected the site for Indiana’s capital city, river navigation consisted of canoes and 
flatboats, and in the early years of the nineteenth century, White River was navigated by 
hundreds of boats of considerable size.1   
At first White River appeared to live up to the expectations of the commissioners.  
In the spring of 1821, a keel boat loaded with flour, bacon, whiskey, and “other 
necessaries of life” made a successful trip from Frankfort, Kentucky, to Indianapolis via 
the Ohio, Wabash, and White Rivers.  Noah Noble (Indiana Governor 1831-1837) 
believed the river was capable of more extensive navigation, and in 1828-29, he offered a 
reward of $200 to the first captain who would bring a steamboat to Indianapolis.2   
Unfortunately for the residents of Indianapolis, the steamboat excursions that 
followed soon proved White River to be a difficult and unreliable route of transportation.  
In April 1830, Captain Saunders made two attempts at claiming the Governor’s reward.3  
His steamboat Traveller made it as far as Spencer, Indiana, and his steamboat Victory  
                                                 
1Jacob Piatt Dunn, Greater Indianapolis: The History, the Industries, the Institutions, and the 
People of a City of Homes (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1910), 1:18. 
2Ibid. 
3The first name of Captain Saunders has not been preserved in the sources. 
2 
Figure 1.  Digital photograph of map showing Wabash River Basin.  
Flood Control Plan: Wabash River and Tributaries, U. S. Engineer  
Office, Louisville, Kentucky, April, 1938, Revised December, 1938,  
prepared under the direction of Lieut. Col. D. A. Davison, Corps of  
Engineers, District Engineer, Louisville District.  Courtesy of Indiana  
State Library. 
3 
came within fifty-five miles of Indianapolis before the river level began to fall and he had 
to seek safety downriver.4   
In 1831, General Robert Hanna decided to accept the challenge with his 
steamboat hauling stone and timber for bridges from Cincinnati.  Although he and his 
crew encountered some difficulties, they successfully arrived in Indianapolis on 11 April 
1831.  The mayor called a public meeting and appointed a committee to arrange an 
appropriate celebratory event.  As part of the celebrations, the General Hanna made two 
excursions upriver from Indianapolis on 12 April 1831 with large loads of passengers.  
During one of the trips, the boat lost its pilothouse and chimneys when it ran into an 
overhanging tree, and a number of passengers had to jump into the river.  Despite this 
mishap, these excursions were also considered successful.  When the General Hanna 
started back down the river on 13 April, it grounded on a sandbar south of Indianapolis 
and was stuck there for six weeks before finally completing the trip in the fall.5   
No other attempts were made until 1865 when the Indianapolis and White River 
Steamboat Company launched the Governor Morton.  (See Figure 2.)  Its maiden voyage 
on 25 August 1865 was successful, but the farthest north the steamboat reached was Cold 
Spring, about three miles north of Indianapolis, on 29 April 1866.  Its short career ended 
on 6 August 1866 when it sank at its moorings below the National Road bridge in 
Indianapolis with no one on board except the sleeping watchman.  By then, the Governor 
Morton had been reduced to a running joke (allegedly, “her most profitable trip was one 
when she stuck on a sandbar for several hours, and the bar took in $168 for drinks, at 25 
                                                 
4Dunn, 1:18. 
5Ibid., 1:18-19 
4 
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5 
cents per quench”6).  The steamboat failures helped establish the idea that modern 
navigation on White River was unprofitable.  Indianapolis residents set aside their hopes 
for a navigable river and looked instead to canals and railroads for economic success.  
The failure of commercial transportation on White River is only one facet of the story 
that the river shares with Indianapolis.   
This study explores the shared history of West Indianapolis and the White River 
and reveals an interdependent, yet conflicted, relationship between the people and the 
river.  This relationship was part of a broader set of attitudes that natural resources were 
unlimited and that humans must master the landscape.  From the founding of Indianapolis 
in 1821 until the flood of 1913, a series of uncoordinated human actions related to 
settlement and growth of the city took place.  Despite noble intentions of progress and 
improvement, the cumulative effect of these actions resulted in unintended and undesired 
consequences in the form of a flood disaster in 1913, an unhealthy environment in West 
Indianapolis, and a negative identity for that community.  One might argue that these 
results occurred because nineteenth century settlers in the Indianapolis area lacked an 
understanding of the nature of rivers or that scientists had not yet proven the germ theory.  
As shown in this study, however, the historical sources support an argument that the 
relationship between the people and the river dictated the fate of the river and the 
community of West Indianapolis, which suffered significant damage when White River 
overflowed its banks in the “Great Flood” of 1913.   
To fully appreciate the interwoven story of Indianapolis and White River, it is 
important to understand the land the city occupies and its nature prior to and after Euro-
American settlement.  When the glaciers in the Wisconsin Stage of the Ice Age migrated 
                                                 
6Ibid., 1:19. 
6 
south, they leveled the land in northern and central Indiana.  The retreat of these glaciers 
deposited rich soil that bred and nourished hardwood forests.  Numerous rivers and 
streams providing food, water, and a means of transportation also crisscrossed the 
territory.  This was the landscape occupied by Native Americans and later discovered by 
Spanish, French, and British explorers—a landscape that offered a seemingly endless 
supply of resources. 
The Wabash River and its tributaries were alluvial streams, meaning that they 
carried and deposited soil material and regularly overflowed their banks.  During this 
process, the soil along the banks was replenished with vital nutrients, and the river 
created a natural flood control system.  When the water rose above the banks, larger 
debris carried by the rushing water was deposited along the banks, thereby building up 
the banks to within inches of the crest.  The spreading water carried finer silt farther back 
from the banks.7   
The Native Americans “did not concern themselves with flood control.  They took 
conditions as they found them, and followed the path of least resistance.”8  This was not 
the case with the white newcomers, who coveted the fertile soil and flat land closest to 
the riverbanks.  This land seemed to them a prime location to grow crops and to satisfy 
transportation needs.  If the water did get a few inches over the bank of the river, these 
newcomers assumed the river could be held back with a small levee.  European settlers 
also saw the rich soil of the forests and believed that clearing the trees would provide fine 
locations for farm lands and towns.  Settlement proceeded without regulation of where a 
                                                 
7J. P. Kemper, Rebellious River: Use and Abuse of America’s Natural Resources (Boston: Bruce 
Humphries, Inc., 1949; reprint by permission of Branden Press Inc., New York: Arno Press, a New York 
Times Company, 1972), 28 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
8Ibid. 
7 
person could live or what he or she could do with the land.  The artificial grid pattern that 
divided the Northwest Territory further interfered with the landscape and imposed 
impossible boundaries on ecological systems.9 
The conflict between natural systems and white settlement played out in 
Indianapolis as well.  In 1820, when the commissioners to the legislature explored and 
surveyed the land that would later become Indianapolis, they believed they had found a 
location with excellent farming potential, a plentiful supply of fresh water, and a 
navigable river centrally located in the state.  The site was intersected by White River, 
Fall Creek, Eagle Creek, Pleasant Run, and Pogue’s Run.  One commissioner commented 
that the banks of White River were from 25 to 30 feet above the water, and the back 
country was high and dry with good soil.  Apparently, the year 1820 was a relatively dry 
year because Indianapolis residents’ battles with marshy lands and flooding problems 
began shortly after the city’s inception bringing into question the suitability of the 
location.  The new inhabitants of Indianapolis struggled to control and utilize the ample 
supply of water.10 
In the spring of 1821, the new capital city saw the first series of floods that would 
plague Indianapolis for many years.  The receding waters left stagnant ponds that 
provided breeding places for malaria-carrying mosquitoes.  In January 1847, a thaw and a 
heavy downpour of rain lasting several days “unleashed the full fury of the White River 
and Fall and Eagle Creeks.”  Tons of churning water carried away homes, tore out canal 
banks, and washed out whole sections of the National Road.  The 1847 flood was “far 
worse than the floods of 1828, [and] the town’s distress was so great that the legislators 
                                                 
9Ibid.; Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, s.v. “Urban Environment,” by Philip V. Scarpino, 199.  
10Dunn, 1:7. 
8 
extended the deadlines for payment of property taxes and remitted some.”11  Both major 
and minor floods continually occurred.  It is little wonder that many of the founders 
quickly began to view Indianapolis as “situated in a vast mud-hole which could never be 
dried up so as to be depended upon.”12  
The settlers viewed rivers and streams in contradictory terms, not uncommon to 
Americans more generally.  They expected White River and its tributaries to fill 
conflicting needs—clean water uses and waste disposal.  The water sources were 
absolutely necessary, yet they were not treated as such and were considered a nuisance 
when flooding occurred.  These tensions would become more significant as the city grew 
and developed in the century after 1820.  Similar to many other areas of the country, 
settlers in Indianapolis began by clearing the hardwood forests to make way for homes, 
barns, farm fields, and civic structures.  Clearing the forests, however, removed the 
natural drainage system, caused land erosion, and increased the volume of soil and debris 
obstructing river flow.  Landowners constructed levees to hold back the rivers during 
flood seasons, and city developers built bridges over the river and streams to aid 
transportation.  But, levees and bridges narrowed the natural flow of these waterways and 
changed the character of flood waters. 
As Indianapolis grew into a modern city, its citizens found alternative uses for the 
non-navigable White River.  These changes, made in the name of progress and 
improvement, held serious ramifications for both the river and residents.  For example, in 
the late nineteenth century, sanitary engineers designed the growing city’s sewer system 
                                                 
11Edward A. Leary, Indianapolis: The Story of a City, (Indianapolis/New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1971), 21 and 56. 
12Ibid., quoting from Catharine Merrill’s diary, 33.  See also Dunn, Vol. 1; Logan Esarey, A 
History of Indiana: From Its Exploration to 1850 (Indianapolis: Hoosier Heritage Press, Inc., 1970).  
9 
in the customary method so that waste flowed into the river.  Moreover, with its location 
on the National Road, at the “crossroads of America,” Indianapolis developed into a 
center for railroads, stockyards, and industry.  Property owners believed that the 
swampland close to White River was most profitable when devoted to these endeavors, 
resulting in overdevelopment and consumption of the fragile floodplain.  Simultaneous 
with growth in Indianapolis, agriculture and industry expanded upriver from Indianapolis.  
The river received the brunt of runoff and discharge from developing towns, businesses, 
and farms.  The character of the river was decidedly changing for the worse, as was 
clearly revealed during the disastrous “Great Flood” of 1913. 
The “Great Flood” affected the entire midwestern section of the United States and  
received national attention.  According to a United States Congressional report, the flood 
of 1913 stood out from its predecessors especially because of the exceptional magnitude 
and intensity of the storms and because the greatest damage occurred along tributaries, 
which in the past had not been the case.13  The United States Weather Bureau reported a 
rain total in Indianapolis in excess of six inches during the period beginning 23 March 
1913 through 27 March 1913.  While six inches of rain over a five day period is not an 
extraordinary amount, the Weather Bureau’s reports in the Indianapolis News indicate 
that this storm followed a month of unsettled weather patterns that alternated between 
freezes and thaws and a high amount of precipitation.  Furthermore, an unusually high 
amount of precipitation occurred in the month of January 1913.  The ground was 
saturated when this storm arrived.  According to the Weather Bureau, the flooding that 
                                                 
13A. H. Horton and H. J. Jackson, The Ohio Valley Flood of March-April, 1913 (Including 
Comparisons with Some Earlier Floods), House of Representatives, 63d Congress, 2d Session, Document 
Number 421, Water-Supply Paper 334, Department of Interior, United States Geological Survey, George 
Otis Smith, Director (Washington, D.C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1913), 47. 
10 
resulted “cost the lives of scores of people, rendered many thousands homeless, and 
destroyed property beyond estimate. . . .  The enormous losses over such an extended 
area is unprecedented in the history of this portion of the United States, and it must 
follow that an occurrence so unusual must have been produced by extraordinary weather 
conditions.”14   
While many sections of the city flooded in 1913, West Indianapolis was the area 
of the city hit hardest by that flood.  It was a recently-annexed suburb located southwest 
of downtown Indianapolis on the other side of White River.  Its borders were White River 
to the east, the Pennsylvania Railroad line to the north, Eagle Creek to the west, and 
Raymond Street to the south.  (See Figure 3.)  The low-lying area was inundated with 
overflows from both White River and Eagle Creek.  This viable community, so important 
to the early boosters and the eventual economic success of Indianapolis, was swallowed 
by the larger city and then slipped from view.  This case study of the “Great Flood” of 
1913 and its effects on West Indianapolis reveals how the relationship between city 
residents and the river impacted not only the environmental history but also the social 
fabric of the city.   
People and their environments are not separate, as environmental historian 
Richard White proves in The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River 
(1995).  This claim rings true for West Indianapolis, which was located on low-lying land 
at the bottom of a major developing urban center.  (See Figure 4.)  For years the waste 
from Indianapolis had been directed toward West Indianapolis, both by natural and  
                                                 
14Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau, The Flood on White River in March, 1913, by 
Verne H. Church, Section Director (Indianapolis, April 8, 1913), located at the Indiana State Library. 
11 
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engineered means.  After the 1913 flood, the community of West Indianapolis became 
intertwined with their bottomland environment on the fringes of the capital city. 
The 1913 flood was in part a natural occurrence, but the devastation from the 
flood in West Indianapolis was also an artifact of the city’s development and residents’ 
attitudes toward the use of the river.15  Flood waters contained the accumulation of years 
of human and industrial waste that washed through the city and was deposited in West 
Indianapolis.  Flooding resulted in unhealthy and disconnected areas of the city, shifts in 
social power, and other undesired and unintended cultural changes.  These outcomes 
were possible largely because of the nature of the relationship Indianapolis residents had 
with the river.   
In his classic work, The Culture of Cities, historian of urban planning, Lewis 
Mumford, calls the city a “geographic fact” and the river a “unifying agent.”16  Mumford 
notes that rivers initially provided transportation, then irrigation systems for crops and 
transportation canals for commerce; even the railroads usually clung to riverbanks.  In 
Indianapolis, White River unified the city in some ways—residents, business owners, and 
government alike considered the river non-navigable and believed that the river must be 
controlled through various means such as levees and straightening.  They expected the 
river to provide clean water, and they used the river as a dump.  These groups were 
united in their belief that the river must be controlled and manipulated to serve their 
needs.  But, in other ways, White River divided the city.  The land east of the river was at 
a higher elevation, and city founders selected this land for the original one-mile plat.  
City developers classified West Indianapolis, a suburb west of the river on low-lying 
                                                 
15Scarpino, 199. 
16Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York and London: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 
Inc., 1938; recopyrighted by Lewis Mumford, 1970), 316 (page citations are to the recopyrighted edition). 
14 
land, as the prime location for industry, railroads, stockyards, and the city dump.  The 
river that originally contributed to the selection of the site and unified the city’s 
inhabitants, developed into a dividing feature when, after years of manipulation and 
misuse, the river reaped repercussions.  The river was the littered battleground on which 
the environmental impact of human settlement played out.   
As Ari Kelman explains in A River and Its City: The Nature of Landscape in New 
Orleans (2003), the relationship between the residents of a city and the river is reciprocal.  
This interdependent relationship is the key understanding often missing when people 
perform actions in response to flooding, which in turn net unintended consequences.  The 
river, when manipulated by human actions, often behaves in undesirable, unforeseen 
ways, which prompts further modifications.  Thus, the relationship is formed.  The 
topography of Indianapolis was certainly susceptible to flooding prior to changes 
wrought by humans, but those human actions served to increase flooding problems, 
reflecting the interdependent relationship that existed between the river basin and its 
inhabitants. 
The contemporary field of environmental history emerged in the last third of the 
twentieth century and initially represented the political and intellectual history of the 
environmental movement, and its predecessor, the conservation movement.17  American 
scholars wrote about the importance of the human relationship with nature as early as 
1874 when George P. Marsh introduced his book, The Earth As Modified By Human 
Action; A New Edition of Man and Nature, in which he points to the connection between 
settlement patterns, such as deforestation, and increased flooding, erosion, and climate 
                                                 
17Richard White, “American Environmental History: The Development of a New Historical 
Field,”  Pacific Historical Review 54 (1985): 299-300. 
15 
changes.  Another compelling environmental study appeared in 1949 with J. P. Kemper’s 
book Rebellious River: Use and Abuse of America’s Natural Resources.  Both of these 
early environmental scholars asserted the interrelationship between people and nature.  
As Kemper illustrates, “there is no way to destroy energy. . . . In attempting to control 
floods in the past, the idea seems to have prevailed that the water had no rights and could 
be sloshed around any old way.”18  Certainly, White River was “sloshed around” in the 
name of improvement. 
The 1913 flood not only wreaked havoc on homes and personal belongings, but it 
also reworked the landscape of West Indianapolis and the identity of that community.  
The flood enforced the popular belief that the land was best suited for industry and low-
income housing.  After the flood waters receded from West Indianapolis in April 1913, it 
was as if the flood left a persistent stain on the reputation of that community.  The area 
nearest to White River, called the “Valley,” became undesirable.  The area contiguous to 
the Valley, called the “Hill,” became a place of refuge.  Flooding divided and labeled the 
community and, more importantly, the flood emphasized the disposable nature of this 
community.  Recurrent flooding in the Valley seemed to give politicians and planners 
license to resign the Valley to an environmentally unfriendly place.  The landscape in 
1821 existed as hardwood forests and swamps, changed to farmland and homes, then 
modest homes integrated with business and industry.  The flood highlighted the political 
ecological process of “environmental destruction” resulting from this pursuit of the most 
economically beneficial use of the land.19   
                                                 
18Kemper, 9.  
19See Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004), 96. 
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Negative social distinctions developed for residents of West Indianapolis 
following the 1913 flood, reflecting the stagnant ponds left behind.  Citizens of 
Indianapolis associated those living in West Indianapolis with the dirtiness and unhealthy 
conditions that existed in the aftermath of this monumental flood, and these feelings 
developed into a mixture of fear of and disassociation from West Indianapolis.  The 
stigma associated with West Indianapolis was not a simple matter of people wanting to 
distance themselves from the filth left behind by the flood.  This flood event did not 
occur without any history behind it.  Mumford reminds that “local history implies the 
history of larger communities to a much greater extent than national history implies the 
local community.  Every great event sweeps over the country like a wave; but it leaves its 
deposit behind in the life of the locality; and meanwhile that life goes on, with its own 
special history, its own special interests.”20  While one might attribute many of the 
changes that occurred in West Indianapolis to the nation’s industrial revolution of the late 
nineteenth century, the history of settlement and growth in Indianapolis tells a story of its 
own informative of the city’s flooding challenges.   
Chapter 1 lays the groundwork by looking at the development of the Wabash 
River Basin as a region to which West Indianapolis belongs.  A regional study offers a 
broader perspective of the multiple factors impacting the culture of a place and, 
consequently, the thinking behind approaches and responses to flooding.  The chapter 
also explores the non-navigable status of the regional rivers and the influence of this 
status on the inhabitants’ relationship with the rivers and their perception of flooding.  
                                                 
20Lewis Mumford, “The Value of Local History,” in The Pursuit of Local History: Readings on 
Theory and Practice, ed. Carol Kammen (Walnut Creek, California: AltaMira Press, A Division of Sage 
Publications, Inc., 1996), 87, reprinted from Lewis Mumford, “The Value of Local History,” Year Book 12 
(Poughkeepsie, NY: Dutchess County Historical Society, 1927): 22-26. 
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Then, by expanding into areas outside the region to explore flood prevention and 
responses from a regional perspective, this chapter contextualizes flooding and flood 
control issues in the White River Basin.  Unlike Indianapolis, flooding in these other 
locations has been the topic of scholarly writing and provides insight into events that 
occurred in West Indianapolis. 
Chapter 2 introduces and identifies some of the people of West Indianapolis—
who they were, where they came from, why they came, and what they did once they 
arrived.  Of course, there are great men who made a name for themselves in history 
books, but this study includes working men, working women, and children.  In addition, 
this chapter explores the relationship that the local people in West Indianapolis had with 
White River.  Finally, it establishes the social and cultural history of West Indianapolis 
prior to the 1913 flood in order to highlight the changes effectuated by the 1913 flood.   
The flood history of Indiana, including the “Great Flood” of 1913, is the topic of 
Chapter 3.  This chapter discusses the environmental impact and significance of flooding, 
by recounting the history of flooding in the White River Basin and actions taken to 
respond to and control flooding.  One specific issue addressed is why flooding created the 
“Valley” in West Indianapolis, an undesired and unintended negative identity, and 
reinforced a decline in conditions and a change in the cultural geography. 
Chapter 4 discusses the political ecology of West Indianapolis and the impact of 
geography on public policies.  If indeed public policies originate with the citizens of a 
place, then identifiable factors must have influenced the people of Indianapolis to initiate 
and lobby for adoption of policies that impacted their environment, including the river 
and flood control.  This chapter delves into the circumstances surrounding flood control 
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actions in Indianapolis and discusses how flood control and conservation policies 
affected the social and cultural history of West Indianapolis.  Negative press following 
the 1913 flood labeled the area, but the intrinsic geography and nascent public policies 
laid the foundation for that imposed identity.  Land sales that, in effect, drew migrating 
families to less than desirable areas, a court ruling that the river was non-navigable, 
unchecked settlement practices, imposition of political boundaries on natural systems, 
and uncoordinated flood control efforts helped construct that foundation. 
This study concludes that the relationship between people and the river created an 
unintended identity for West Indianapolis.  The combination of beliefs that resources 
were limitless, attitudes that nature could be controlled, and values rooted in economic 
success ultimately shaped the environment and meaning of the place.  The geography 
ensured the result.  Finally, this study examines the changes that occurred in West 
Indianapolis following the 1913 flood, including its isolation from the larger city. 
The period for this study begins with 1821, the year the state legislature 
established Indianapolis as the capital city of Indiana, because it was then that Indianans 
first imposed their values on the existing environment.  The study ends in 1923, ten years 
after the “Great Flood.”  The treatment is topical and chronological within each topic. 
Additional factors that impacted the environment of West Indianapolis are not 
covered, such as industrial air pollution or the results of the Interstate Highway Act.  
Focusing on flooding allows an in-depth examination of one aspect, and as already 
suggested, the interdependent nature of the environment means that one factor will 
impact the others.  Without one, there would not be the other; each simply adds another 
facet to the story. 
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CHAPTER 1: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Interconnectedness is the sinister companion of chaos. . . . 
--Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and Method” 
The Wabash River Basin includes 33,000 square miles covering 68 percent of the 
state of Indiana, 16 percent of the state of Illinois, and a small fraction of the state of 
Ohio.  The Wabash River rises in Ohio thirty miles east of the Indiana border, then 
stretches in a westerly direction across the northern portion of Indiana through Peru until 
it veers southwesterly toward Lafayette.  From there, the river flows through Covington 
and Terre Haute before creating the border between the states of Illinois and Indiana and 
then joining the Ohio River at the confluence of the states of Indiana, Illinois, and 
Kentucky.21  Some of its larger tributaries include the Little Wabash River, Embarrass 
River, White River, Tippecanoe River, Eel River, Salamonie River, and Mississinewa 
River.22  (See Figure 1 on page 2.) 
This chapter explores flooding from a regional perspective and seeks to answer 
the following questions: What factors made the Wabash River Basin a region?  How did 
the region play a part in the relationship that formed between people and the rivers?  Did 
a regional mindset contribute to flooding issues?  How do responses to flooding in one 
region differ from the responses in another region?  The information presented discloses 
                                                 
21The Wabash River formed the downstate border between Illinois and Indiana until the flood of 
June 2008 when the river carved a new channel and created an island of 1,700 acres at the southwestern tip 
of the state of Indiana.  Geographers expect the oxbow of the river’s original path to dry up so that these 
1,700 acres of Indiana will lie on the other side of the Wabash River.  As the journalist notes, “the land’s 
reshaping supplies a lesson in the power of a river to change lives, play havoc with tax and title records, 
and shake a citizenry’s grasp of geography.”  Jeff Swiatek, “Changing Channels,” Indianapolis Star, 11 
September 2008.    
22Ronald R. Boyce, ed., Regional Development and the Wabash Basin (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1964), v and 9. 
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how Indianapolis and the West Indianapolis suburb were part of a larger regional system 
that influenced the perception of and identity assigned to the rivers in the region. 
One significant source informing this chapter is a series of papers prepared by 
members of the Wabash Valley Advisory Committee, a group formed in the late 1950s, 
chaired by Professor Harold W. Hannah, University of Illinois, with representatives from 
Indiana and Illinois universities and state agencies.  The committee’s tasks were to 
explore why regional development in the basin lagged behind neighboring regions and 
discover possibilities for future development.  Although the committee intended to focus 
on economic, agricultural, industrial, and recreational development, the topics of water 
resource planning, water conflicts, and water management naturally permeated the study.  
In introducing the committee’s findings, Ronald R. Boyce reports that water in the 
Wabash River Basin is considered “more a problem . . . than an asset,” evidenced by the 
fact that during the period from 1875 to 1955, fifteen “major” floods occurred on the 
Wabash, with average annual flood damage amounts of several million dollars.23 
Professor Hannah explains that “water and its physical behavior . . . provide the 
unifying factor which makes a river basin and its various watersheds an entity.”24  The 
river basin functions as an entity from the perspective of the ecologically interdependent 
relationship of each of its features.  Looking at the whole, the Wabash River Basin is a 
landscape of wetlands, hardwood forests, rich soil, the river and its many tributaries, and 
a climate abundant with rain and rapidly changing weather conditions.  If the wetlands 
are drained, for example, the hardwood forests will experience a decline.  The basin not 
                                                 
23Ibid., 42.  Note that the flood damage amounts are stated in terms of the value of the dollar in 
1953 based on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisville, Interim Report on the Wabash Basin and 
Tributaries at and About White River, Indiana (1955), 55-57. 
24Ibid., vi. 
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only functions as an interconnected entity, but it also plays an instrumental role in the 
lives of its inhabitants.  Because of this crucial relationship, the region for purposes of 
this study of flooding is defined as the Wabash River Basin.   
The Wabash River Basin’s site includes a varied topography, with a flat to gently 
undulating northern portion and a rolling and rougher southern portion.  It is situated in 
America’s agricultural heartland, in the manufacturing belt, at the “crossroads of 
America,” and in close proximity to major metropolises, such as Indianapolis, Chicago, 
Detroit, Dayton, Cincinnati, Louisville, and St. Louis.  (See Figure 5.)  According to the 
study conducted by the Wabash Valley Advisory Committee, the situation of the Wabash 
River Basin allowed it to “far exceed the national average in terms of population density, 
industrial output, income per capita, and many other criteria of regional importance.”25  
Therefore, the region’s site and situation have played a significant role in defining its 
successes, challenges, and culture.26 
The Wabash River Basin “is best viewed as a region of contrasts,” because of the 
varied topography and the resulting irregular economic development.  Compared to the 
northern portion of the region, which includes the Indiana state capital of Indianapolis, 
the southern portion has faced the most challenges in terms of agricultural success, 
industrial development, and flood control.  This diversity has challenged regional 
planners when making important decisions such as placement of reservoirs and additional 
industry.27  Regardless of the contrasts that existed in the region, flooding was one  
                                                 
25Ibid., 10-11. 
26Lewis, 19-20.  Urban geographer Pierce F. Lewis introduced the terms “site” and “situation” to 
conceptualize the role of a city’s landscape.  Lewis defines “site” as the actual real estate which the city 
occupies and “situation” as the place with respect to neighboring places. 
27Boyce, 11. 
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Figure 5.  Location of the Wabash River Basin. Regional Development and the 
Wabash Basin, ed. Ronald R. Boyce (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 
1964), 10. 
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common denominator.  One might argue that the topography of the region dictated this 
result. 
The “Great Flood” of 1913 was a disaster that affected the entire midwestern 
portion of the United States.  The storm that began in Nebraska slowly marched across 
the country leaving destroyed towns in its wake.  In economic terms, the Wabash River 
Basin incurred costs associated with this flood in the amount of $29,658,000.28  Although 
some categorized the storm and resulting flood as a “natural” disaster or an “act of God,” 
the extent of the flood damage was exacerbated by human actions.  This chapter looks at 
how the Wabash River Basin constituted and functioned as a region and whether these 
human actions were undertaken within a regional mindset.  Studying the various facets of 
the Wabash River Basin together reveals that people in the region shared certain attitudes 
toward nature and the rivers that spawned a flooding disaster in 1913. 
Regionalism  
Taking a step back to view history from a regional perspective contributes 
additional meaning and significance.  Instead of focusing on one city within the region 
and floods that impacted that single place, taking a look at the region gathers important 
information for an interconnected area.  Geographer Terry G. Jordan argues in favor of 
regional studies for students because regional classifications simplify reality to enable 
learning about the world while “avoiding lapses into pure description.”  According to 
Jordan, the concept of regionalism “may be a universal, inborn human way of looking at 
                                                 
28Ibid., 42.  Note that the flood damage amount is stated in terms of the value of the dollar in 1953 
based on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisville, Interim Report on the Wabash Basin and Tributaries 
at and About White River, Indiana (1955), 55-57. 
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the earth”—a way to control the chaos.29  Jordan is concerned with making geographic 
connections to bring some logic to the forefront.  Certainly, a major flood creates chaos 
that begs for logical explanation. 
Historians’ purpose in regional studies is to combine disciplines to come to a 
greater understanding of the history of a place.  Susan H. Armitage points out that “we 
historians owe our particular usage of the term regionalism to Frederick Jackson Turner,” 
whose frontier thesis exploring “the uniquely American traits of individualism and 
democracy” arrived on the scene in 1893.30  Armitage notes that Turner and other early 
regional historians focused on the dominant groups, excluding groups on the periphery.  
More recently, “thanks to historians’ growing awareness of the work of historical 
geographers and the very rapid growth of environmental history, our definitions of 
regionalism are getting much more precise.”31   
Similar to geographers, historians typically conceptualize regionalism as the study 
of pertinent relationships: between people and the land, or between the region and other 
areas (i.e., other regions or the nation).  Connecting people with the land, Donald Worster 
provides an insightful explanation of regionalism:   
The history of the region is first and foremost one of an evolving human 
ecology [emphasis added].  A region emerges as people try to make a 
living from a particular part of the earth, as they adapt themselves to its 
limits and possibilities.  What the regional historian should first want to 
know is how a people or peoples acquired a place and, then, how they 
perceived and tried to make use of it.32 
                                                 
29Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay of Land and 
People, ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1992), 9. 
30Susan H. Armitage, “Gender and Regionalism,” in Lich, 85; Richard Jensen, “On Modernizing 
Frederick Jackson Turner: The Historiography of Regionalism,” Western Historical Quarterly 11, no. 3 
(1980): 309. 
31Armitage, 85. 
32Donald Worster, “New West, True West: Interpreting the Region’s History,” Western Historical 
Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1987): 149 (italics added), quoted in Armitage, 85-86. 
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Bringing ecology into the explanation emphasizes the interconnected relationship 
between not only people and the land, but also the impact actions taken by one person 
living in a region will have for other regional inhabitants. 
Regional historians not only proclaim the opportunities offered by regional 
studies, but they also caution that these studies can be elusive.  Regionalism establishes a 
framework for “studying without separating what nature, history, and culture have put 
together” and recognizing the complement of “local and global, regional and national, the 
particular and the universal.”  These are “not antithetical concepts.”33  However, 
ascertaining all the factors that created a regional culture may not be possible.  As John 
Lauritz Larson points out,  
What shaped the culture on American frontiers like pioneer Indiana was 
an inherently historical process governed by people and place and also 
dreams and ambitions that reflected as clearly the times and the terms of 
settlement as the determinative landscape or the cultural baggage brought 
by the pioneers.34 
Although elusive, the existence of regional culture is clear.  Cultural landscapes take on 
clear character even though they are the result of decisions of innumerable individuals.35 
Lending another view of regionalism, many historians have focused on regional 
identity as something derived from outside forces.  Andrew R. L. Cayton and Susan E. 
Gray state that 
regionality was a cultural and political expression of peripheral status 
transformed into boasts of moral superiority and demands for a greater, 
territorially specific voice in national government.  Regional communities 
                                                 
33Jim Wayne Miller, “Anytime the Ground is Uneven: The Outlook for Regional Studies and 
What to Look Out For,” in Geography and Literature: A Meeting of the Disciplines, ed. William E. 
Mallory and Paul Simpson-Housley (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 17, quoted in Glen 
E. Lich, “Spatial Integration: The Argument for Context,” in Lich, 170. 
34John Lauritz Larson, “Pigs in Space; or, What Shapes America’s Regional Cultures?” in The 
American Midwest: Essays on Regional History, ed. Andrew R. L. Cayton and Susan E. Gray 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 70. 
35Rapoport, 178, 137. 
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emerged among people who felt excluded or potentially excluded from the 
national discourse and the national patronage trough, and who found in 
their shared alienation a way of demanding recognition of their special 
attributes.36   
This connection of region to other entities harkens back to Turner’s frontier thesis.  Just 
as “a frontier cannot be defined except in some kind of relationship to a nation or to an 
international political or economic nexus,” historians have argued that the same is true for 
a region.  Historians that ascribe to this concept of region believe that the region “takes 
its definition from the fact that it is part of something larger—most often a nation.”37 
Taking a regional history approach, however, is not without a unique set of 
challenges.  The first methodological problem is determining “what is merely perceived 
and what is real when one discusses region and regionalism,” which leads to the second 
problem of determining “why the perceived region or regional culture [is] sometimes a 
more powerful concept than the actual geographic region.”38  Howard R. Lamar notes 
that, in The Great Plains, Walter Prescott Webb 
hit on a fundamental characteristic of a people living in a particular place 
over time: inevitably they try to rationalize the landscape and the social 
and economic conditions in which they find themselves.  The image could 
be either favorable or negative, and it could equally well be more 
inaccurate than accurate, but a sense of distinctive place and/or 
community—or what is lacking to prevent that sense—usually comes 
sooner or later.39   
To “achieve a depth of analysis” and “acknowledge the degrees of complexity and 
the multiple factors that some scholars may feel is necessary in serious regional studies,” 
Lamar recommends a method from William Cronon—the “layered look”—which 
                                                 
36Andrew R. L. Cayton and Susan E. Gray, The American Midwest: Essays on Regional History 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 8-9. 
37Jerome O. Steffen, Comparative Frontiers: A Proposal for Studying the American West 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), ix-xix, quoted in Howard R. Lamar, “Regionalism and the 
Broad Methodological Problem,” in Lich, 26. 
38Ibid., 25. 
39Ibid. 
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“identif[ies] and stud[ies] a series of overlapping entities which, taken together, define a 
region.”  For example, a layered look might include a look at federal-regional relations, 
urban-rural relations, environmental issues, economic studies, transportation concerns, 
demographics, regional literature, public rhetoric, and art.  Lamar raises the question we 
may be asking ourselves: “how does one evaluate all of these factors in relation to one 
another?”  He offers in response that “one answer is to take a comparative approach.”40 
Regional studies translate into making connections that may not otherwise be 
apparent.  The concept of regionalism has been explored, discussed, and challenged by 
geographers, planners, and historians.  Is regionalism “real”?  How can a regional culture 
possibly develop?  Is a regional culture just perceptual, either by the people in the region 
or from those outside?  To answer these questions, historians have suggested ways to 
approach the topic—comparisons, layering, documentary evidence, etc.  Historians have 
debated the validity of the concept since 1893, yet they continue to agree that regional 
studies add an opportunity to raise our level of understanding. 
Noting these concepts and guidelines for a regional study, this chapter first 
explores the different “layers” of the Wabash River Basin to achieve a depth of analysis 
of the relationship between people, the landscape, and in particular, the rivers.  Secondly, 
this chapter compares flooding responses in the Wabash River Basin with those in other 
regions.   
The Wabash River Basin 
Jordan explains three possible ways of defining regions: formal regions (an area 
that “displays homogeneity of one or more traits”); vernacular regions (an area in which 
the inhabitants have a “broadly perceived regional self-consciousness”—they “believe 
                                                 
40Ibid., 26. 
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that the region exists”); and functional regions (such as a state, a school district, or a 
newspaper’s sales area).41  The Wabash River Basin is both a formal region and a 
functional region.  The area is drained by the Wabash River with an interdependent 
landscape.  The river is the focal point that coordinates its functionality.  The Wabash 
River Basin is also a vernacular region.  The people living in the basin do not verbally 
identify with the region, but they have bought into a “regional self-consciousness” of 
living near a river that is not navigable.  Throughout the region, whether a person lives 
along the banks of a river or miles away, the rivers do not provide an avenue for 
connecting with other regions.  This realization of the non-navigable status of rivers may 
exist only subconsciously; nonetheless, it is one of the defining features of the region. 
The Wabash River Basin is situated within the larger Midwest region.  One could 
simply talk about the basin in terms of that widely accepted region.  For purposes of this 
study, the Midwest would be overwhelming because it encompasses a multitude of 
subregions—states, plains, mountains, lakes, major river valleys.  Furthermore, the 
Midwest as a region shifts, depending on your perception, to include states that arguably 
should be considered part of the South or the West.42  Defining and focusing this regional 
study on the Wabash River Basin accomplishes several goals.  First, the region becomes 
more manageable and localized.  Second, the region is defined by a river basin that is 
ecologically crucial to its inhabitants.  Third, the river basin directs attention to this 
study’s overarching concern with the relationship between people and the rivers in their 
communities. 
                                                 
41Jordan, 16-22. 
42James R. Shortridge, The Middle West: Its Meaning in American Culture (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1989), 1-12. 
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To set the stage, a brief explanation of the emergence of a midwestern story of 
region is in order.  As early as the 1840s and 1850s, distinct regional stories existed in 
America.  New Englanders associated with a “cozy world of pastoralism and domesticity, 
of white steeples and village greens, safe from the intrusions of urban hustle and 
working-class Catholics.”  White southerners created a “tale around the issue of slavery, . 
. . by celebrating the peculiar institution as the bedrock of a more humane society than 
that of Northern industrial cities.”43  The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 created a new 
region that was populated by people who migrated westward from the eastern states and 
northward from southern states and immigrated from western Europe.   
How could regionalism possibly develop for this diverse group of people?  
Contrary to a common, present-day perception of the Midwest, Cayton and Gray note 
that 
many people saw the Midwest as malleable, as a place of liberation from 
tradition and a source of enormous energy for change, both of which were 
made possible by a unique combination of place, capitalism, and 
nationalism. . . . Shakers, Mormons, English reformers, African 
Americans and a host of others tried to mold parts of the landscape to their 
purposes.  Often harassed by their neighbors, they were nonetheless part 
of the extraordinary complexity of life in the region.44  
The region began as a land of comparative foreignness in language, food, customs, and 
religion as people with different backgrounds merged with a common goal.  Unlike New 
England and the South, the Midwest did not strive for individuality and alienation.  
Instead, the region identified with the market economy and nationalism.45   
The story that resulted was one of “energy and optimism” and “rapid and 
inexorable progress.”  As Cayton and Gray describe it, “exaggerated and contested, the 
                                                 
43Cayton and Gray, 9. 
44Ibid., 10. 
45Ibid., 5-10. 
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story of the Old Northwest was a narrative of success: We came, we saw, we conquered, 
we improved, we are deservedly enjoying the fruits of our labor.”46  Midwesterners 
adopted a theme of tenacity and hope.  The landscape in the region was harsh, but instead 
of slavery, as in the South, midwesterners boasted the availability of honest, hard work 
for everyone.  This was an “honorable” claim that midwesterners were proud to tout and 
which they believed distinguished them from other regions. 
Cultural ideas of pastoralism are typically associated with the Midwest.  Indiana 
historians are wont to portray the state as conservative, traditional, and unchanging.  
While working for Conner Prairie Pioneer Settlement, a living history museum north of 
Indianapolis, John Lauritz Larson saw a central problem with interpretation at such a 
venue--that the American frontier did not have a “folk culture” extending back for 
generations as did the Scandinavian museums after which Conner Prairie had been 
modeled.  The American Midwest was too new; its “regional culture was the product of a 
complex process that had only just begun in Indiana in 1836.”  In trying to discern the 
regional culture, the museum interpreters needed to look for “something very recently 
conceived, still embryonic, and scarcely viable.”47  Larson colorfully explains that  
the American frontier by 1800 was peopled by light-footed men and 
women who claimed for themselves the right to invent a new life, a new 
kind of community, one that may or may not reflect the habits and 
folkways to which they were born.  Americans played with unpredictable 
cards, the deck shuffled by acts of immigration and stuffed full of jokers 
dealt by a revolution that promised literal self-creation to all who believed 
in and swore allegiance to the new republican experiment.  What did this 
mean to a restless, mobile, semi-subsistence population wandering 
ungoverned (perhaps ungovernable?) through trackless interior forests?48 
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47Larson, 70. 
48Ibid. 
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Turning to the more specific history of the Wabash River Basin, is there a distinct 
culture that grew from the mixture of people and place?  What is the place that history 
created?  A regional narrative with a focus on flooding in the Wabash River Basin will 
explain how regionalism contributed to the change over time.  While Indiana and Illinois 
historians mention flooding on the Wabash River and tributaries when recounting state 
history, flooding has not been their focus. 
Indiana historians have noted that the region is “blessed” with natural resources, 
including water.  In Indiana in Transition (1968) Clifton J. Phillips describes Indiana as 
possessing “an almost inexhaustible plenitude of natural wealth in its soil, forests, lakes, 
rivers, and streams, as well as beneath the surface of the earth.”49  Below the ground, 
Indiana possessed coal, natural gas, petroleum, limestone, clay, sand, and mineral waters.  
These resources drew settlers and entrepreneurs to the state.   
Hardwood lumber production in the state began as an important industry, with the 
state ranking as the fifth highest producer of hardwood boards in the country in 1879.  
Production peaked in 1899 when 1,036,999 board feet were produced by Indiana lumber 
companies, but notably, by 1904, production plummeted to 563,853 board feet because of 
dwindling resources.50  Private citizens and scientists organized to stop deforestation of 
the state, noting the effect on soil erosion and flooding.  Professor Glenn Culbertson of 
Hanover College spoke at an Indiana Academy of Science conference in 1908 on the 
topic of “Deforestation and Its Effects among the Hills of Southern Indiana” and called 
                                                 
49Clifton J. Phillips, Indiana in Transition: The Emergence of an Industrial Commonwealth, 1880-
1920 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau and Indiana Historical Society, 1968), 181. 
50Ibid., 214, compiled from R. V. Reynolds and A. H. Pierson, Lumber Cut of the United States 
1870-1920 (United States Department of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 1119, 1923), 30-33, and Henry B. Steer, 
Lumber Production in the United States, 1799-1946 (United States Department of Agriculture, 
Miscellaneous Publication No. 669, 1948), 11-13. 
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for “planting tens of thousands of acres of trees in southern Indiana at state expense.”  
The efforts of Culbertson and other key individuals, such as John P. Brown of 
Connersville, who published the journal Arboriculture, and Professor Stanley Coulter of 
Purdue University, a botanist and active member of the State Board of Forestry, led to the 
Indiana General Assembly officially designating Arbor Day as an annual celebration in 
1913.51 
While notable accomplishments were made to reverse exploitation of natural 
resources in some areas, such as forestry, entrepreneurs used other natural resources until 
gone.  When one resource no longer produced a profit, entrepreneurs moved on to other 
resources.  Geologists estimated that more of Indiana’s natural gas supply was wasted 
than judiciously used.52  Drillers found natural gas in 1876 at Eaton (near Muncie) which 
developed into a full-blown boom by late 1886.  Indiana historian Peter T. Harstad tells 
of the spectacular events associated with “bringing in of a well”: 
. . . especially when it was accomplished by dropping nitroglycerin down 
the drilled-out hole and igniting it.  When the result was a roar of 
pressurized gas, belches of smoke, and flames taller than elms, Sunday 
afternoon audiences went home delighted. . . . 
At Anderson a flaming archway spanned the street near the train 
depot.  Gas was also pumped into the White River and ignited so that a 
gigantic flambeau appeared to burn out of the water. . . .53 
Natural gas production peaked in 1900, but the supply quickly diminished.  By 1906 
production was less than a quarter of that in 1900.   
This cycle of boom and bust is significant in the history of Indiana 
industrialism—Indianans simply adjusted and moved on to the next big thing.  At that 
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point in time, the next big thing was automobiles.  Elwood Haynes, who was “a science 
teacher caught up in the gas boom at Portland, Indiana,” provides one example.  Haynes 
invented a meter for specific use with the natural gas business, and he continued this 
entrepreneurial trend by building an automobile, patenting alloys, and becoming 
Kokomo’s foremost industrialist.54 
The economic history of Indiana also echoes this cycle of boom and bust.  In the 
early 1800s Indiana farmers and townspeople benefited from access to markets beyond 
the state and region.  This access was possible via keelboats traveling the Wabash River 
and tributaries to connect with the Ohio River and Mississippi River.  The Wabash River 
Basin, however, did not have easy access to the Great Lakes as did people in the northern 
reaches of the state.  Thus was born the Mammoth Internal Improvements Act of 1836, 
which “called for alteration of Indiana’s drainage system with canals, locks, aqueducts, 
and dams to make the major river systems navigable and provide outlets to Lake 
Michigan and Lake Erie.”  Indiana made plans to construct the Wabash and Erie Canal 
that would provide a connecting route from Lake Erie to the Ohio River.  Construction on 
the canal began near Fort Wayne, Indiana, in 1832 after a series of delays to obtain land 
grants and employ the necessary engineers and thousands of Irish immigrant workers.  
The project expanded after completing a short section of the canal between Fort Wayne 
and Huntington, with Indiana passing the Mammoth Internal Improvements Act of 1836, 
incurring significant bond debt, and in typical Indiana style, celebrating profusely.55   
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The “scheme,” financed by a ten-million-dollar loan, bankrupted the state after 
the economic Panic of 1837.  According to Paul Fatout, the plan was “conceived in 
madness and nourished by delusion.”56  Interest alone on the borrowed money amounted 
to ten times the state’s revenues from taxes.  Harstad claims that “men and money 
succumbed to the environment.  The resulting political and fiscal embarrassment affected 
Indiana permanently.”57  Indiana legislators changed the constitution in 1851 to prohibit 
the state from contracting debt, except to correct “casual” revenue deficits, pay interest 
on existing debt, to repel invasion or suppress insurrection, or if threatened, to provide 
public defense.  The state did complete the Wabash and Erie Canal as far as Evansville in 
1853, “making it the longest canal in the country.” Although the “southern section was 
often inoperable and never attracted much traffic,” the section above Terre Haute 
provided an “important gateway for shipping agriculture products to northeastern 
markets.”58 
Indiana lagged behind other states in the Old Northwest (especially Illinois and 
Ohio) in terms of industrialization.  But, Indiana’s “growing network of rail 
transportation, together with accumulating knowledge and increased exploitation of its 
natural resources” set the stage for later rapid expansion of the industrial sector of the 
economy.59  The gap between gross value of agricultural products and the value added by 
manufacture was finally virtually closed in the federal census year 1920 (reflecting the 
production year of 1919).  Phillips attributes the emergence of Indiana as a leading 
industrial state to the following four major factors: 
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(1) large quantities of agricultural and forestry products which furnish the 
raw materials for manufactures; (2) deposits of mineral resources, 
especially abundant and cheap fuels such as coal, natural gas, and 
petroleum . . .; (3) excellent transportation facilities with a dense network 
of railroads crisscrossing the state . . .; (4) Indiana’s fortunate geographic 
location at or near the center of the population of the United States and 
directly in the path of a large share of east-west commerce, with wide 
access to markets.60 
Changes in methods and the nature of manufacturing also contributed to Indiana’s 
growing economic successes at the turn of the twentieth century.  Sources for power 
switched from water to steam, and eventually to electrical, increasing horsepower and 
production possibilities.  Production shifted from processing local raw materials to 
manufacturing durable goods.  The third change was a regional shift.  In the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, the early manufacturing centers along the Ohio River declined 
in importance, and the central and northern counties became more heavily industrialized.  
Unfortunately for the economy of the Wabash River Basin, this shift continued 
northward.  By 1914 East Chicago in Lake County ranked second in the state based on 
the value of its manufactured products, ahead of older industrial cities such as South 
Bend, Evansville, Fort Wayne, and Terre Haute.  By 1919 Indianapolis held onto first 
place, but Gary took second place.  Other important industrial cities by 1919 were 
Hammond, Anderson, Kokomo, Michigan City, Muncie, Mishawaka, Elkhart, Marion, 
Richmond, and La Porte, reflecting the northward movement.61 
Slaughtering and meat packing was the leading industry in Indiana by 1899.  
Although Hammond, Indiana, was the earliest center for this type of enterprise, when J. 
Ogden Armour moved operations to Chicago in 1903, Indianapolis became the new 
center.  The Union stockyards and facilities, such as Kingan and Company, were located 
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southwest of downtown Indianapolis near White River.  Industries related to flour and 
gristmill products also boosted the economy.  Indiana was second to New York in 
production of starch in 1889 and 1899.  The National Starch Manufacturing Company, 
which according to William F. Piel, Jr., vice president of the corporation, controlled 
about 65 percent of the American market, also set up shop southwest of downtown 
Indianapolis on the banks of White River.  Tin, paper, strawboard, and automobiles were 
some of the other important early industries.62 
Who were the people who came to Indiana, and how do they contribute to an 
understanding of the region?  Certainly, opportunities to start a business or find 
employment with the plethora of existing industries drew people to the state.  Indiana 
Governor Thomas R. Marshall (Democrat, 1909-1913) observed that “the Hoosier did not 
come from another planet, nor even from another continent.”  Harstad notes that 
Marshall’s assessment agreed with the United States census and modern scholarship.  
Most Hoosiers up to 1850 came from eastern states, but the National Road seemed to 
serve as a dividing line distinguishing the demographics in the northern portion of the 
state from the southern portion.  Settlers in the southern portion came largely from 
Virginia, the Carolinas, and Kentucky, while northern settlers came from New England, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.  Southern settlers were “southern in thought” and 
“quite inclined to let well enough alone.”  Northern settlers were more typically “liberty-
loving” and “always experimenting.”63 
Harstad explains that in 1850 southern-born settlers in Indiana “comprised 44.0 
percent of the population . . . far above the average of 28.3 percent for the Old Northwest 
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as a whole,” representing a sharp contrast between the demographics of Indiana and the 
rest of the Old Northwest.64  Indiana’s population was decidedly more southern in origin; 
however, “some of the people who migrated northward into Indiana did so . . . to escape 
certain features of southern civilization.”  For example, the population included fugitive 
and emancipated slaves (11,000 in the 1850 census) and Quakers from North Carolina.65   
Whites who entered the state were predominantly farmers and by 1850 occupied 
the entire state, except the Kankakee Swamp, with a population of at least six people per 
square mile.66  Harstad describes the result, as follows: 
These people altered forever the natural community of living plants and 
animals by felling centuries-old trees, plowing the earth, and replacing the 
native fauna with bovines, swine, horses, and sheep of European origin.  
They planted a mixed bag of seeds and tubers that plant geneticists had 
developed over a period of centuries on both sides of the Atlantic. . . . By 
the end of the century they were plowing, planting, cultivating, and 
harvesting with increasingly efficient implements manufactured in the 
region . . .67 
Indiana’s foreign-born population grew from 54,426 in 1850 to 141,474 by 1870, and 
peaked at 159,663 in 1910, but the foreign-born never comprised more than 10 percent of 
the total population.  In 1850 more than 50 percent of the foreign-born population was 
German, so that homogeneity existed even among the foreign-born.  Second to German 
immigrants were Irish immigrants.68  James H. Madison claims that 
this population homogeneity was central to many aspects of the state’s 
history, doubtless helping to reduce conflict and to make change more 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary or disruptive, to give Hoosiers a 
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propensity to conserve and to cling to traditions rather than adopt radically 
new political, economic, or social arrangements.69 
The political history of the Wabash River Basin can best be described as a mix of 
conservatism and progressivism that blended into moderation.  Indiana Governor Samuel 
M. Ralston (Democrat, 1913-1917) is often quoted as saying, “the citizenship of Indiana 
has, in truth and in fact, always been conservatively progressive.”70  Illinois and Indiana, 
the two states that share the majority of the Wabash River Basin, are part of the larger 
section known historically as the Old Northwest, which originated from a common 
charter, the Northwest Ordinance.  Daniel J. Elazar offers further insight on this 
commonality in “Influences on Political Values and the Wabash Basin” (1964): 
The majority of the present political institutions and attitudes present 
within the Wabash Valley states have developed from the early settlers’ 
applications of the charter’s provisions to local conditions at the time of 
settlement and from the additions to that pattern engendered through the 
addition of various cultural “currents,” both American and European, 
whose representatives have settled in the various parts of the section.71   
Indiana was a “swing state” for national politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries leading to many incidents of political corruption and raucous campaigns.  
According to Madison, “politics gave Indianans a common interest and bond, a 
distinctive culture to claim as their own.”72  Elazar notes several competing factors that 
affected the political culture and contributed to Indiana’s “swing state” reputation: the 
blend of north and south mentalities in the Wabash River Basin, conflicts brought by “the 
advancing urban-industrial frontier,” the political culture of the Ohio Valley where 
“politics is a system of favors, friendships, and rewards, in which ‘issues,’ as such, are 
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unimportant,” and the higher than average multiplicity of governments (i.e., state, 
counties, districts, townships, and cities) present in the Wabash River Basin.73 
Despite the active politics of Illinois and Indiana, the position of the basin itself 
negatively affected the political culture and became a “handicap” for the region.  In many 
respects, the basin has been isolated from the Midwest section’s larger concerns.  Except 
in the basin’s northeastern reaches, it is not the home of either big business or big labor.  
Ethnically and racially, it is more homogeneous than the Midwest section as a whole.  It 
lacks major urban centers, and it is not the scene of much urban-rural conflict.  Elazar 
concludes that “in practical political terms, being out of harmony with one’s section 
means lack of ‘leverage’ in the political process.”74   
When the Wabash Valley Advisory Committee completed its study of the basin in 
the early 1960s, the committee discovered that most efforts to develop the basin had 
occurred in the southern reaches.  For example, when residents in the Embarrass River 
Basin counties in Illinois had been contacted to generate support for flood prevention that 
would benefit them, they were only interested in finding a solution for their own 
problems instead of participating in area-wide improvements.  Similarly, residents in the 
northeastern portion of the basin had been “conspicuously absent” from organized basin-
wide activities.  The committee report concludes that these real-life examples provide 
“common-sense evidence” that “fundamental socio-political differences” exist and result 
in barriers when organizing basin developments.75   
Analysis of the political culture in Indiana reveals another convoluted layer to add 
to any understanding of the Wabash River Basin.  Madison quips that “Indiana’s political 
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traditions were still waters that ran deep and were not easily diverted even if storms 
roughed the surface.”76  There is certainly a depth to Indiana’s political culture that 
deserves more exploration than can be covered in this study. 
The characteristics of midwestern culture are evident in the Wabash River 
Basin—tenacity, hopefulness, honesty, and a strong work ethic can be used to generally 
describe the region’s inhabitants.  While it may not be possible to claim that there is a 
distinct regional culture attributable to the Wabash River Basin, the layers studied portray 
common beliefs, attitudes, and values with regard to natural resources.  People in the 
region tended to use natural resources until exhausted, and they viewed the rivers as an 
obstacle to battle and overcome.  A dichotomy existed between basin inhabitants and 
nature wherein people needed the resources for livelihood (e.g., drinking water and raw 
materials for manufacturing) but abused those same resources to the point of 
endangerment.  By the end of the nineteenth century, White River no longer provided 
potable water and hardwood forests had been nearly depleted resulting in land erosion 
and increased drainage and flooding problems.   
Rivers in the Basin 
Another characteristic of the Wabash River Basin is the commercially non-
navigable status of its rivers.  Arguably, a navigable river system would join together 
river basin residents, business owners, and politicians to ensure the continued success of 
the river.  People would work together not only to maintain the bottoms and banks for 
navigation, but also possibly to protect the river from pollution, to conserve floodwaters 
for irrigation, and to develop the river basin for hydropower needs.  One might assume 
that a navigable river becomes an important component of the affected society and is 
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recognized as crucial to its livelihood, if not survival.  If a river is not navigable, the 
relationship between people living in the basin and the river has different dimensions. 
By early nineteenth century standards, the Wabash River and many of its 
tributaries were navigable by means of canoes and flatboats.  With the advent of 
steamboats, the river’s navigability came into question.  Indianans were not too 
concerned because they had turned their focus and hopes toward the possibility of a 
fabricated river.  As Madison records, “the success of New York’s Erie Canal, completed 
in 1825, sparked a canal boom in the Old Northwest.”77  But, the economic depression 
that began in 1837 stopped the canal projects and bankrupted the state.  Madison asserts 
that “Indiana’s reputation suffered a blow that stung long after the wooden canal boats 
and locks had rotted.”78 
Neither natural rivers nor fabricated rivers satisfied the transportation and 
economic needs of the Wabash River Basin.  Roads and railways brought much greater 
success.  The National Road was completed through Indiana in the 1830s, linking Indiana 
to the East Coast and eventually to the west.  The Michigan Road connected Michigan 
City, Indiana, at the northwestern border to Madison, Indiana, at the southeastern border 
by 1836, but these early roads were rough.79  In 1848, a letter written from Indianapolis 
to LaPorte humorously warned that “the roads are not now navigable and this [letter] may 
be long in reaching you.”80  By the mid-1850s, “eighteen railroad companies had laid 
over 1,400 miles of track in Indiana,” and although many were local companies, the 
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railroads soon merged with regional or national companies to provide the connections the 
Wabash River Basin so desired.81    
These early beginnings are important because, although embarrassing and 
financially harmful, they reflect the “forward-looking optimism, the belief in progress, 
the intense desire to lift Indiana out of the mud and leave behind the isolation of pioneer 
life.”82  This brief history also sheds light on how Indianans viewed their rivers.  If the 
river did not help them in their quest for prosperity, they turned to something else that 
would.   
The rivers in the Wabash River Basin lost power and meaning for basin 
inhabitants once deemed non-navigable.  Reaffirming the notion that the rivers were non-
navigable translated into benefits for property owners and the state, as reflected in legal 
cases.  In Ross, et al. v. Faust, et al., a landmark Indiana Supreme Court case decided in 
1876, the court proclaimed White River a non-navigable river.83  The case involved two 
riparian property owners.  When Faust removed gravel from the bed of White River in 
front of Ross’s property, Ross filed a lawsuit in the Marion Circuit Court claiming that 
Faust had trespassed on his property and unlawfully hauled away gravel.  After the trial 
court found in favor of Faust, Ross appealed.   
The appeals court’s written decision presents the three classes of rivers in the 
United States: salt-water rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, fresh-water rivers that 
are navigable for vessels used in interstate commerce, and fresh-water rivers which are 
not navigable for vessels used in interstate commerce.  The court asserted that the bed of 
the first class of rivers was publicly owned land, the bed of the second class of rivers 
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located in the “North-West Territory” was in doubt, and the bed of the third class of 
rivers was owned by the riparian property owner to the “thread” (or center) of the stream.  
The question reviewed by the Indiana Supreme Court was to which class White River 
belonged, which in turn would decide whether the riparian property owner’s title 
extended to the edge or to the thread of the stream.  In other words, if ownership did not 
extend to the thread, then trespassing and unlawful taking did not occur.  Ross raises an 
additional piece of evidence in support of the navigable status of the river—the United 
States surveyor of public lands had excluded the beds of rivers, and the property owner 
did not pay for the land to the thread of the stream.  Scoffing at the ability of the surveyor 
to determine whether the river was navigable and dismissing the lack of payment, the 
court states that it “knows, judicially, as matter of fact, that White river, in Marion 
county, Indiana, is neither a navigated nor a navigable river.”84  This ruling ignored 
applicable federal law under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that provides, “whether a 
river is navigable was an issue of fact and dependent upon whether [the] river was 
available and was susceptible for navigation according to general rules of river 
transportation at [the] time Indiana was admitted to the Union, and it does not depend 
upon whether it is presently navigable.”85 
As Jacob Piatt Dunn notes, when the court decided in this way—that White River 
was non-navigable and that the title of riparian property owners extended to the thread of 
the river—the court overstepped its bounds and changed the course of the river.  Dunn 
portrays the importance of public access to pump sand and gravel from the bed of the 
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river in terms of both improving navigability and saving the state the cost of purchasing 
needed materials: 
They take out the material to an average depth of fifteen feet, and in the 
eleven years that this work has been in progress over three miles of 
Indianapolis river front has been made actually navigable for any kind of 
river craft. . . . 
 . . . In fact, thousands of dollars have been paid to riparian owners 
for gravel from the river bed for public uses, when the river bed should 
justly belong to the state. . . . But of all stupid aberrations of public policy, 
none ever was more absurd than this abandonment of public right by a 
hasty and ill-considered Supreme Court decision.86 
By claiming the river was non-navigable, the state distanced itself from any 
responsibility to maintain the bed of the river (i.e., remove sand bars or debris impeding 
navigation), reaffirmed its sovereignty, and relied on a “common law rule [that] would 
best subserve the public peace and protect from violence.”87  The state also wanted to 
avoid interfering with perceived rights of individual property owners.  For years 
following this ruling, numerous cases in Indiana, as well as state courts throughout the 
Midwest, cited this 1876 case.  Courts debated the issue of navigable status and its impact 
on private versus public ownership over and over, and at times, the courts decided that 
portions of the Wabash River or one of its tributaries were navigable while other portions 
remained in the non-navigable category.  The legal “sand,” like the sand in White River, 
shifted back and forth.  It was not until 1950 that the Indiana Supreme Court questioned 
the 1876 ruling and adamantly reinstated White River to its legally recognized navigable 
status.88    
Regardless of its legal status, after the General Hanna grounded in 1831, in the 
minds of most Indianans the Wabash River and its tributaries remained non-navigable for 
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commercial purposes.  Even the fabricated rivers had been abandoned by the late 
nineteenth century in favor of roads and railways.  What did this non-navigable status 
mean in terms of the relationship between people and the rivers?  How did it affect 
perception of the rivers?  As Phillips relates, Indianans appreciated natural resources as 
long as a profit could be achieved.  Once the rivers lost their capacity for navigation at 
the level necessary to keep up with the growing market economy, the rivers were no 
longer a benefit.   
This loss of prestige added to the nuisance of repeated flooding and spelled 
further neglect for the rivers.  The use of the rivers as a dump by slaughterhouses, 
industries, and humans provides another piece of evidence of the relationship that had 
developed.  The interconnected relationship was unfolding into chaos for the region. 
Regional Comparisons 
If the relationship with the rivers in the Wabash River Basin is compared with the 
relationship in other river basins, similarities and differences appear that provide 
additional explanation about the history of flooding in the Wabash River Basin.  A 
number of historians have reviewed flooding in other river basins that will be useful for 
this analysis.  Three examples of studies involving midwestern rivers that are non-
navigable, except by canoe or rowboat, are the Elkhorn River Basin, Kansas River Basin, 
and the Great Miami River Basin.  Two examples of navigable rivers, one being the 
Sacramento River and the second involving the Mississippi River Valley, also provide 
insight. 
Todd M. Kerstetter presents the history of responses to flooding in the Elkhorn 
River Basin in Nebraska from 1823 to 1940.  Like the Wabash, the Elkhorn River and its 
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tributaries regularly flooded the valley.  Initially, settlers took defensive actions, moved 
on to offensive actions, and then tried a combination of both.  Defensive actions meant 
adapting to flood conditions—they rebuilt their homes, they built boats, and they learned 
how to cope during times of high water.  Offensive actions included building levees, 
ditches, and dams and instituting a flood warning system.  Later, more aggressive actions 
included straightening or combining river channels, dredging the river, and building 
stronger and higher levees.  Kerstetter ends his historical account with the year 1940 
when federal government engineers conducted a study to determine flood control needs, 
but basin residents failed to utilize the information gleaned from that study.  Kerstetter 
foreshadows that “a scant four years later, nature and the Elkhorn would twice send 
floodwaters, the highest and most destructive yet, onto the floodplain.  Those floods 
would draw serious attention and deserve their own story.”  Kerstetter notes that as 
humans encroached on the flood plain, “floods became increasingly devastating,” but 
from a historian’s perspective, “examining the response [emphasis added] to floods also 
casts light on human nature and the American political system.”89 
Dale E. Nimz reviewed the history of the Kansas River Basin, concentrating on 
“human aspirations to improve, control, and manage” the river.  Its history also includes 
repeated flooding, and Nimz details the major flood events in 1903 and 1951 and some 
key projects to control flooding by means of dams and floodplain management.  Similar 
to the Wabash River and its tributaries, the Kansas River did not meet transportation or 
power needs.  The river became polluted and caused health concerns that were multiplied 
when the river flooded.  Unlike responses in the Wabash River Basin, Kansas political 
                                                 
89Todd M. Kerstetter, “High Water: Flooding in the Elkhorn Basin, 1823-1940,” Nebraska History 
76, no. 4 (1995): 176-187. 
47 
leaders and business owners called upon the federal government for assistance following 
the flood of 1903.  As part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal program in the 
1930s, the Kansas River Basin underwent extensive changes to control flooding.  
Through careful research, Nimz reveals that “the proposal for dams and reservoirs in 
Kansas originated in the 1930s because Kansas City business and railroad interests did 
not want levees that would interfere with their operations in the floodplains.”  Therefore, 
business concerns directed public policy, and as Nimz asserts, “those who dreamed of 
improving and then controlling the Kansas River agreed on the river they wanted.”  The 
1951 flood highlighted the one-sided interests addressed in the agreement when the 
Kansas River became “wild,” “rampaging,” and “uncontrolled.”90   
The Great Miami River Basin in southwestern Ohio suffered severe damage and 
loss during the 1913 flood.  In “Taking Engineering by Storm” (2004), science and 
technology historian Trudy E. Bell presents her study of the responses to the flood in the 
Great Miami River Basin and finds that within two months after the flood, the Dayton, 
Ohio, city commission decided that 
the federal government would not act to prevent a recurrence of a future 
disastrous flood in the Miami Valley.  So, it was up to the citizens 
themselves to raise funds and begin work.  The commission established a 
flood-prevention fund as seed money to begin financing engineering 
surveys, plans, and construction contracts for a fix-it-forever, flood-
control program.  After a monumental campaign of only 10 days, the fund 
had received pledges for more than $2 million (in 1913 dollars) from 
23,000 subscribers.91  
The city commission of Dayton also hired a thirty-five-year-old engineer from Memphis, 
Tennessee, Arthur E. Morgan.  Although young, Morgan had an impressive resume, and 
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armed with instructions to “find a way out,” he rolled up his sleeves.92  Instead of sending 
“dirt flying” as the commission had hoped, Morgan warned that a localized response 
would not solve the problem in the basin.  After completing detailed studies, surveys, and 
calculations, he presented eight alternatives to the city commission in a report on 3 
October 1913.  The commission approved Morgan’s plan for a system of five “dry” dams 
(what Morgan called “detention basins” or “retarding basins”) that would accommodate 
the Miami River’s tendency to produce flash floods and would control runoff 40 percent 
greater than the runoff in March 1913, a percentage calculated to be “beyond all 
possibility.”93  Despite delays due to World War I and additional funding needs, which 
local bond issues satisfied, the Miami Conservancy District completed its dams in 1923.  
Bell ends this success scenario, as follows: 
The dams have held back floodwaters more than 1,500 times.  In 1937 and 
1982 (when rain and flood stages approached the magnitude of 1913) and 
in 1959 (year of highest watershed runoff in the valley since 1913), the 
areas protected—including downtown Dayton—never flooded.94    
A variety of responses to flooding occurred in these cases of non-navigable rivers, 
all with flooding histories similar to the Wabash River Basin.  Two ended in failures to 
achieve the desired flood control, and one ended with success.  All reflect a mindset of 
local control.  Even when folks in the Elkhorn River Basin and Kansas River Basin 
reached out for federal assistance, they were unwilling to relinquish control for 
implementing plans.  All of these cases are similar in that they dismissed the rivers for as 
long as they could before taking more critical steps—the rivers were a nuisance rather 
than an asset.  But, can this also be said of cases involving a navigable river? 
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Sacramento is located at the junction of the Sacramento and American Rivers, 
with a long history of flooding challenges.  The founders of Sacramento, who were first 
and foremost real estate merchants, chose the site because of its natural advantages on the 
rivers.  This location soon became a distinct disadvantage.  Yet, once the city boosters 
believed they could profit from the location, they believed they could profit despite the 
location.  Andrew C. Isenberg notes in “Banking on Sacramento” (2006) that levees were 
a politically popular flood control method because these relatively simple actions boosted 
public support.  According to Isenberg, Sacramento survived its flooding problems 
because the city government, “lacking even a shadow of legitimacy, intuited that a flood 
control project might boost public support and legitimize the municipal government.”95  
Isenberg describes a situation where nineteenth century city governments were  
faced with an ecological dilemma:  to mitigate the threat to their urban 
environment by levying taxes and creating levees, they had to restrain the 
commerce that was the source of prosperity.  Yet municipal public works 
projects, despite their expense, imparted significant political benefits to 
city governments:  such projects conferred political legitimacy on 
governments that had been initially conceived as little more than real 
estate development companies.96 
When dealing with a navigable river, profit seekers controlled decisions more so than 
with non-navigable rivers—the stakes were higher. 
Flood control for the Mississippi River has a long history in part because of its 
importance as a navigable river with shipping ports for the United States.  Matthew T. 
Pearcy studied the 1927 flood on the Mississippi River and the resulting federal Flood 
Control Act of 1928.  Although the 1927 flood devastated the Lower Mississippi Valley, 
                                                 
95Andrew C. Isenberg, “Banking on Sacramento:  Urban Development, Flood Control, and 
Political Legitimization, 1848-1862” in Andrew C. Isenberg, ed., The Nature of Cities (Rochester, New 
York:  University of Rochester Press, 2006), 116-117. 
96Ibid., 105. 
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President Calvin Coolidge ignored the pleas for assistance from Louisiana.  The state of 
Illinois had suffered losses during this flood as well, and it was Chicago Mayor William 
Hale “Big Bill” Thompson who took the lead and “kicked off a campaign calling for the 
federal government to assume full financial responsibility for flood control on the 
Mississippi River.”97  It took a strong political figure to catch the attention of the public 
and legislative committees.  This turn of events also suggested the difference in federal 
political pull in the North versus the South.  Pearcy follows the progress of this law 
through congressional committees and explains the proponents’ battles with President 
Coolidge, whose main concern was keeping a balanced budget.  Thirteen months later, 
the United States Congress passed the 1928 Flood Control Act, albeit a significantly 
changed law from the original intent.  Implementing the law proved to be another 
challenge due to the 1929 economic collapse, “years of litigation initiated by the [local] 
residents,” and the “gradual ‘unwinding’” of the plans of the Army Corps of Engineers’ 
Major General Edgar Jadwin, who had worked closely with President Coolidge.98   
The responses to flooding along the Sacramento River and Mississippi River 
differ only in some respects from responses in the non-navigable river basin examples.  
The fact that a river is navigable, even in the case of the mighty Mississippi River, does 
not necessarily bring the flood control action needed.  As Hurricane Katrina proved in 
2005, levee-only systems do not put an end to flooding.  With a navigable river, there are 
more interested parties and, consequently, more special interests.  The interested parties 
did not dismiss the rivers because they were an important component of the local 
economy; instead, they added to the chaos. 
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These case studies show that the Wabash River Basin does not have a unique 
problem or that its residents have acted radically different from their neighbors.  Instead, 
the studies confirm a widespread issue related to urban development.  People settled on 
sites that benefited them in one or more respects while suppressing those aspects that 
threatened their success.  Growth and success unfortunately exacerbated problems and 
emphasized limitations.  
Summary 
Following the 1913 flood, Indiana Governor Samuel M. Ralston appointed the 
Indiana Flood Commission.99  This was the first organized, publicly ordained effort in 
Indiana to determine the cause of major floods and find ways to lessen the resulting 
damage.  Unfortunately, according to Indiana historian Clifton J. Phillips, “no action was 
taken as a result of [the commission’s] deliberations.”100  In the 1910s, the state was not 
ready to coordinate to address flooding and conserve these water resources.  Water power 
continued to be used but only by a few small mills scattered throughout the state.101  
Therefore, one difference in the Wabash River Basin was reluctance to organize or to 
seek outside assistance from the federal government or a talented engineer.   
William C. Ackerman and J. H. Dawes, members of the Wabash Valley Advisory 
Committee in the 1960s, mention the Miami Conservancy District’s “pioneering steps 
undertaken in the Miami River Basin, which is the watershed immediately east of the 
Wabash” as “one of the milestones in integrated watershed planning and 
                                                 
99
Laws of the State of Indiana, 1915, 143. 
100Phillips, 216.  Also see W. K. Hatt, “Flood Protection in Indiana,” Indiana Academy of Science, 
Proceedings (1914), 149-156. 
101Phillips, 216. 
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management.”102  Ackerman and Dawes end with remarks reflective of the laissez-faire 
politics and culture of the Wabash River Basin: “The world has adopted from the Miami 
the concept of basin-wide planning, but it has since progressed beyond that concept of 
single-purpose development.  Further, it has rejected the Miami concept of assessing 
individual property owners according to their calculated benefits.”103   
This dismissal of ideas and methods from outside sources is indicative of the 
regional mentality.  The Wabash River Basin possessed plentiful natural resources, a 
strong economic base, a boisterous political culture, and a hopeful and growing 
population.  The price tag of $29,658,000 that accompanied the 1913 flood was small in 
comparison with the benefits and possibilities offered by the basin.  The inhabitants were 
trying to develop the land, but they were paying dearly in terms of millions of dollars 
annually in the form of damage repairs, loss of property, and loss of lives.  The cost of 
displacing one’s family to move elsewhere also must have outweighed these costs.   
The people who settled in the Wabash River Basin, in both the southern and 
northern portions, melded together to create a regional mentality that controlled decisions 
affecting the region and its relationship with the outside world.  Basin inhabitants felt 
excluded from other regions that were part of a navigable river system as evidenced in 
part by the canal project that had a long-lasting impact on the culture.  The residents saw 
themselves as isolated from other regions and, consequently, abandoned the non-
navigable river, turning instead to the possibilities of canals, road, and railroads.  
Arguably the combination of alienation and eternal optimism overrode sound flood 
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control decisions, but the basic need to secure a living from this land more likely drove 
decisions.   
Madison and other Indiana historians have argued that the culture of Indianans 
inhibited change—they desired continuity.  Yet, viewing the landscape of the Wabash 
River Basin as “history” reveals a changing landscape, one in which inhabitants cut down 
hardwood forests, extracted natural gas, mined coal, quarried limestone, drained swamps, 
filled in ravines, built levees, rerouted rivers, dug canals, and constructed bridges, roads, 
and railroads.104  The environmental history of Indiana denies the argument of continuity.  
Basin residents maintained a constant relationship with natural resources, but they 
continuously changed the landscape to meet their needs.   
Historically, the relationship between people and the rivers in their towns, 
whether navigable or non-navigable, is one of conflict and misunderstanding—they have 
not understood their interdependence with their rivers.  This misunderstanding is more 
prominent in river basins where the river is non-navigable because the river holds less 
prominence.  The common theme is that the relationship with rivers has been a growing 
process.  Settlers did not understand the river’s nature and cycles when they first arrived.  
They did not understand that expansion into the floodplains, along with building levees 
and bridges, would increase devastation from flooding.  They did not understand that 
dumping their waste into the river would cause health problems.  Certainly, in the 
nineteenth century, people were not familiar with concepts of ecological systems.  The 
early settlers did quickly learn that flooding along the Wabash River and its tributaries 
                                                 
104D. W. Meinig, “The Beholding Eye: Ten Versions of the Same Scene” in The Interpretation of 
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would frequently occur, but they accepted that challenge and clung to the advantages of 
the region. 
Flooding impacted regional development in the Wabash River Basin in terms of 
the dollars spent on flood prevention and recovery, in terms of how the region saw and 
utilized its natural resources, and in terms of the effect on the culture of the place.  
Moving from the broader, regional perspective to take a closer look, the significance of 
the history of flooding for the common person inhabiting the place becomes apparent.  
The next step in this study is an analysis of one particular place devastated by the 1913 
flood—West Indianapolis.  As this history shows, negative associations with flooding 
become an integral part of this place in the twentieth century, and Worster’s concept of 
“evolving human ecology” is laid bare. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE COMMUNITY OF WEST INDIANAPOLIS 
Wherever we can point to human beings, there we can point to 
somebody’s home—with all the kindly meaning of that word. 
--Yi-Fu Tuan, Topophilia 
Traditionally, valleys have appealed to human beings as “ecological niches” 
where they can find an easy livelihood with a water source, possibly a natural 
transportation route, rich soil for farming, and a wide variety of food available from the 
river, the floodplain, and the valley slopes.  Yet, the valley can also shelter dangerous 
animals, the floodplain may be poorly drained and malarial, and the valley may be 
subject to flooding and fluctuating temperatures.105  In West Indianapolis, the “Valley” fit 
this description in many ways.  West Indianapolis, located on the southwestern fringe of 
Indianapolis, was an important community for the capital city.  (See Figure 3 on page 
11.)  Not only was it home to the people who lived within its borders, but it was also an 
integral part of the economy of Indianapolis.  Yet, floods plagued West Indianapolis, 
especially in the section nearest White River, referred to as the “Valley.” 
In 1820, the Indiana state commissioners observed that the ground on the west 
bank of White River was marshy, low, and prone to flooding.  Regardless, in the summer, 
a good crop of corn could be grown in this river bottomland.  Nicholas McCarty, Sr., a 
Virginia-born merchant, purchased the land and called it his “bayou farm.”  By the mid-
nineteenth century, landowners and city developers recognized that this land had even 
greater value for railroads and industry than its agricultural use.   
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Indianapolis was becoming a major transportation and commercial center with 
eleven railroads entering the city from all directions.106  The railroads were an economic 
savior for the capital city after its disappointing discovery that White River was not 
navigable, and thus, city and state officials wanted to capitalize on the railroads.  These 
railroads, however, were making the city noisy, dirty, and congested.  Nicholas McCarty, 
Jr., managed the “bayou farm” for his deceased father’s heirs, but he was also a realtor 
with an idea that a set of tracks to connect the incoming rail lines would divert the 
through freight from downtown Indianapolis.  He proposed that the new line run through 
his property.  His plans failed when workers were laid-off during an economic recession, 
the “Panic of 1873.”  Two years later, the Mayor of Indianapolis, a Republican named 
John Caven, came up with a plan for the city to profit from its expanding cattle business, 
enlarge its tax base, provide work for the unemployed, and alleviate downtown traffic 
problems.107  By Ordinance No. 51, 1876, the Indianapolis Common Council approved 
selling one-half million dollars in municipal bonds for the purpose of completing a belt 
rail line that would divert rail traffic around the center of the city.108  In November 1877, 
the Union Railroad Transfer and Stockyard Company completed the belt rail line and the 
stockyards opened on McCarty’s property.109   
The community of West Indianapolis, originally known as Belmont, grew around 
the stockyards and railroads.  The “Valley” had something to offer the people; it provided 
                                                 
106Dunn 1:259; Madison, The Indiana Way, 153-157. 
107John Caven served his first term as mayor from 1863 to 1867 and his second term from 1875 to 
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109James J. Divita, Professor of History, Marian College, Workers’ Church: centennial history of 
The Catholic Parish of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in West Indianapolis, (Indianapolis: 
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jobs and homes—a place to call home.  By the time of the “Great Flood” in 1913, it was a 
working community of homes, schools, churches, neighborhood businesses, the 
stockyards, and railroads.  Although the people who settled there found employment and 
a welcoming community, they soon learned that flooding would challenge them and 
eventually isolate them.   
Places in History 
Human geographer Tim Cresswell contends in Place: A Short Introduction (2004) 
that John Agnew’s three fundamental aspects that make a “meaningful location”—
location, locale, and sense of place—must include “space” and “landscape.”  By 
considering “place” from these perspectives provides a way of understanding an area “as 
a rich and complicated interplay of people and environment.”  The central theme of place 
studies is a quest to answer the question of what makes a place—what factors came 
together to create its significance instead of just a spot on the map without meaning to its 
inhabitants.  Looking at the relationship of riverine community members with the river 
will be enriched by considering those members’ sense of the place.  It is important to 
understand how people interacted with the landscape and environment, what processes 
occurred that created meaning, and how powers were exercised to form relations between 
social groups.110 
Cresswell claims that, ultimately, connections and change are key elements of a 
place.  He refers to William Cronon’s case study of Kennecott, Alaska, a ghost town in 
south-central Alaska, which was once “one of the greatest copper milling centers in the 
                                                 
110Tim Cresswell, Place: A Short Introduction (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 
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world,” to explore placemaking.111  The case of Kennecott is analogous to West 
Indianapolis in many ways.  The connections between West Indianapolis and the 
Indianapolis economy, as well as the national and international economies, made through 
the railroads and industries drove changes that occurred there.  In both Kennecott and 
West Indianapolis, the ecology and landscape have been irreversibly interrupted.  While 
West Indianapolis is not a ghost town, it is a forgotten part of the city.  It has been 
abandoned despite the fact that it was an important component of the economic success 
of Indianapolis.  People who travel to West Indianapolis are immigrants in search of a 
place to begin their lives in this country.  West Indianapolis has been a place to make a 
start, but not a final destination. 
Local history often falls on two ends of a spectrum—the old-fashioned variety 
that is richly anecdotal and social history that deals with people as impersonal aggregates.  
Michael Kammen suggests that local historians find a middle ground to not only identify 
trends but exemplify the trends with real, flesh-and-blood individuals.112  According to 
local historians David E. Kyvig and Myron A. Marty, a useful model for analysis and 
interpretation in order to see a cultural landscape more intelligently and to give order to 
questions about it, is to see the whole and see the parts.  To do this, one must look for 
relationships—between buildings and open spaces, between building and building, 
between the cultural and the natural landscapes, between commercial and residential 
areas, and between old and new.  Also, one must ask how natural features, such as a river, 
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shaped the city; how the railroad reshaped; and how an interstate highway reshaped it 
again.  The task for the historian is to find the material traces from the past in the cultural 
landscape to understand and reconstruct events and ideas of earlier times.113   
Who were the people that settled in West Indianapolis and what factors influenced 
their decision?  What role did the river play in the cultural landscape of West 
Indianapolis?  What relationship formed between the river and the residents?  To answer 
these questions, this chapter considers both quantitative and qualitative evidence, presents 
an overview of the history of West Indianapolis, and introduces some of the former 
members of the community.  Upon careful scrutiny, the factual data found in federal 
census records and city directories and the documented changes over time revealed by 
fire insurance maps can provide unexpected insight.114   
This chapter and the next reference several sources that warrant explanation.  Two 
sources fill in useful information not available from primary or scholarly secondary 
sources: “Early West Indianapolis,” compiled by the Mary Rigg Senior Citizen Group 
(1979), and “Social History of the ‘West Indianapolis’ Section of Indianapolis, Indiana,” 
written by Margaret Wolfer (1970s).  Both of these historical accounts are held in the 
Special Collections of the West Indianapolis Branch of the Indianapolis-Marion County 
Public Library.  These sources not only provide details not otherwise available, but they 
also reflect the oral history of this place as passed from generation to generation.  
Another secondary source referenced in this chapter is a history of the Nordyke & 
Marmon Company, a large employer in West Indianapolis, prepared for distribution to 
delegates to the Convention of the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World, 
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Indianapolis (1920) and held by the Indiana Historical Society.  An additional source 
referenced is immigration and church historian James J. Divita’s “Workers’ Church: 
centennial history of The Catholic Parish of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary 
in West Indianapolis” (1994).  Although focused on the history of the parish in West 
Indianapolis, Divita includes invaluable, cited information about the community’s origin 
and members.  Federal census and city directory data, as well as works by Indianapolis 
historians, support much of the information provided by these sources.115   
The People and Businesses 
The predecessor to West Indianapolis, the village of Belmont, developed in the 
1800s on the other side of White River from Indianapolis with tree-lined dirt roads, farm 
lands, and wide-open spaces.116  The early settlers bought “donation tracts,” which were 
tracts of land approved for sale by an Act of Congress on 19 April 1816 for the purpose 
of settling Indianapolis.  After selecting the prime lots on higher ground for the city’s 
downtown, the Indiana General Assembly designated less desirable lots that would be 
available for purchase by individual settlers.117 
One of the earliest settlers was the Harding family.  In 1820, Mrs. Martha 
Harding, a widow and the mother of twelve children, moved her family from Kentucky 
and settled on a donation tract on the banks of White River where they built a log cabin.  
                                                 
115See Dunn, Vol. 1; Esarey; and Leary. 
116Members of the Mary Rigg Senior Citizens Group, “Early West Indianapolis,” (October 22, 
1979), located at Special Collections, West Indianapolis Branch, Indianapolis-Marion County Public 
Library, 2. 
117George Pence, “The Indianapolis Donation,” 1922, in the Inventory of State Land Records 
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The Harding family continued to purchase property in West Indianapolis, and by the time 
Mrs. Harding died in 1841, she owned a farm of one hundred sixty acres in Wayne 
Township near Eagle Creek.  (See Figure 6.)118  
Other families established farms in the area.  The Reuter family had twenty-three 
acres of ground just north of Oliver Avenue and east of Belmont Avenue.  The Becker’s 
farm was located at Tremont Avenue and Morris Street, and the Hommel family owned a 
farm at Belmont Avenue and Minnesota Street.  (See Figure 7.)  The soft light from oil 
lamps in the windows of very modest homes welcomed neighbors, and the town grew 
into a “close-knit community.”119   
The Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad tracks created the northern border of the 
village and brought more settlers.  The stockyards opened in November 1877 near the 
intersection of Hadley Avenue and Judge Harding Street (which are now Kentucky 
Avenue and Harding Street).  Two private parties were key advocates for the 
development of the stockyards: the McCarty family, who owned the land, and Thomas D. 
Kingan, who owned a meat packing firm at Maryland Street and White River.120  (See 
Figure 7.) 
Settlement in the West Indianapolis area fostered the growth of industry in 
Indianapolis.  This area on the other side of the river from the mile square of Indianapolis 
provided a prime location for early businesses.  In 1867, the Indianapolis Abattoir 
Company established a slaughterhouse and tallow manufacturing business south of  
                                                 
118Atlas of Donations: Sales and Reserves, City of Indianapolis, 1821-1913, “Map of the 
Donation: Survey of 1831,” available on microfilm at Commission on Public Records, Indiana State 
Archives; Margaret Wolfer, “Social History of the ‘West Indianapolis’ Section of Indianapolis, Indiana,” 
located at Special Collections, West Indianapolis Branch, Indianapolis-Marion County Public Library, 1. 
119Members of the Mary Rigg Senior Citizens Group, 2. 
120Wolfer, 1-2; Dunn 1:256-261. 
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Figure 6.  Digital photograph of future site of West Indianapolis from  
“Map of Marion County, Indiana” (Indianapolis: Condil, Wright & Hayden, 
Real Estate Agents, 1855).  Courtesy of Indiana State Library. 
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Morris Street, between Drover Street and White River.  Around 1885, the Parry brothers 
purchased the shop and assets of the Great Woodburn Savern Wheel Co. near the 
Vandalia Railroad and renamed it the Parry Manufacturing Company, “the world’s 
largest cart, wagon and carriage making plant.”121  (See Figure 7.) 
Another important business arrived in West Indianapolis in 1876.  The Nordyke 
& Marmon Company, a flour milling machinery manufacturer, purchased a building at 
the southwest corner of Morris Street and Hadley Avenue.  (See Figure 7.)  The Nordyke 
& Marmon Company also founded another business in West Indianapolis, the Jenney 
Electric Company, in 1885.  The Nordyke & Marmon Company was a partnership 
formed between two families.  The Nordykes were grist millers in Holland who 
immigrated to Pennsylvania prior to the Revolutionary War.  The family business was 
passed down from generation to generation as the sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons 
moved to Virginia, Georgia, Tennessee, and Ohio.  Ellis Nordyke settled in Richmond, 
Indiana, and he and his son, Addison, set up their mill manufacturing and construction 
business in 1851 on the banks of the Whitewater River.  The business began in a small 
frame, one-story wood building behind the house.122 
Addison Nordyke and Daniel W. Marmon were both from Quaker families, and 
they met at Earlham College.  Daniel Marmon’s father was a prominent Ohio physician 
who moved to Richmond, Indiana, in 1846.  His father was of French origin, and his 
mother’s family was of North Carolina extraction and originally Scotch.  Marmon lost 
both of his parents when he was five years old, and he was raised by his uncle, Eli 
                                                 
121Ibid., 2; Divita, 2; http://www.coachbuilt.com/bui/m/martin_parry/martin_parry.htm. 
122
Nordyke & Marmon Company: An Institution.  A History of the Development of a Leading 
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Stubbs, who operated a saw mill at West Elliston, Ohio, where he also manufactured 
furniture, coffins, pumps, and broom handles.  Marmon possessed an unusual genius that 
developed into a high-grade workmanship that permeated the entire organization founded 
by these men.  The “Marmon shop standards—‘Build well, not slovenly’—was an ideal 
and a practice that . . . descended directly from the little shop, hardly more than a barn, in 
Richmond, Indiana.”123 
The business expanded operations in Richmond in 1866, and Nordyke and 
Marmon decided to move near Indianapolis in 1876 for more space, better shipping 
facilities, and the deeper labor pool that the larger city offered.124  Over the years, the 
men diversified, adding operations such as bolt cloth production and automobile 
engineering.  The company prospered in West Indianapolis, and the community benefited 
too.   
Nordyke and Marmon were very proud of the number of long-term employees 
listed on the company’s roles.  One such employee was Smith S. Griffith, born in 1844 
near Winchester, Kentucky, moved to Richmond as a small boy, and hired as foreman for 
the cutting room in 1873.  He moved to Indianapolis with the company in 1876, and as of 
1920, had been with the company for forty-six years.  Miss Mamie Kelley, started 
working for Nordyke & Marmon in 1881 when she was in her twenties.  As of 1920, the 
bolt cloth cutting department had been under her care for thirty-eight years.  Another 
long-term employee, with thirty-nine years as of 1920, was R. E. Roberts, born in 
Hagerstown, Indiana, in 1857.  Roberts began working at Nordyke & Marmon when he 
was twenty-two years old, and for many years was in charge of the mill machine room, 
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carrying out the close supervision of mechanical detail that was the pride of Daniel W. 
Marmon.  Roberts also helped develop the first Marmon car in 1902 and supervised the 
machining of the experimental parts that had been designed by Howard C. Marmon.125 
Amos K. Hollowell was the company’s treasurer and also handled all 
correspondence, but letter writing at this time was a laborious process.  Typewriters were 
not in use then, and letters were written in longhand.  Daniel Marmon saw an 
advertisement by a stenographic school in the East to place its graduates, and brought it 
to the attention of Mr. Hollowell suggesting, “we should try one of these ‘shorthand 
writers.’”  They immediately sent a request to the school to send a stenographer.  Within 
a few days Miss Hattie Clock arrived and began working as the first commercial 
stenographer to be employed in the city.  Miss Clock’s marriage two years later “was a 
real tragedy” for the company, according to Mr. Hollowell, and another message was 
hurriedly dispatched to the Eastern school.  Miss Hattie Sperry was employed as the 
company’s second stenographer, a position she held for some time.126 
A good number of Nordyke & Marmon’s employees not only worked, but also 
lived, in West Indianapolis.  John W. Bennett was a woodworker who started with the 
company in 1887 and, in 1913, was living at 1247 Nordyke Avenue.  Fred J. Cook was a 
machinist who started with the company in 1885.  In 1913, he was living at 1361 
Nordyke Avenue with his wife, Minnie, and his twenty-one year old daughter, Nellie.  
John Follett was a laborer for the company since 1882.  In 1913, he was living at 1101 
Division with his wife, Barbara, and his eleven year old son, William.127 
                                                 
125Ibid., 15-25. 
126Ibid., 33. 
127R. L. Polk & Company, Indianapolis City Directory for 1913; Census of the United States 
(1910), available from http://www.ancestry.com. 
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Many of the people who settled in West Indianapolis arrived from Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Ohio, and southern Indiana, and eastern states.  First-generation immigrants 
from England, Germany, Ireland, France, and Holland also settled in this area.  The men 
who moved either on their own or with their families in the late 1870s were drawn by the 
employment opportunities at the railroads, stockyards, and industries.   
Along with industry, the community grew and developed.  In 1881, the village of 
Belmont built a school at the corner of Reisner and Howard Streets called West 
Indianapolis No. One.  Later, the residents renamed this brick schoolhouse the West 
Indianapolis High School.  The schoolhouse also served as the community center for 
meetings and gatherings of all kinds.  The community expanded until there were five 
public schools and one Catholic school run by the Assumption Church.128 
On 5 March 1882 a group of Belmont’s residents decided to incorporate their 
town, and they filed a petition to accomplish this.  At the election on 4 April 1882, 
residents voted in favor of the petition and incorporated the town under the name West 
Indianapolis.  By the 1890 census, West Indianapolis was the largest suburb of 
Indianapolis with a population of 3,527, and in 1894, West Indianapolis incorporated as a 
city.129  McCarty’s dream of building the belt line resulted in an economically developed 
area, a city named West Indianapolis.   
The new city platted streets from the belt line thoroughfare and sold lots to small 
businesses opening along Oliver Avenue.  Street car “O” provided public transportation 
for those who lived in West Indianapolis but who worked in downtown Indianapolis or at 
                                                 
128Wolfer, 3. 
129Dunn, 1:440. 
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Kingan and Company on the east bank of White River.130  The political heart of the 
suburb was the two-story brick city hall, fire house, and jail that stood on the southeast 
corner of Morris and Harding Streets in the Valley.  (See Figure 8.)  Republicans won 
most of the offices in the first city election with bribery charges abounding, and 
Alexander B. Tolin, a livestock commission merchant at Union Stockyards, became the 
first mayor of the city.131 
West Indianapolis boasted a wide range of religious communities.  Among the 
largest of its churches were the West Morris Street Free Methodist Church, Parkview 
Christian Church, and the Assumption Catholic Church.132  These churches played an 
important role in bolstering the sense of community. 
Father Joseph F. Weber served as the pastor of the Assumption Church for forty 
years.  He was born in Ripley County, Indiana, in 1865, and raised in Cincinnati where 
his father was a brewer.  After attending the St. Meinrad seminary in southern Indiana, 
Bishop Chatard ordained Father Weber on 15 June 1889 and appointed him assistant at 
St. John in Indianapolis.  As a young cleric, Father Weber regularly visited the Catholic 
families in West Indianapolis and celebrated three Masses each Sunday in a private house 
on Warren Avenue in the Valley.  The mule-drawn streetcar fortunately passed by the 
house; otherwise, the trip would not have been possible in inclement weather because the 
unpaved streets became dangerous and unsightly.  Efforts to organize a parish in West 
Indianapolis were challenged by a lack of financial resources.  The future of the parish 
depended on building a church and a school.  The parish membership list reflected that 
these individuals were employed as blacksmiths, boilermakers, carpenters, railroaders,  
                                                 
130Divita, 2-3. 
131Ibid., 3, referencing Dunn, 1:5-6. 
132Wolfer, 6. 
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Figure 8.  West Indianapolis Fire Department and Police Station (Bass 
#26551), W.H. Bass Photo Company, 1911, Courtesy of Indiana 
Historical Society, Digital Images Library. 
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laborers, etc.  They lived comfortably, but they possessed little surplus.133  Bishop 
Chatard requested the priest to raise $800 to pay the notes due for purchase of the Blaine 
Avenue property, where the parish eventually built the church.  Father Weber traveled to 
Cincinnati to ask his father for financial assistance, and after receiving a donation from 
him, the local residents were encouraged to “dig deeply into their shallow pockets,” and 
they contributed over $1,100 toward construction of the church.  On 12 August 1894 
Bishop Chatard dedicated the Assumption Church with Father Weber serving as 
pastor.134  (See Figure 9.) 
Residents of West Indianapolis buried their family members close to home in City 
Cemetery, but the close proximity to White River created problems.  (See Figure 7 on 
page 63.)  When flooding occurred, bodies and tombstones often washed away.  
Indianapolis responded by establishing a new cemetery north of town in a more visibly 
appealing, pastoral setting.  The city then mandated that residents move the bodies of 
family members buried in City Cemetery to the new Crown Hill Cemetery at the 
families’ expense.  As early as 1898, Indianapolis had condemned a portion of City 
Cemetery and ordered its use as a park, although many families still had not moved their 
family members at that time.135     
West Indianapolis, a young but thriving city, showed its character and separated 
itself from Indianapolis in many ways, in its politics, churches, schools, cemeteries, and 
its social problems.  As was typical for industrial towns at the turn of the century, West 
Indianapolis had its share of corner saloons for quenching thirsts after long hours at the  
                                                 
133Divita, 7. 
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135Garman, Plat Map of Union Cemetery, recorded July 25, 1898, located at Indiana State Library; 
and Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, s.v. “Built Environment,” by Elizabeth B. Monroe. 
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Figure 9.  Church of the Assumption, 1904 (Bass #3123), W.H. Bass 
Photo Company, Courtesy of the Indiana Historical Society, Digital 
Image Library. 
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stockyards and factories.  A strong temperance movement existed in the religious 
community, but the saloons outnumbered the churches.  Besides drinking, other problems 
in West Indianapolis included gambling, loafers, a smelly dump, the streetcar line not 
extending to Belmont Avenue, baseball games on Sundays (Indianapolis rejected Sunday 
ballgames), and poor streets and sidewalks.136   
The city’s second election year occurred in 1896 and initiated important changes, 
including annexation by Indianapolis.  Democrats won the elections in West Indianapolis, 
at a time when the Indianapolis Mayor was the popular Democrat Thomas Taggart.  A 
desire to upgrade city services and reduce the cost of government prompted discussions 
of annexation to Indianapolis.137  On 15 March 1897 Indianapolis annexed West 
Indianapolis along with four other suburbs: Brightwood, Haughville, Mount Jackson, and 
Eastside Terrace.  (See Figure 10.)  The City Council passed the ordinances in a hurried 
proceedings without a dissenting vote although the “preliminaries bristled with evidence 
of opposition from the Republican side.”  The proponents of annexation felt that West 
Indianapolis would benefit from the union.  The Comptroller of Indianapolis estimated a 
gain of $36,000 in annual revenue from annexation of the new territories, an amount they 
considered sufficient to take care of them.138 
Shortly after annexation, Indianapolis established a new library for the suburb in a 
red brick building at the corner of Morris Street and River Avenue in West Indianapolis.   
                                                 
136Divita, 4; see, also Town of West Indianapolis Ordinance Book A (1883-1889), located at 
Commission on Public Records, Indiana State Archives, which includes ordinances passed to address 
pertinent issues such as inspecting slaughter houses, requiring permits for draining water or fluids, fining 
prostitutes and men associating therewith, fining gamblers, prohibiting vagrancy, and regulating saloons 
and billiards. 
137Divita, 5. 
138“Annexation Complete,” Indianapolis News, 16 March 1897; Dunn, 1:440. 
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(See Figure 7 on page 63.)  However, in 1898, White River overflowed its banks and 
flooded the Valley just west of the river.  The city librarian, Miss Eliza G. Browning, 
went with field glasses in hand to the top of the Soldiers and Sailors Monument to check 
on the condition of the library.  Although the water almost surrounded the library, she 
managed to have the books moved.  After the muddy waters receded, they found that the 
books had been moved to shelves about one-half inch above the highest water mark.  In 
May 1898, Indianapolis erected a new building on higher ground and moved the library 
there in November.  Later on in 1910, Indianapolis used a portion of a $120,000 gift from 
Andrew Carnegie to build a permanent library building in West Indianapolis.139  In the 
early years following annexation, residents felt assured that annexation would benefit 
West Indianapolis. 
By 1906 Indianapolis had firmly established itself as a forward-thinking, viable 
city in which to consider starting a business or settling down and finding a job.  The 
following description appeared in the introduction of the 1906 Polk’s City Directory: 
Indianapolis is more than a “city of homes.”  It is a hustling, thriving 
business city, filled with up-to-date and progressive establishments and 
dotted thick with great and growing manufactories, which have 
experienced the greatest year’s business in their history.  That Indianapolis 
is attracting wide-spread attention in the world of manufacturing is 
evidenced by the fact that during 1905 no less than 89 different 
manufacturing plants were established in the city, many of them coming 
from other cities.  At the present time the city has almost 2,300 
manufacturing establishments, in which approximately 45,000 people are 
employed, receiving $15,000,000 in wages annually.140 
West Indianapolis contributed greatly to these statistics describing Indianapolis and its 
manufacturing successes.  Some great achievements were coming out of this community 
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now enveloped with Indianapolis.  Although it was officially no longer separate from 
Indianapolis, residents still referred to their neighborhood as West Indianapolis.   
In the early twentieth century, Indianapolis became a forerunner in the automobile 
and racing industry.  Howard C. Marmon achieved great success as an automotive 
engineer working at the Nordyke & Marmon Company.  In the early twentieth century 
racing stock chassis was considered the final test of a motor car’s fitness for everyday 
service.  Howard Marmon first entered into a contest of this kind on 19 August 1909 at 
the Indianapolis Speedway.  Ray Harroun drove the Marmon car in the Ten-Mile Free-
for-All Handicap and won the race.  Victories followed in quick succession after that first 
attempt.  On 30 May 1911 Marmon’s racing history reached its pinnacle when Ray 
Harroun and Cyrus Patschke drove the Marmon “Wasp” to first place in the International 
Sweepstakes Five-Hundred-Mile Race at the Indianapolis Speedway.  The average speed 
during the race was 74.61 miles per hour.141   
Howard Marmon also won attention for his West Indianapolis family business 
when he assisted in the development of the Liberty Motor used in aircraft engines during 
World War I.  The Nordyke & Marmon Company won the first honor pennant offered by 
the United States government for building and shipping the highest number of Liberty 
Motors during the month of October 1918.  The workers surpassed their production 
record at 225 percent of the allotted quota.142   
By 1913, West Indianapolis had shown its value as a viable, cohesive community 
that contributed to the overall success of Indianapolis.  The people living in West 
Indianapolis were hard-working, tax-paying citizens who contributed to the support of 
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Nordyke & Marmon, 53-54. 
142Ibid., 41-42; “Wins Liberty Motor Flag; Nordyke & Marmon Company Led All Manufacturers 
in October,” New York Times, 2 November 1918, 14. 
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their local schools, library, and churches.  Well-established large and small businesses 
supplied opportunity for employment to residents of the city of Indianapolis.  The area 
accommodated railroads, stockyards, and industries, crucial components that joined the 
capital city and the state of Indiana with the national economy.   
West Indianapolis was a community of working families.  John A. Claghorn, a 
laborer at an automobile factory, lived at 523 Coffey in 1913 with his wife, Prudence, his 
eleven year old son, Irvin, and his three daughters, Adeline, Mina, and Teresa, ages ten, 
eight, and four.  Walter Vanasdal was an electrician for a heating and lighting company.  
He and his wife, Catherine, and five year old son, George, had been living in the house 
across the street from the Claghorn family at 522 Coffey for a short time in 1913.  
William E. Longemire was a laborer, who moved to Indianapolis from North Carolina 
with his wife, Lucinda, and their five sons and three daughters, living at 528 Coffey in 
1913.143  (See Figures 11a and 11b.) 
Those who owned the major businesses or had been involved with bolstering this 
community in its earlier years, were now living outside the borders of West Indianapolis.  
According to the 1910 United States Census, Addison Nordyke lived at 2330 College 
Avenue, and Walter Nordyke lived at 901 North Capitol at a boarding house.  Daniel 
Marmon died in 1909, but his widow, Elizabeth, was living in their home on North 
Delaware Street.  Howard Marmon lived on North Pennsylvania, and Walter Marmon 
lived on North Delaware.  Nicholas McCarty, Jr., lived at 32 East Vermont.  Alexander 
B. Tolin, the first mayor of West Indianapolis, lived at 120 Nordyke in 1896, but 
following his tenure as mayor, he moved to a home at 2164 North Pennsylvania Avenue.   
                                                 
143Polk, Indianapolis City Directory for 1913; Census (1910). 
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The Relationship with the River 
These were some of the people and businesses that comprised West Indianapolis.  But, 
what does this information say about the relationship they had with White River?  Did the 
river influence where they lived, their activities, and their identities?  Did their beliefs 
and actions have an impact on the river? 
Nicholas McCarty, Sr., “an honored and distinguished pioneer of Indiana and its 
capital city,” was progressive and ambitious not only for personal success but for the 
general welfare of his home town and state.144  He tried a number of business operations 
on his bayou farm in West Indianapolis.  He introduced growing silk in Indiana around 
the year 1835.  About five years later he initiated cultivation and manufacture of hemp, to 
which he devoted much of his bayou farm, in addition to land in other sections of the 
state.  Unfortunately, due to the financial condition of the country at the time, 
manufacturing hemp proved unprofitable to McCarty, and he abandoned the initiative 
after a period of about three years.  Nonetheless, he had confidence in the ultimate 
prosperity of the capital city, and his endeavors laid substantial foundations for the city.  
He purchased large tracts of land in Marion County and other counties of the state, and 
because of great appreciation in the value of his holdings near Indianapolis, his 
descendants received large financial returns.145   
McCarty was one who initially worked with the river to achieve success.  His 
“bayou” farm location depended on flooding from White River for successful crops.  
Eventually, the river and its surrounding landscape became an obstacle in the way of 
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economic progress for the city and McCarty’s heirs.  The proximity of this low-lying land 
to the city made it more profitable for McCarty’s heirs to sell the land for other uses. 
The White River and the railroads influenced the locations of many early 
businesses that set up shop in West Indianapolis.  While land values likely played a part 
in business owners’ decisions, clearly shipping and receiving and waste disposal concerns 
directed their decisions as well.  By a Special Commission on 8 March 1883 the Board of 
Trustees of West Indianapolis declared it unlawful to slaughter cattle, sheep, hogs, or 
other animals within the corporate limits of the town, except on the banks or margin of 
White River.146  This ordinance reflects how businesses used White River to dispose of 
their waste, thereby influencing their choice of location.   
By the 1920s, the quality of the water became so polluted that farmers down 
stream of Indianapolis could not allow their cattle to drink from White River or to grow 
crops along the river’s banks.147   Residents dismissed the river for their most basic 
need—a clean, potable water source.  Until the early twentieth century, citizens of 
Indianapolis relied on dug wells for drinking water and other household uses.  The 
connection between waste dumped in the river and potable water went largely 
unrecognized.  Due to waste and sewage disposal in White River, accompanied by 
repeated flooding, city health officials were troubled by typhoid fever cases for many 
years, and residents were often required to boil water to kill bacteria.148  
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Town of West Indianapolis Ordinance Book A (1883-1889), located at Commission on Public 
Records, Indiana State Archives. 
147Scarpino, 202. 
148Joint Commission composed of George W. Fuller, C.E. Ferguson, and B.J.T. Jeup, “Report 
Upon the Water Supply and Sanitary Conditions of the City of Indianapolis” (Indianapolis: by the author, 
October 26, 1904), 1 and 3-5. 
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When people were navigating the river by canoes and flatboats in the early 
nineteenth century, they took care to remove obstructions from the river.  When Congress 
began appropriating funds to build canals in 1828, people turned their attention to the 
possibility of creating new watercourses and discarded efforts to improve and maintain 
the existing river.  This change in mindset, together with alterations associated with the 
growing city—continual land development, levee construction, bridge erection, drainage 
projects, the lure of the railroads, and industrialization—redirected the future of the river.  
These developments set the stage for White River to become the topic of jests about its 
navigability, for a state court ruling at the end of the nineteenth century that declared the 
river not navigable, and for misuse of the river leading to increased pollution, flooding, 
and undesired social consequences.149 
After the failure of the Governor Morton to prove White River navigable, the city 
expected that governmental aid would be provided to help remove obstructions from the 
river, but nothing came of those expectations.  The fact that the boat made it as far as it 
did was a surprise given the years of accumulated drifts and sandbars.  By 1910, the flow 
of White River had become more uneven due to cleared land and increased drainage, 
making the surface water pass off more rapidly and increasing obstructions in the 
streams.  After clearing the land, rainstorms then washed more and more trees into the 
river.  These logs either formed drifts or became water-logged and sunk to the bottom 
forming a base for sand and gravel bars.150   
The river had been abandoned as a navigable route and the level of filth dumped 
in the river was steadily increasing.  Typically, one would expect that the river provided 
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some source of recreation.  Did residents catch and eat fish from White River?  Did they 
take canoe rides?  Did children play on the river’s banks?  Did they ice skate in the 
winter?  Or, did the threats of malaria and typhoid keep people away?  Social historian 
Frederick Doyle Kershner, Jr., found that in the 1860s and 1870s summer activities in 
Indianapolis included all-day picnics in the woods, hiking parties, and swimming in the 
Canal or “holes” of Fall Creek and White River.  In the winter, people engaged in 
activities such as ice skating, sleighing, and tobogganing.151  Therefore, residents enjoyed 
the river for recreation, while at the same time, they viewed the river as an unhealthy 
place. 
While contemplating the future of Indianapolis and what could be done with the 
property in West Indianapolis to help economic conditions in the capital city, Mayor John 
Caven retreated to the river to meditate about his problem.  Mayor Caven shared the 
following account in 1881: 
One day in September 1875 I walked around the old abandoned 
embankment west of White River, and from the Vandalia Road to the river 
I walked all the way through weeds higher than my head, pushing them 
aside with my hands.  I took off my boots and waded White River not far 
from the present Belt Road bridge, and, as the water was deep, I got my 
clothes wet.  Climbing over to the partially built abutment on the east bank 
to dry, I sat there for two hours considering the question of whether the 
great work of a road around this city could be put in motion.  It would 
combine all the benefits sought, not only furnish work for our laboring 
population during the savage year of 1876, or at furthest 1877, but also 
relieve our streets.  It would also bring here an immense cattle business 
and lay down a great taxable property.  As I looked over that almost 
desert-looking river bottom, the outlook for moving in the matter to 
furnish bread to hungry people a year or two anyway was gloomy, but I 
then and there determined that this was the only project that could 
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accomplish the result, and resolved to make the effort, and see what will 
and a good purpose could do.152  
The spot where Mayor Caven sat provided a good view of the landscape of West 
Indianapolis, so that may have been his goal when he headed toward the river.  He 
described the river bottom as desert-like and the river banks as abandoned and full of 
overgrown weeds.   
As Mayor Caven thought about the best use of the land west of White River, he 
emphasized the importance of taxable property.  Converting the swampy land to 
commercial use made economic sense in the wake of the Panic of 1873.  In his “Belt 
Road Message” read to the Common Council of Indianapolis on 17 July 1876, Mayor 
Caven asked the Council to suppose that 
Indianapolis were surrounded by a navigable water, into which poured 
eleven navigable rivers, navigable to every county in the state, and to 
every state in the Union, to every fertile valley, to every hillside with its 
exhaustless mines, to every quarry of stone and forest of timber, and, in 
addition, this water was especially adapted for the location of innumerable 
manufactories, would it be deemed an improper expense for the city to 
improve such harbor?  What that harbor would be to the city in the water, 
that road might be to us.153   
Clearly, city administrators were sensitive to the non-navigable status of White River and 
believed the railroads held the potential the river lacked. 
A dichotomy existed in the relationship between people and the river.  Actions 
taken by residents and businesses reflect that people often failed to realize the 
interdependent relationship they had with the river and, instead, disassociated themselves 
from the river.  The river was important for farming and many industries.  It was also 
useful for waste disposal.  It was even useful for a retreat from the city or for recreational 
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Indianapolis Sentinel, 18 May 1881, quoted in Dunn, 1:259. 
153Dunn, 1:259.  Mayor Caven was referring to the eleven railroads that passed through 
Indianapolis in 1876. 
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purposes.  Regardless, the river had been abused by residents and businesses resulting in 
an unhealthy environment.  The 1913 flood brought the reciprocal relationship that 
existed but remained unacknowledged into the foreground. 
85 
CHAPTER 3: THE 1913 FLOOD 
Pop and Irvin had brought in 2 X 4’s to put under the piano . . . the piano 
was the important thing.  It was a beautiful one and we were all so proud 
of it, especially Pop.  He had worked hard to keep up payments on it and 
only owed one or two more. 
--Adeline Claghorn Haine, “1913 Flood  
(West Indianapolis, Indiana) 523 Coffey Street,  
as remembered by Adeline Claghorn Haine in 1979”   
In 1913, White River flooded like never before, devastating West Indianapolis.  
Adeline Claghorn’s family lived at 523 Coffey Street in West Indianapolis, and they rode 
out the storm in their attic.  She was ten years old in 1913, and she remembered it as a 
long, fearful night.  It turned out that the strange noises they started hearing around 11:00 
p.m. under the attic floor were the furniture bumping against the ceiling.  They could also 
hear voices, close and far away, calling out in distress, one was their neighbor calling for 
his wife.  Finally, around 11:00 the next morning, a canoe pulled up to the edge of the 
roof, and the Claghorn family—mother, father, and four children—climbed out of the 
attic window and stepped down into the canoe.  When they were allowed to go back to 
their house, after about two weeks, they found a sickening sight.  Wet and slippery mud 
covered everything, and they sprinkled lime everywhere, especially on the outside toilets 
to prevent disease.  After working for days just getting the mud and ruined things out of 
the house, they carried the “once beautiful piano out in the back and burned it.”154   
People like the Claghorns, who moved to West Indianapolis to find employment 
and a place to call home, faced flooding as a fact of life.  Regardless of their resolve, the 
“Great Flood” of 1913 “isolated the west side,” literally and figuratively.155 
                                                 
154Adeline Claghorn Haine, “1913 Flood (West Indianapolis, Indiana) 523 Coffey Street, as 
remembered by Adeline Claghorn Haine in 1979,” interview by Vicki Haine Hatfield and Irma Baker, 
spiral booklet (Adeline Claghorn Haine, 2000), located at Indiana State Library, 10-16.  
155Leary, 184. 
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In the middle of March 1913 severe storms blew into the country from the 
northwest.  The local newspapers reported on tornados, floods, and fire from Nebraska to 
Illinois as the storms slowly marched toward Indiana.  Reports of deaths, destroyed 
homes, ravaged railroad lines and bridges, downed telephone lines, and stranded 
communities filled the front pages.  The storms entered the state on 23 March 1913, with 
a tornado that killed an estimated fifteen to twenty-five people in Terre Haute.156  The 
Indianapolis News reported on the destructive path of the storms with flood reports from 
every city in the state located near a river.  Articles titled “$500,000 Loss at Peru,” “Over 
the Muncie Levee,” “Boats in Carmel Streets,” “Danville Cars Stopped,” “Bloomington 
is Cut Off,” and “Shelbyville Levee Breaks” appeared on just one page of the 
Indianapolis News on 25 March 1913.157   
The rain began to fall in Indianapolis on 23 March and lasted for five days.  In 
Indianapolis, the stone railing and a part of the roadway washed from the east side of the 
Meridian Street bridge over Fall Creek.158  Stories and photographs in the Indianapolis 
News showed flooded streets and submerged houses in the area of Thirtieth Street and 
Central Avenue and in Broad Ripple. 
In the end, however, the flood hit West Indianapolis the hardest, including 
collapsing the Washington Street bridge, which was the link between West Indianapolis 
and downtown Indianapolis.  (See Figures 12a and 12b.)  In the early evening on 25 
March water from White River crested and spilled over the banks, and West Indianapolis  
                                                 
156“Relief is Given Indiana Victims of the Tornado,” Indianapolis News, 24 March 1913. 
157
Indianapolis News, 25 March 1913. 
158“Part of Meridian Street Bridge is Swept Out,” Indiananpolis News, 26 March 1913, photograph 
and caption. 
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flooded east of Harding Street.159  In some places the water was from 10 to 15 feet deep.  
The flood washed away the tracks of the Belt railroad, from the Kentucky Avenue shops 
east to White River.  The Union stockyards were completely surrounded by water.  A 
heavy current ran through the gap made by the break in the Belt railroad levee.160  Late in 
the afternoon of 25 March Mayor Shank notified Fire Company 19 at Morris and Harding 
Streets that the Morris Street levee was breaking.  (See Figure 13.)  Within a few 
minutes, water began to flow into the station.  By the time the firemen hitched horses to 
their wagons, the flood water had reached their waists.  The lower floor of the fire station 
ultimately had water 9 feet deep, and the station was a half mile from White River.161 
When the levee south of Oliver Street broke, the torrential waters drowned a man, 
a woman, and a child in their own home.  Rescuers in boats worked tirelessly to save the 
stranded families on roofs and from attics.  Houses floated in the middle of the streets.  
Finally, at 1:30 a.m., the efforts stopped because rescuers could work no more, although 
many people remained stranded.  “Cries of distress were heard from all sides during the 
early hours of the night, but as the night wore on the cries became fewer and feebler, and 
at 3:00 a.m., there was stillness in the flooded district.”162 
On 26 March the east and middle spans of the West Washington Street bridge 
over White River gave way.  The high tension feed wires that supplied electricity for the 
Indianapolis Street Railway Company over the bridge were almost in the river at places.  
The bridge tore loose from the pier on the east, and the end of the roadway went below 
the water.  The water ran over the road in torrents and gradually washed away parts of the  
                                                 
159Members of the Mary Rigg Senior Citizens Group, 5. 
160“Belt Railroad Track Reported Washed Out,” Indianapolis News, 26 March 1913. 
161Divita, 18; and Indianapolis Star, 30 March 1913. 
162“Reports of Bodies Seen on the Water,” Indianapolis News, 26 March 1913. 
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railing.  The night before, the rushing water swept away the Indianapolis & Vincennes 
railroad bridge over White River.  All efforts on the part of the railway employees to save 
the Vandalia bridge proved futile.  The police, anticipating the bridge to be washed away, 
had backed five coal cars, two of them filled with bricks, onto the tracks to weigh the 
bridge down.  Those standing at Washington and Illinois Streets testified that they heard 
the crash of the failing bridge.163  (See Figure 13.) 
The United States Weather Bureau reported a total of six and one-tenth inches of 
rain during those five days.  The flooding that resulted “cost the lives of scores of people, 
rendered many thousands homeless, and destroyed property beyond estimate. . . . The 
enormous losses over such an extended area is unprecedented in the history of this 
portion of the United States, and it must follow that an occurrence so unusual must have 
been produced by extraordinary weather conditions.”164  (See Figures 14a and 14b.) 
The flood affected the entire Ohio River valley and its tributaries and received 
national attention.  According to a Congressional report, the flood of 1913 stood out from 
its predecessors especially because of the exceptional magnitude and intensity of the 
storms which were its direct cause and because the greatest damage occurred along 
tributaries, which in the past had not been particularly effective in creating flooding on 
the Ohio River.  Table 12 included in this report indicated that when the river level 
reached 21 feet on the West Branch of White River, recorded at Elliston, Indiana, experts 
considered the river in danger of flooding.  The crest on 27 March 1913 reached 31.3 
feet—1.7 feet higher than the previous maximum crest.  This location had kept records 
since about 1908.  On the East Branch of White River, recorded at Shoals, Indiana, when  
                                                 
163“West Washington Bridge Gives Way,” Indianapolis News, 26 March 1913. 
164Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau, The Flood on White River in March, 1913, by 
Verne H. Church, Section Director (Indianapolis, April 8, 1913), located at the Indiana State Library. 
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the river level reached 25 feet, experts considered the river in danger of flooding.  The 
crest on 28 March 1913 reached 42.2 feet—8.1 feet higher than the previous maximum 
crest.  This location had kept records since about 1903.165  Scientific recording of flood 
data did not begin until the twentieth century at these locations, but by all accounts, the 
1913 flood was the greatest flood in the history of the midwest portion of the United 
States.   
The Pennsylvania Railroad commissioned a report to assess the damage to the rail 
lines and bridges, and its report included an observation station at Indianapolis.  The 
railroad reported the stage at which flooding occurred at the Indianapolis station as 12 
feet.  The water level reached 25.7 feet in March 1913—6.2 feet higher than the previous 
maximum level.166  As shown by these statistics, the flood in 1913 reached new levels in 
Indianapolis, compromised flood control measures previously implemented, and 
challenged city planners and engineers to devise new methods for flood control. 
Local reports confirmed the unprecedented flooding in 1913.  On 25 March the 
local office of the weather bureau issued a statement concerning the flood conditions on 
White River: “At Indianapolis the government river gauging station is surrounded by 
water making it inaccessible for further readings.  The last obtained was 19.6 feet at 9 
a.m.  The highest previous record was 19.5 feet, in 1904, on April 1.”167 
The report commissioned by the United States government did not include 
Indianapolis, a capital city, as a recording point on White River.  The report 
                                                 
165A. H. Horton and H. J. Jackson, The Ohio Valley Flood of March-April, 1913 (Including 
Comparisons with Some Earlier Floods), (Washington, D.C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 
1913), 47 and 51. 
166C. W. Garrett, comp., A History of the Flood of March, 1913. Pennsylvania Lines West of 
Pittsburgh, (Pennsylvania Company, 1913), 251.  
167“Weather Bureau’s Statement,” Indianapolis News, 25 March 1913. 
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commissioned by the Pennsylvania Railroad did record statistics at Indianapolis, although 
it did not include any information about damage to the railroad lines and bridges in 
Indianapolis.  This lack of attention to flooding in Indianapolis raises the question of why 
government agencies and businesses treated flooding in the capital city as unimportant?  
The river flowing through the city seemed to hold little significance locally or nationally. 
The Topography 
Long before the 1913 flood occurred, certain factors were present and a number 
of events transpired that governed the impact of the flood.  The commissioners to the 
legislature came from southern Indiana where the land was knobby and intricately laced 
with streams.  The prospect of building a town on land “as level as a barn floor” was 
appealing to them.  Unfortunately, they failed to consider the issue of drainage.168  In 
their defense, the commissioners visited the future site of Indianapolis in 1820, 
apparently a dry year.  As previously mentioned, the commissioners chose the site for the 
capital city because of its central location in the state, because the land was level with 
rich soil for farming, and because they believed White River was navigable.  The 
following year, the more common, wet conditions of Indianapolis were revealed.   
Geologists have conjectured that the site where the city now stands was in some 
past age the bed of a lake.  The average elevation is about 720 feet above sea level but 
with somewhat higher ground on all sides.  (See Figure 15.)  A swampy valley called 
Pogue’s Run ran diagonally across the site.  An extensive swamp called Fletcher’s 
Swamp existed northeast of the mile square that in wet seasons discharged its overflow 
through the site of the city via “the ravines.”  During floods, Fall Creek emptied its 
surplus water through Fletcher’s Swamp and the same ravines.  A number of deep places  
                                                 
168Dunn, 1:8. 
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developed where water stood most of the year, and water puddled for weeks during the 
wet seasons in low places scattered through the dense forest.  In the area that later 
became West Indianapolis, just southwest of Greenlawn Cemetery a body of stagnant 
water existed, called “Graveyard Pond,” that was covered by a green, filthy scum and 
inhabited by snakes and frogs in the summer.  (See Figure 7 on page 63.)  Lake McCarty 
was another pond in the low ground between Ray and Morris streets.  It was both a 
natural and man-made pond, as its size and depth increased due to excavations and fills 
for the National Road.  Settlers in the area maintained that it rained much more in 
Indianapolis in the earlier years than later, which is probable because the conditions were 
“peculiarly favorable to local evaporation and reprecipitation.”169   
By forging ahead with plans to build the city in that muddy location, the founders 
set the stage for the environmental future of the city—an environment in which flooding 
would become increasingly more severe, costly, and unhealthy.  Consequently, the 
relationship between city residents and the landscape continually grew into one of distrust 
and distance.  People either ignored their circumstances or distanced themselves from the 
river as much as possible.  They covered swamps and filled ravines.  They knew flooding 
would occur, but not exactly when.  In fact, the city enjoyed years without flooding. 
The muddy location also meant unhealthy conditions for the settlers.  
Unfortunately, as the secretary of the Indiana State Board of Health John N. Hurty noted 
in 1908, “almost nothing was known of the disease-bearing possibilities of water” and 
early settlers considered diarrhea, dysentery and typhoid “among the necessary 
                                                 
169Ibid., 1:8-14. 
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concomitants of life.”170  Diseases common in Indianapolis included cholera, 
consumption, scarlatina, diphtheria, dysentery, pneumonia, influenza, typhoid, cerebro-
spinal meningitis, and tuberculosis.  The common diseases shifted over time, but without 
the bacterial key, doctors found it difficult to distinguish between the various maladies 
and often categorized them simply as miasma and epizootic.171 
The conditions in Indianapolis “made a natural field for malarial diseases.”172  
But, it was not until the mosquito theory arrived on the scene around 1898 that people 
understood the cause of the disease.  People believed it was the product of the miasma 
rising from the damp soil and decaying vegetation or possibly the alternations of heat and 
cold.  Most of the early settlers “served a regular apprenticeship at the ague,” including 
the doctors who treated them.  They did recognize that the disease became less common 
as the land was cleared, another reason to take control of the topography.173 
During floods, the ravines became raging torrents.  Before Washington Street was 
graded for the National Road, the ravine that crossed Washington Street was a broad 
valley and so deep that in flood time the water at that point “would swim a horse.”  The 
city became almost an island in flood time surrounded by ravines, the swamps, and 
creeks.  In the early years of settlement, the floods did little damage because cabins were 
constructed out of harm’s way, but the floods obstructed travel.  In April and May 1821 
publication of the Gazette was suspended for a month because the editors had gone out of 
town and could not get back through the floods.  On 10 May 1824 the Western Censor 
printed an apology for its limited outside news because the mail carriers were not able to 
                                                 
170Dr. John N. Hurty in Indiana Sanitary and Water Supply Association, Proceedings (1908), 11, 
quoted in Kershner, 252-253. 
171Kershner, 251-252. 
172Dunn, 1:8. 
173Demas McFarland in Locomotive, 13 June 1859, quoted in Dunn, 1:10; and Dunn, 1:8-11. 
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get out of or into town.  In March and April 1826 the mails were stopped for some days 
due to flooding.174 
Flood Prevention 
By the flood of 1828, greater damage occurred because farmers had begun to 
cultivate the bottom-lands.  Flood waters washed away fences and covered fertile fields 
with sand and gravel.  Property owners began building earthen levees to protect their land 
from flood waters, but the levees narrowed the current of flood waters, especially those 
built by river bank property owners.175  When engineers designed bridges to cross the 
river, they were too short, and the bridges acted like dams during high water, restricting 
the flow of water and increasing its intensity. 
As the settlement of Indianapolis progressed, humans encroached more and more 
on the existing environment of the site.  The Indiana legislature passed an act on 4 
February 1837 appointing a commission to oversee the drainage of the swamps and 
lowlands northeast of the mile square of Indianapolis.  The legislators decided to cut a 
state ditch.  The ditch disposed of the trouble with the ravines for about ten years until the 
banks gave way on 1 January 1847.  The “water came down its old channels in volume 
that startled those who had invaded them.” 
. . . Israel Jennings, who had been living peacefully at the northwest corner 
of Walnut and New Jersey streets, was awakened by a noise in the night, 
and on rising from his high-post bed to investigate went into water almost 
to his waist.  He managed to get ashore with his family; and in the 
morning rescued his belongings by aid of a wagon and team.  The flood of 
1847 was quite general throughout the state, and did so much damage that 
the legislature provided for the reappraisement of real property that had 
                                                 
174Ibid., 1:11. 
175Ibid., 1:11-13; and Divita, 17. 
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been injured, and for change of the tax duplicates to the extent of the 
injury.176 
The ditch was repaired, but it broke again in June 1858, and the waters again found their 
old channels.  After another set of repairs to the ditch, it seemed to be fixed for good.   
People forgot about the ravines.  But, on 1 June 1875 a severe electric and wind 
storm followed by a deluge of rain visited the city.  This time the waters surged through 
the fashionable residential district of the city flooding the first floors of homes in the 
vicinity of Twelfth and Pennsylvania. After 1875, the ravines were filled in so that the 
trace of their course was barely visible except in the occasional slope of street grades and 
lots.  People did believe that the course of the filled ravines was traceable by “typhoid 
belts” along their old channels and tributary swales.  Medical professionals did not attach 
much importance to this belief, but they did believe the old ravines affected wells which 
were commonly sunk only to the first level.  In 1887, Dr. Samuel E. Earp, the first city 
sanitarian, noted that the city’s water supply was not good because it was drawn from a 
swampy source.177 
Until the arrival of the first railroad in Indianapolis in 1847, the topography south 
of Pogue’s Run, which was rife with flood conditions, was of little importance to the city.  
Between 1860 and 1870, the city started expanding in that direction as a result of the 
railroad, and the city turned its attention to this troublesome area.  Lake McCarty was one 
of the natural features causing problems; the “Virginia River” was the other.  In 1866, the 
Common Council of Indianapolis ordered Nicholas McCarty, Jr., to cut a ditch through 
his land to drain the pond into White River.  In 1868, the Common Council adopted a 
more permanent solution by levying a sewer tax of 15 cents on each $100 of property 
                                                 
176Dunn, 1:13. 
177Ibid., 1:13-14. 
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value and appropriated funds to build a sewer through Ray Street to the river to drain 
Lake McCarty.  The ordinance also authorized McCarty to fill in the pond once drained.  
Likewise, the Virginia River caused problems.  The Indianapolis Committee on Sewers 
classified this “so-called river” as a mere stream with a two-mile winding course 
beginning southeast of the Deaf and Dumb Asylum, passing down East Street and 
Virginia Avenue, and ending at Pogue’s Run, but after heavy rains, it transformed into a 
swiftly flowing stream from 15 to 100 feet wide and deep enough in places to “swim a 
horse.”   With the growth of the city, the river became obstructed by street grades and 
culverts, it started forming deep ponds along its course, and its channel was deep and 
rapid, carrying a formidable body of water after heavy rains.  The Committee on Sewers 
noted that these evils would increase with future street improvements; therefore, the 
Common Council approved lodging the river in the South Street and Kentucky Avenue 
sewer.178 
The city continually took steps to conquer its drainage and flooding problems, and 
in the process, White River and the surrounding landscape underwent dramatic changes.  
As the town of Indianapolis grew and progressed into a “modern” city, additional 
concerns rose to the surface.  Garbage and human waste disposal became an important 
problem that, combined with drainage and flooding problems, had to be addressed by city 
administrators. 
The Modern City 
The introduction to the 1906 Polk’s City Directory for Indianapolis described the 
city’s growth in the following terms: 
                                                 
178Ibid., 1:14. 
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Some time ago Indianapolis became noted as the largest inland city in the 
country; that honor still rests with us . . . .  Another remarkable fact about 
the population of Indianapolis is that during the decade from 1890 to 
1900, the city had a percentage of growth larger than any other city in 
America of its class.179 
This growth was attributed in part to the industrialization of Indianapolis.  Industry brings 
environmental issues of one type, but the expanding numbers of people that accompany a 
booming industrial economy, brings other issues. 
Indianapolis hired Moses Brown, the outstanding sewerage engineer in the nation 
at the time, to plan a sewerage system for the city.  By 1873 the city had constructed 10 
miles of conduits at an expense of $200,000.  Similar to systems adopted in other cities 
during this time, the sewer system dumped into White River.  The real purpose of the 
sewers was draining storm waters to prevent flooding city streets.  The city continued to 
rely on privies or mere dumping in the yard or alley for human waste disposal.  By 1893 
“the accumulated filth of one hundred thousand people was enough to turn the stomach,” 
and the city hired Rudolph Hering, a New York sanitary engineer of national reputation, 
to devise a new system.  Hering’s plan provided for a city-wide system of conduits, with 
artificial and natural flushing, but the system discharged its contents into White River.180  
(See Figure 16.) 
The city initially had no provision for disposal of garbage or trash, which people 
simply buried in their yards or dumped into White River.  Finally, in 1873 Indianapolis 
purchased the Sellers Farm just south of the official borders of West Indianapolis as a 
future dumping ground, and in 1875 arranged for collection of garbage by contractors for 
deposit on the Sellers Farm at the expense of residents.  Unfortunately, an economic  
                                                 
179Polk, Indianapolis City Directory for 1906, 75. 
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Figure 16.  Digital photograph of “Map Showing Principal Sewers of 
Indianapolis,” Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the 
Indiana Engineering Society held at Indianapolis January 7, 8, and 9, 1897 
(Greenfield, Indiana:  Herald Publishing Company, 1897), 51.  Courtesy of 
the Indiana State Library.
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depression slowed progress and residents did not want to pay the collection fee.  By 1895 
people were still throwing over ninety-five percent of their refuse into privy vaults, 
cellars, and alleys.  Mayor Taggart decided that the city must take responsibility and 
inaugurated free city collection of refuse, which after three years made a noticeable 
difference in city streets and back yards.181 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the city’s growth had created serious 
environmental problems for the river.  Flooding took on more significance, because flood 
water was not only a nuisance, it was dangerously unhealthy.  The river regurgitated what 
had been dumped into it by the city’s residents and businesses.  The 1906 Proceedings of 
the Indiana Engineering Society reported on the state of White River: 
A black deposit of oily, foul, animal and vegetable matter can be raised 
from the bed for miles.  The weeds are coated with grease and with 
sewage plants.  Flats are covered with blackening offal; driftwood collects 
dead hogs and other animal refuse where they putrefy.  The odor is distinct 
for 40 miles down the river.  Animals will not drink it.  It cannot be used 
for the laundry or other domestic purposes when the cisterns and wells go 
dry.182 
The river also contained a large quantity of industrial waste from mills and strawboard 
factories.183 
In addition to efforts to gain control of refuse and human waste disposal, the city 
undertook another project shortly before the 1913 flood, which was influenced by the 
country’s Progressive Era and “city beautiful movement.”  George E. Kessler, a 
landscape architect and city planner who had been hired by the city on 1 February 1908, 
designed a park and boulevard system for Indianapolis.  Kessler intended to manipulate 
the natural setting in Indianapolis to serve many functions at one time: quality of life 
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improvement, beautification, improved automobile thoroughfares, and flood control.  He 
wanted to “reclaim the garbage-strewn banks and polluted waters of streams in order to 
provide a natural beauty to the boulevards” based on methods he learned in Europe.184  
As noted by Kessler, “Only those familiar with the conditions in most European cities 
where river improvements have been of first importance will realize the vast difference 
between conditions in such cities and those presented on your water front.”185  Kessler 
applied his appreciation for European form to the conditions in Indianapolis by merging 
the City Beautiful tenets of design with practical considerations, where function and 
beauty were equally considered.186  This project, underway in 1913, was an exception 
when city administrators acknowledged the potential positive attributes of the river. 
Although considered a political movement, the City Beautiful movement was also 
a social movement.  Similar to other American cities in the early twentieth century, 
Indianapolis had changed from an agrarian society to an urban society centered around 
industry with these changes occurring rapidly over the course of a few decades.  The City 
Beautiful movement reflected the struggle by people to achieve a standard of modern 
living that inserted beauty and comfort into their lives while also taking advantage of 
newly-acquired scientific knowledge.  The movement reflected the response by people to 
the changes brought to society by industrialization on one hand and the growing 
realization of health concerns on the other.  Industrialization improved the economy, but 
it regimented lifestyles and transformed pastoral landscapes into urban spaces. 
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By 1880 scientists had proven the germ theory.  Progressive Era city 
administrators began to promote clean water and good health as requirements of the 
modern society.  As Suellen Hoy describes in Chasing Dirt (1995), “personal health and 
comfort forced private individuals to take an interest in their neighbors’ sanitary 
condition.”187  Cleanliness became the national expectation with scientific backing, but 
“the disturbing possibility lurked that not everyone would share or practice it.  Like other 
features of progressivism, public sanitation and personal cleanliness retained a lingering 
middle-class, indeed upper middle-class tincture.”188  Flood control and cleanliness 
became intertwined and signified progress.  If a sector of society did not conform, others 
took note. 
Flooding in West Indianapolis 
The word victim was spoken often following the “Great Flood.”  Those who 
found themselves in the path of the flood waters were referred to as “flood victims.”  The 
city itself was a “victim” of the flood.  The flood reiterated the fearful and distrustful 
relationship with the river. 
People living on the Hill in West Indianapolis, just beyond the flood zone, worked 
all night, rescuing survivors from their homes in the Valley.  Mayor Samuel L. Shank 
created a committee of community volunteers to provide charitable relief and basic 
necessities to the affected families.  This committee, along with other charitable 
organizations, collected contributions and worked to distribute aid to the flood victims in 
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the form of food, clothing, furniture, etc.189  The federal government provided assistance 
when President Woodrow Wilson sent financial aid, United States sailors to provide 
assistance, and a message of sympathy and encouragement to flood victims. 
The churches in West Indianapolis pitched in to help.  Reverend Joseph Weber 
opened the Assumption Church as a temporary home for over three hundred people who 
found themselves homeless after the flood.  He aided in delivering the message of their 
suffering to the rest of the city: “Only those of us who live among and know the poor can 
appreciate the great suffering and the great need of assistance . . . They are all good at 
heart and it is the fault of society, mainly, that they are placed in such a position that they 
can not help themselves when calamity falls upon them.”  Reverend Weber served as a 
mediator and coordinator in the rescue and salvage efforts, and he offered the rectory at 
Assumption Church to serve as a Red Cross station.190 
The people of Indianapolis temporarily put aside any social differences and 
assisted those in need.  Adeline Claghorn’s family originally went to the Salvation Army 
until her school teacher, Miss Ruth Allerdice, spotted them and insisted that Adeline, her 
mother, and her two sisters stay with them.  Miss Allerdice lived with her parents, who 
were wealthy people in the meat packing business and owned a home at 1212 Park 
Avenue.  Adeline, impressed by their servants and the elegance surrounding her, said she 
“had never been in such a grand and beautiful home.”191  The aid soon ended, and people 
                                                 
189See Indianapolis General Relief Committee for Flood Sufferers, March 26, 1913 to December 
29, 1913, appointed by Mayor Samuel Lewis Shank March 26, 1913 and disbanded upon the completion of 
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attempted to return to their normal lives.  They tried to clean up the muddy, unhealthy 
mess the flood left behind.  (See Figure 17.)   
Day after day, the headlines and stories in the local newspapers reported on the 
conditions in West Indianapolis: looting and arrests, the dangers of disease, guards posted 
to prevent anyone who did not live there from entering the area, health advisors sent in to 
counsel on proper cleaning methods, women scooping mud from carpets with shovels, 
children playing on mud-covered porches, and troublesome drainage problems.  In the 
midst of these reports, the Indianapolis News included a report that “many of them had 
lost what to them was a great deal.  There are days of discomfort and work ahead of 
them, but the end of the flood and the opportunity of getting back home was a happy 
incident, and more than one whistled as he started the work of cleaning house.”192  
Certainly, the people in West Indianapolis resolved to get back home and back to 
work.  The task of doing so was overwhelming, especially for those living in the Valley.  
The people of West Indianapolis received aid, locally and federally, but this flood had 
dealt a life-changing blow.  Newspaper reporters delivered messages to the residents of 
Indianapolis that this area was unclean and unfit, while at the same time reporting that the 
people of West Indianapolis had happily moved back without regard to the health risks. 
Those outside the flooded area wanted to distance themselves from the disaster.  
The caption under a large photograph on the front page of the Indianapolis News on 29 
March 1913 stated that “Astor Street on the west side of Indianapolis, presented an 
excellent example of the insanitary conditions that caused the city board of health to take 
stringent measures in guarding against disease.  In the water, which stood in pools, were  
                                                 
192“Men Repair Their Homes,” Indianapolis News, 28 March 1913. 
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dead chickens and other animals.”193  (See Figure 18.)  The flood tore away one corner of 
the Hilgemeier meat packing plant forcing a group of men to move the meat, which was 
fresh when the flood came, by crossing the water and mud on temporary footbridges of 
planks and posts.  Mrs. Gish, a resident from the Hill in West Indianapolis noted for the 
Indianapolis News that “it was feared the food supply might be short today.  There was 
talk, she said, of trying to break into some grocery stores in the flood district.”194   
Because of the flood emergency, the Common Council of Indianapolis introduced 
a city ordinance on 16 April 1913 to become effective immediately that required daily 
police inspections in the city to determine whether conditions were dangerous or 
unsanitary and whether there were any violations of any city ordinance.  The ordinance 
required each police officer to complete daily written reports with a description of the 
unsanitary or dangerous condition, the name of the offending person, and the names of 
any witnesses.  If the premise was not cleaned or the danger not removed within five 
days, the police officer must file an affidavit charging the person with the violation.  The 
police reports were declared to be public records for the use and benefit of the public at 
large and for the city of Indianapolis.195 
Negative labeling following the 1913 flood further separating the flooded area 
from the rest of the city.  A year after the flood, the Indianapolis News reported that the  
                                                 
193“A Reason Sanitary Measures are Necessary,” Indianapolis News, 29 March 1913. 
194“Men Repair Their Homes,” Indianapolis News, 28 March 1913; and “Hill Folk to the West 
Toiled Through Night,” Indianapolis News, 27 March 1913. 
195Common Council of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, Journals of the Common Council of the 
City of Indianapolis, Indiana, from January 1, 1913, to January 5, 1914 (Indianapolis: Sentinel Printing 
Company, 1914), 216-217.  The Mayor of Indianapolis approved this General Ordinance No. 34 on 21 
August 1913 after the ordinance was amended to restrict each patrolman’s inspection and reporting 
responsibilities to his own district; by the time of approval, the language regarding the existence of an 
emergency was struck. 
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Washington Street bridge still had not been repaired by the city.196  The flood sufferers 
were victims of a disaster left to cope in an unhealthy environment.  The property values 
of homes in the Valley were lower than homes on the Hill, and flooding highlighted this 
difference and entrenched the Valley in a negative identity.  One West Indianapolis 
resident, who was interviewed in the 1970s, said, “When I was young, eyebrows would 
be raised if a girl or boy from the ‘Hill’ dated someone from the ‘Valley.’”197  
Following the 1913 flood, the city administrators rallied together to provide funds 
to meet the emergency needs.  The Common Council of Indianapolis approved issuing 
municipal bonds and transferring money from one designated fund to another for the 
purpose of addressing flood repairs, providing charitable aid to flood victims, preventing 
contagious diseases, surveying the river, and any other need arising following the flood.  
The city had been through this process before.   
A comparison of entries in the Journal of the Common Council following the 
1913 flood with those following the last major flood in 1904 shows that the responses 
were practically identical.  In 1904 city administrators immediately called a special 
meeting of the Common Council and appropriated a total of $225,000 for purposes of the 
flood ($200,000 in municipal bonds plus a $25,000 transfer to an emergency fund).  
Likewise, in 1913 city administrators immediately called a special meeting of the 
Common Council and appropriated a total of $225,000 for purposes of the flood 
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($150,000 in municipal bonds plus two transfers to an emergency fund, one in the amount 
of $50,000 and another in the amount of $25,000).198 
Although experts refer to the flood in 1913 as the “Great Flood,” with one-
hundred-year levels, widespread damage, and an entire area of the city, including the vital 
union stockyards and belt railroad, inundated and cut off from the rest of the city, the 
Common Council devoted no greater resources to the “Great Flood” than the last major 
flood.  It was just another flood in Indianapolis.  Unfortunately, in West Indianapolis, the 
1913 flood was not like any of the others. 
The Great Flood of 1913 occurred at a crucial time in history for the people in 
West Indianapolis.  Indianapolis had been in existence for almost a century and during 
that time its citizens had used and exploited the landscape and river.  The city had grown 
in population and changed from an agrarian town to an urban society reliant on an 
industrial economy.  With these changes came even greater demands on its landscape and 
river.  Shortly before the 1913 flood, the city, along with the rest of the nation, began to 
make scientific discoveries that highlighted the connection between health and sanitary 
conditions.  The city became attuned to cleanliness, which heightened awareness of the 
unhealthy river and its tendency to flood.  Flooding was now not only a nuisance but also 
a fearful, despised occurrence.  The river had been “sloshed around any old way,” and it 
was now dishing it back to the city.199   
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By 1913, generations of Indianapolis residents had withstood almost a century of 
flooding.  Yet, this flood exceeded all others.  Following the 1937 flood the Indiana State 
Planning Board prepared a report on Indiana flood damages noting that monetary 
damages from floods prior to 1913 were less partially because the investment in physical 
improvements was considerably less in the younger days of the state.  According to the 
Board’s report, “it may be stated definitely that floods are becoming more severe with the 
more extensive cultural use of the land.”200   
Citizens living in West Indianapolis were the people working in and living among 
the great manufactories of Indianapolis, but they were now associated with filthy 
flooding conditions.  The people in the path of flood waters bore the brunt of the focus on 
cleanliness.  The folks living in grand homes on Park Avenue benefited from the 
economic improvements brought by this new industrial economy, but they had the 
additional benefit of living far from the river and surrounding landscape. 
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CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The modern world is forged amidst our inattention. 
--Richard White, The Organic Machine 
 
While the community of West Indianapolis was forming and solidifying on the 
fringes of Indianapolis, a number of public policies developed that reflected the residents’ 
relationship with White River and ultimately how the river gave meaning to this urban 
space.  Environmental history, urban history, cultural history, and planning history 
converge in public policies.  But, as John A. Agnew asserts in Place and Politics (1987), 
“political behavior is intrinsically geographical.”  Agnew further suggests that “policy 
outputs” reflect “place-specific social-geographical bases,” and “to the extent outcomes 
are similar across places, one can talk of ‘types’ of place, but it is in specific places that 
the causes of political behavior . . . are to be found.”201  This chapter reviews the strength 
of Agnew’s argument when applied to West Indianapolis.  
Public policies originate with people, yet the average person living in West 
Indianapolis around the turn of the twentieth century probably gave little attention to 
policymaking.  Such matters as reviewing details of municipal ordinances and 
regulations, introducing bills and lobbying for passage of state laws, or monitoring to 
determine who really benefited from policies that governed their daily lives were left to 
the so-called experts.  In any event, the policies that became important to the residents of 
West Indianapolis in the aftermath of the Great Flood of March 1913 were in many cases 
policies that had been implemented by people gone long before the arrival of the 
residents who were present in 1913.  Prior chapters discussed those earlier people who 
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did concern themselves with how the river and the land in West Indianapolis would be 
used and developed.  This chapter delves into larger movements that often go unnoticed 
and how those outside influences interfaced with local policies.  This focus reveals how 
certain factors, seemingly beyond the average person’s control, resulted in public policies 
that changed the environment in West Indianapolis. 
This chapter also explores the types of relationships believed to exist between 
people and nature, who or what possessed the power in that relationship, and what 
movements or trends emerged to affect that relationship.  Environmental, urban, political, 
and planning historians provide a path to follow the history of thought in this regard.  
Throughout these historical studies, the culture of the place, created largely by the 
geography and manifested in the local tensions and power struggles, was the thread 
connecting public policies with environmental changes.   
Historical Studies 
In his landmark book, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency:  The 
Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920, Samuel P. Hays highlights the conflicts 
between the proponents of the federal conservation movement, whose platform rested on 
multiple-use programs for the country’s resources, and local concerns about rights to 
resources.202  The progress made by supporters of the conservation movement was often 
slowed and transformed into something different than originally intended by interference 
from various federal agencies, scientists, and engineers, and in small measure from local 
people who would be impacted by proposed programs.  Hays’s work in this book is of 
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particular interest because of his focus on the larger political movements and national 
trends surrounding 1913, the year of the “Great Flood.”   
Following the Mississippi and Ohio River floods in 1912 and 1913, the debate 
about a federal flood control program intensified.  Keeping with its long-standing 
position, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers remained focused on navigation and failed to 
grasp the possibilities of multiple-purpose river development.  As voiced by Brigadier-
General Mackenzie, Chief of the Corps, in 1905, “partnerships or quasi partnerships 
between the Government and private persons or corporations have not been generally 
favored in the past, as experience has shown that they are apt to be attended by many 
annoying complications.”203  Thus, Hays reveals a muddled relationship with rivers, one 
in which local citizens and businesses had their own goals that sometimes conflicted with 
those of the surrounding region or matters considered in national jurisdiction.  Not only 
did contention exist among local, regional, and national concerns, but conflicts also arose 
between viewpoints at each of these levels.   
Hays illuminates the points of cooperation and conflict between the values of 
technology implicit in conservation and the competing values with which they came into 
contact.  New forms of organization that arose during the Progressive Era extended 
networks of economic life into wider circles of influence, which drew people toward the 
larger centers of decision-making and power—the state and federal governments.  But 
many geographical areas and communities were reluctant  and fearful of the 
consequences and persistent loss of control over the conditions that affected them.  By 
studying these political structures, Hays claims “the more significant context can come 
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into view and reveal history as a web of human interrelationships,” and “the rival systems 
of decision-making which have developed in modern society.”204 
Other political and environmental historians, including those who have 
specifically considered Indiana, have presented relationships between federal and local 
factions that correspond with Hays’s work.  Stephen F. Strausberg and Ann Vileisis 
reviewed the significance of the Swamp Lands Act of 1850 on America’s wetlands.  
Although the Swamp Lands Act was a federal policy, Strausberg argues in “Indiana and 
the Swamp Lands Act” (1977) that the lack of expertise and corruption involved with 
implementation of this Act in Indiana reflected the impact of local culture on its 
environment.205  The desire to control flooding and to reclaim barren wastelands overrode 
larger thinking about the possible long-term impact, especially downstream from drained 
swamps.  The westward movement in America promoted land acquisition, and draining 
wetlands was one scheme the federal government implemented to accomplish this goal.   
The 1863 Indiana Senate Journal referred to the “desolate waste” of Indiana that 
would be transformed into a “habitat for industrious, healthy, and happy people.”206  The 
Indiana Senate voiced its desire for advancement of society, not misuse of valuable 
wetlands.  As Vileisis points out, destruction of wetlands began with cultural disdain for 
swamps coupled with recognition that wealth could be extracted from wetland 
properties.207  Indiana’s early settlers believed they were improving the land from its 
natural state of wastefulness and ridding the landscape of breeding grounds for mosquito-
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borne diseases.  Indiana, unlike other states, decided to retain title to its swamplands, 
selling acreage to settlers with the understanding that the state would drain the land in the 
future.  Unfortunately, due to a number of unforeseen events, including corruption at the 
local level, the state broke that promise.208 
In keeping with the belief that national trends governed river relations, 
environmental and urban historians have pointed to the rapid, unprecedented changes in 
people’s environments that resulted from industrialization.  Samuel P. Hays focuses on 
how industrialization impacted people and their culture in The Response to Industrialism: 
1885-1914 (1947).  Eager to take advantage of the opportunities for economic gains, 
millions of people from Europe and rural America poured into the metropolitan nerve 
centers and learned to cope with a new, impersonal economic environment.  These 
industrial endeavors employed rivers to run mills, to dispose of waste, and cool 
mechanisms, making rivers an important component of industrialization. Theodore 
Steinberg discusses the commodification of water that coincided with increasing 
scientific expertise in Nature Incorporated (1991).  A change occurred in how people 
understood and made use of the environment around them with the broadening industrial 
base and leap in production capacity.  Steinberg argues that industrial capitalism was a 
system of ecological relations that altered human relations with the natural world.  By the 
mid-nineteenth century, laws moved firmly toward an instrumental conception of water 
use and the widely-accepted support for maximizing economic growth.209 
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Industrialization transformed urban geography, then spawned new ideas about 
urban living.  Planning historians John D. Fairfield in The Mysteries of the Great City 
(1993) and William H. Wilson in The City Beautiful Movement (1989) state that urban 
plans were the result of orderly, conscious political decisions, even before the rise of 
professional urban planning.  One such ordered movement occurred during the 
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century when the City Beautiful movement spread 
to cities around the country, including Indianapolis.  The goal of this movement was to 
“influence the heart, mind, and purse of the citizen and to persuade urban dwellers to 
become more imbued with civic patriotism and better disposed toward community 
needs.”210  The City Beautiful movement was a political movement that required 
environmental reorganization and urban planning that edged into functional concerns 
such as beautifying unsightly river banks and improving sewer systems, water supply, 
and flood control.211 
These historians argued that changes driven by national trends, proponents of 
federal control of resources to improve efficiency, and a desire to maximize profits and 
economic growth were beyond the realm of everyday lives of common people.  Other 
environmental and urban historians introduced the concept of unintended consequences, 
suggested unpredictable and messy actions on the part of engineers and politicians, and 
proposed that progress gathers momentum and changes occur whether people are paying 
attention or not.212 
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Whether ordered or disorderly, a series of relationships was always present.  
Historians have disagreed about who or what affected those relationships.  While the 
government, at national, state, and local levels, has played a distinct role in 
environmental decisions, historians have also explored the impact of common people, the 
culture of a place, and the rivers themselves on public policies and the environment.   
Samuel P. Hays emphasizes the need for “a sensitivity to the value assumptions” 
that occur in the course of urban planning in Explorations in Environmental History 
(1998).213  Hays instructs historians to discover the social values on the human side of the 
equation to determine the history of public policy decisions.  He notes that the first basic 
assumption of urban planning is a search for social control, reminding us that “planning 
is never divorced from power.”214  The city was the focal point of increasing human 
congestion with its accompanying changes in urban environmental circumstance, 
especially in contrast with the less-pressed countryside, establishing tension in 
environmental conditions.  Thus, Hays argues that urban planning in the twentieth 
century has changed in relation to changes in social values, especially the emerging 
values of environmental quality and tension with development values.215 
In Environmental Inequalities (1995) historian Andrew Hurley looks at groups of 
common people—middle-class white, working class, and African Americans—and the 
impact each group had on the environment in their community in Gary, Indiana.  
Although these citizens may not have been thinking about the long-term effects and 
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possible unintended consequences of their actions (or non-actions), they nonetheless had 
a definite impact on their environment.  By failing to fight methods of industrial waste 
disposal or, conversely, by fighting to relocate that disposal, distinct environmental 
inequalities occurred.216  Although the groups examined varied greatly in their cultures 
and environmental goals, the example of Gary, Indiana, demonstrates that cultural 
landscapes take on clear character even though they are the result of decisions of 
innumerable individuals.217 
In “American Environmental History” (1985) Richard White calls the urban 
environment an “arena for conflicting pressure groups” and notes the particularly 
significant role women played in raising concerns with urban environmental problems.218  
Often women have stepped into the role of “municipal housekeepers,” presumably a 
logical step.  As Hurley notes, it was middle-class women in Gary, Indiana, who joined 
the League of Women Voters and fought against development along the lakefront.219 
Urban planning historians in the twenty-first century have considered the 
influence of local people and culture on plans involving rivers, unlike earlier planning 
historians who focused entirely on orderly political systems.  Blake Gumprecht, “Who 
Killed the Los Angeles River?” (2005), points to the importance of considering the 
context in which people from an earlier time made their decisions.  The residents of Los 
Angeles viewed their river as a resource and little else; it was the city’s increasing 
reliance on the river for its water supply that first transformed it from a thing of beauty 
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into a concrete eyesore.220  Jared Orsi, “Flood Control Engineering in the Urban 
Ecosystem” (2005), turns to the institution of flood control itself.  Orsi acknowledges the 
influence of human history on the river, but he claims that the failure of Southern 
California’s flood control efforts was a failure born of the interaction between 
unpredictable and messy engineering and unpredictable and messy politics.  He notes that 
“systems for imposing the order of engineering on unruly nature have often failed 
because both engineering and nature are unruly.  Flood control has, therefore, become an 
exercise in substituting one disorderly system for another.”221 
Environmental and urban historian Matthew Klingle, “Changing Spaces” (2006), 
endorses spatial stories that tell how “humans wield power over one another with nature 
as their instrument” thereby merging urban social history with urban environmental 
history.222  Klingle suggests that by looking at what nuisances or problems were deemed 
worthy of attention, historians can map social power against shifting landscapes through 
time.  “Transforming nature and generating inequality are linked, often inextricably 
so.”223 
Planning historian Robert Fishman discusses the different theories among 
planning historians, noting that many have promoted an elitist notion that city planning is 
for experts, underrating contributions of non-professionals to urban form and vitality.  On 
the other side, planning historians, such as Jane Jacobs and Richard Sennett, fell into a 
class of “anti-planners” who believed that a city’s order must be truly social, built up out 
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of the plans of thousands of individuals.  John D. Fairfield suggests that these two 
camps—the assumption that the average citizen is incompetent in the face of complex 
urban problems and the assumption that certain forms of urban development are 
inevitable—are still the most serious obstacles to accomplishing a “democratic form of 
planning.”224  Therefore, the institution of urban planning has inserted its own power 
struggles into the environmental equation. 
More recently, historians have explored the integral role the rivers themselves 
have played in urban environments.  In Organic Machine (1995), environmental historian 
Richard White asserts that the river was a viable part of the culture of a place with the 
power to “rearrange the world,” a much larger role than historians have acknowledged in 
the past.225  While he contends that rational human values guided endeavors to control the 
river, unintended consequences often occurred.  The river reacts in predictable ways:  if 
you narrow its bed, its flow intensifies.  The energy of the river continually fights back 
establishing a give and take relationship.  White argues that the central insight gained 
from the Columbia River is that there is no clear line between us and nature.226 
Looking at the city one most readily associates with its river, urban geographer 
Pierce F. Lewis, New Orleans: The Making of an Urban Landscape (2003), argues that 
the location of New Orleans helped determine the kind of place it was to become.  The 
site, like the city itself, resulted from the river’s behavior over the last 1,000 years.227  
Likewise, urban environmental historian Ari Kelman, A River and Its City (2003), 
focuses on the New Orleans site, and notes that before “our modern-day paved road, 
                                                 
224Fairfield, 12-13. 
225White, The Organic Machine, 3.   
226Ibid., 68 and 109. 
227Lewis, 19-20. 
125 
railroads, and air travel—all technologies circumventing the vagaries of geography—
rivers served as highways of commerce.”228  Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne, sieur de Bienville, 
“saw only a magnificent system of watery roads, a tapestry of commercial empire woven 
from the strands of the river system’s watercourses.”229  Bienville perceived the river as a 
gift and was blinded to the challenges of building a city on the delta.  Kelman argues that 
the river has been an active participant in the city’s development—the most important 
mental and physical landmark for residents, shaping not only ideas about the city, but 
also molding the city spatially.230   
As argued by both Kelman and White, historians cannot separate people from 
nature.  In New Orleans, a reciprocal relationship existed between residents and the river 
and characterized its environmental history.  The river was an actor in many ways, not 
the least of which was creating tension by flooding and by producing urban space.231  
According to Klingle, scholars of environmental history often overlook the animate role 
of nature itself.  He argues that nature is “dynamic, it sets boundaries, and it exacts 
penalties;” nature is “more than just a stage.”232  Undeniably, the White River rose above 
its banks and exacted penalties on West Indianapolis in 1913.  The people who found 
themselves in its vengeful path during the flood probably felt that the river had taken on a 
life of its own.  
Political Ecology 
The field of political ecology contextualizes environmental problems by focusing 
on policy.  With such predecessors as Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), the 
                                                 
228Kelman, 5. 
229Ibid., 4. 
230Ibid., 8. 
231Ibid., 14-16. 
232Klingle, 199. 
126 
“grandfather of modern geography” who led the way for human-environment research, 
and Peter Alexeivich Kropotkin (1842-1921), arguably the first political ecologist who 
extended the anti-thesis to Darwin’s social claims, political ecology lends a crucial 
component to environmental history studies.233  The field emerged in the 1970s and is an 
“umbrella term for the study of ‘politics’ and the ‘environment’” often conforming to a 
“specific set of enquiry to examine the social origins and political ramifications of 
degradation, as well as differential access to natural resources and how ecological 
problems are defined.”234  The common narratives that appear in political ecology studies 
are:  degradation and marginalization; environmental conflict; conservation and control; 
and environmental identity and social movements.  The goal is to explain why 
environmental systems and social systems change.235   
In Political Ecology (2004) Paul Robbins discusses degradation and 
marginalization in the Amazon, which oddly has much in common with West 
Indianapolis.  In “’Political Ecology’ of Amazonia” (1987) and Contested Frontiers in 
Amazonia (1992), M. Schmink and C. H. Wood address the political ecology of the 
Amazon in terms of surplus accumulation.  Struggles for control of the forest occurred 
between indigenous people and non-indigenous laborers, who were governed by 
communal land systems and redistributive economies, and more powerful investors and 
landowner groups, who were driven by market production, competition, and 
commercialization.  Schmink and Wood note, “as class stratification increases under 
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conditions of market expansion, an increasingly hierarchic arrangement of groups will 
struggle over the ‘surplus’ that comes out of the forest, inevitably overextracting.”236   
In West Indianapolis, early settlers bought large tracts of land initially for farming 
purposes, but the landowners’ heirs sold the land as more profitable uses such as 
railroads, stockyards, and industry became apparent.  The land was “improved” by means 
of filling ravines, draining swampland, building levees, and straightening the river.  At 
the same time, these new businesses were polluting the river, soil, and air.  As more 
profitable uses were “extracted” from the land in West Indianapolis, the environment and 
living conditions in the community changed and became unhealthy and dangerous for 
very different reasons from the original miasma of low-lying land.  The residents became 
second-class citizens to the powerful businesses and government officials interested in 
improving the economy of the capital city. 
Robbins describes a parallel but distinctly different approach rooted in philosophy 
and economics introduced by Karl Marx in 1867 and referred to as materialism.  This 
theory attributes environmental degradation to capitalism—specifically, the politics of 
class struggle, industrialization, and capital accumulation—and highlights the 
relationship between nature and society.  In other words, if society is “rooted in 
production,” then it stands to reason that social organizations “are ultimately explained 
by how people use nature.”237  The materialist interpretation fits the case of West 
Indianapolis where local residents were “drawn into market economies” that organized 
the “flow of capital into the hands of investors, landowners, and non-residents” and 
“pushed aside” settlers and land buyers.  Entrepreneurs came to West Indianapolis to start 
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businesses; however, research shows that the majority of people who established 
businesses in West Indianapolis lived elsewhere in Indianapolis.  A number of people 
also moved to West Indianapolis to find jobs with the “great manufactories.”  On the 
other side of the river, these “peasant settlers” were “linked into” the capitalistic, 
industrialized economy.  As Robbins notes, “degradation follows this process of 
enclosure and modernization, in turn driving more intense extraction:  classic political 
ecology.”238 
Historians and geographers reflect the many ways of viewing a city’s relationship 
with its natural environment and especially its river.  But, in study after study, the push-
and-shove relationships among politicians, experts, common people, and nature directed 
the environmental impact.  The source of the power struggle may have occurred at the 
federal level or local level, between political agencies or people, between people and 
their landscape, or between different forces of nature.  In any event, these historians and 
geographers demonstrated multi-dimensional relationships—composed of multiple, 
overlapping struggles—that did not occur randomly.  Even though people may not have 
been paying attention, their actions converged into a culture that determined public 
policies affecting the environment.   
Although this may echo a declension narrative, it reinforces the link between 
citizens and the river and reminds us that “what is real is the mixture of natural and 
cultural.”239  One important component was the intent and beliefs of people involved in 
these power struggles.  Their intent was improvement—of land, unhealthy conditions, 
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technology, urban spaces, and economic conditions.  Unfortunately, unintended 
consequences often occurred. 
Knowing that outside forces can affect the local environment is important.  Yet, 
each place is different.  Therefore, historians must look at the ways in which the 
particular city, state, citizenry, and geography interfaced with outside influences—how 
the power struggles played out locally.  
Municipal Powers 
The structure of municipal government in Indianapolis was similar to many other 
cities founded in the early nineteenth century.  Until 1832 city government did not exist 
separate from state laws as enforced by courts and county and township officers.  Indiana 
towns were organized solely on the “will of the people.”240  Beginning in the fall of 1832, 
Indianapolis organized with a mayor-council system of checks and balances.  The mayor 
held little power serving merely as the presiding officer and police judge, while the 
council carried on all executive functions through multiple committees.  This structure 
resulted in “hodge-podge administrative procedures,” a lack of expert oversight, and 
irresponsibility from overexercise of the checks and balances idea.241 
A review of the proceedings of the Common Council from 1877 to 1915 provided 
insight into the contemporary matters of concern.  The Common Council was responsible 
for all matters relating to operation of the city; consequently, a great deal of time was 
divided among mundane tasks such as naming streets, building bridges, annexing 
suburbs, regulating plumbing, and regulating public health matters such as spitting on 
sidewalks, milk inspections, pest houses, etc.  The Common Council was also the 
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platform for accomplishing any matter that involved an expense, presumably any expense 
associated with building levees and retaining walls.  Therefore, if these flood control 
actions occurred, they would be reflected in the journals of the Common Council. 
The journals during these years did include a sprinkling of entries relating to 
matters one would associate with flood control.  The journal for 1913 referenced 
necessary emergency repairs for a levee on the west bank of White River that would have 
protected West Indianapolis from an overflow.242  Therefore, the city appropriated funds 
to repair levees in emergency situations, but the records do not reflect that the city 
administrators authorized the expense for building the levees.  Instead, landowners had 
shouldered this liability for the protection of their individual holdings. 
Missing from the journals was consistent attention to flood control measures.  
When reviewing the journals of the Common Council, one might expect to find regular 
entries for flood control reflecting that construction and maintenance of levees, retaining 
walls, and drainage systems were revisited each year.  After all, Indianapolis had been 
established on the site of a “vast mudhole,” and city officials would reasonably give 
priority to this underlying municipal concern.  Instead, entries appear only in those years 
in which major floods occurred under the various governmental agencies that handled 
specific problems resulting from flooding, such as the Department of Public Works and 
the Department of Public Health and Charities.  In other words, city officials took a 
defensive stance and responded after each flood occurred. 
Over the years, a number of flood control projects were completed by city 
agencies.  Unfortunately, floods occurred too frequently and there were too many areas of 
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town that needed attention.  City administrators had filled in ravines, constructed wooden 
gutters to drain property of stagnant ponds, completed a drainage project on Pogue’s Run 
(a swamp that spread through town), repeatedly repaired and reinforced the state ditch, 
and repaired levees in response to earlier floods.  (See Figure 16 on page 103.)  Interested 
parties rerouted the river southwest of town (on the Sellers Farm property) to omit a large 
loop that had exacerbated earlier overflows.  (See Figure 19.)  One might say that city 
administrators were overwhelmed with the list of projects that needed to be completed to 
fix the multiple problem areas in the city.  One might also say that it was an impossible 
task.  This riverine city was founded, and was growing and expanding, based on a 
relationship where the citizens dismissed the power, importance, and potential of the 
river. 
Following the 1913 flood, the Indianapolis mayor and city administrators had 
grand plans to rebuild, shore up, and beautify the flooded areas of town.  Unfortunately, 
the majority of these plans never came to fruition in West Indianapolis.  Jacob P. Dunn, 
the City Controller for the City of Indianapolis in 1914, reported that the Board of Works 
budgeted $15,000 and spent $14,986.37 for flood repairs for the year ending December 
31, 1914.243  In his report for the year ending December 31, 1914, City Engineer B. J. T. 
Jeup cites the most important engineering work for the year as preparation of plans for 
the improvement of the channel of White River and Fall Creek.  The general plan of 
proposed work included building an extensive levee in the West Indianapolis area known 
as the West Side White River Flood Protection Work.  In the first phase of this work, 
Jeup proposes elevating the Belt Railroad about three feet at its lowest point, constructing  
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subways under railroad tracks with walls on each side, elevating the Washington Street 
driveway four feet above the high water of 1913, lengthening all bridges to prevent 
obstruction of the channel flow, and constructing weirs and dams to reduce the velocity 
of the stream.  Jeup also discusses plans for the second phase that included levee 
improvements on the east side of the river and plans for the bridge at Meridian Street.  
Jeup states, “it is the purpose of the city in connection with this river work to comply 
with general plans of the Department of Parks for the construction of boulevards along 
the streams, it being the intention to turn the completed work with land acquired to the 
Department of Public Parks for maintenance and further improvement.”244   
For the year ending December 31, 1915, Dunn, who was again the City 
Controller, reported that the Board of Works budgeted $952,992.55 and spent 
$781,413.61 for flood damage repairs and future flood controls.245  This substantial 
increase indicates that the city implemented Jeup’s plans announced the prior year.  The 
annual report of the mayor in 1915 discusses building a levee and a flood prevention 
boulevard, and plans for the water line of the river to be beautified for park purposes.  
Mayor Joseph E. Bell boasted that “no other city in the great flooded district of 1913 has 
yet secured and finally adopted plans for flood prevention” and commended Jeup for his 
quick planning and execution.246  Despite the boast and adopted plans, Indianapolis did 
not implement these plans for beautification along White River until the 1990s when 
White River State Park became a reality. 
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By 1915, the old mayor-council structure no longer existed, yet the remnants of 
disorganization remained.  In 1877, the Indiana state legislature intervened to curb the 
discontent over the ineffective system of checks and balances and split the city 
government into a separate Common Council and Board of Aldermen with concurrent 
powers over finance and administration.  But, political corruption, obstruction, boodle, 
and graft continued to spiral out of control in both the Common Council and Board of 
Aldermen.  Finally, reformists’ notions of how city government should be run won out 
and the City Charter of 1891 launched a new stage for Indianapolis as a “modern 
progressive city.”247  
Mayor Thomas S. Sullivan appointed a new Board of Public Works in 1891 with 
a stated purpose to oversee problems associated with the infrastructure of the expanding 
city.  The Board was authorized under the 1891 charter pursuant to an act passed by the 
General Assembly of the State of Indiana, and the first meeting was held on 9 March 
1891.248  Similar to the proceedings of the Common Council, the minutes of the Board of 
Public Works reviewed for the period 1891 to 1898 do not reveal significant attention to 
flood control issues, but two entries appeared in the minutes for 1891 relating to flood 
control.  At the meeting held 15 June 1891, Charles Hilgenberg filed a petition on behalf 
of interested property owners for stone rip-raffing along banks of White River, but the 
board did not take any action.  At the meeting held 26 June 1891, the City Engineer 
submitted a plat showing a proposed levee along White River, from Chestnut to Ream 
Street in Indianapolis; again, the board took no action.249 
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The minutes of the Board of Public Works do not include additional entries 
relating to flood control until a special meeting on 4 September 1895, when the following 
entry appeared: 
Owing to the heavy rainfall of last night the Board instructs the Street 
Department to employ all necessary labor to patrol streets which, in the 
opinion of the Foreman of Street Repairs, would be affected by 
overflowing and to afford all needed relief to persons or property injured 
by such rain-fall.  The Board instructed the City Engineer to inspect all 
sewers constructed in the city with a view of reporting to the Board their 
condition and to inspect the condition of bridges in the Pogues Run, 
Pleasant Run and Fall Creek districts and to report on the same.  All street 
and sewer contractors were notified to look after the condition of streets 
entered into by them for the purpose of making such improvements.  All 
the Gas Companies and the Water Company were instructed to look after 
the condition of trenches made by them in the streets of the city, and the 
City Engineer was instructed to notify all plumbers or other individuals 
excavating in the streets of the city to inspect the condition of trenches 
made by them.  The Board then adjourned.250 
At the meetings held the next few days, the minutes do not include any mention of 
the results of inspections or any further action needed.  The next entry relating to flood 
prevention appeared a year later on 23 September 1896 when the board adopted 
specifications for the construction of a gate on the White River Levee for flood control 
purposes and ordered legal advertisement for bids on the work.  On 7 December 1896 the 
board approved a bid by Enos Hege for construction of the flood gate.251  In the 
meantime, the minute books include numerous entries regarding draining sewers into 
White River, filling in the state ditch at various intersections, and grading and laying 
asphalt or bricks for streets—actions that would increase flooding problems.  Therefore, 
the department of the municipal government charged with overseeing the infrastructure 
needs for Indianapolis did not direct significant efforts toward flood prevention or focus 
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on the interdependent relationship between the city’s infrastructure and its river, streams, 
and creeks.  When citizens attempted to involve local government in measures intended 
to address flooding problems, government agencies did not respond on a timely basis. 
Municipal government in Indianapolis continued on the same path under the 1891 
reformed charter as it had under the 1821 initial charter, which reformists considered 
elementary and antiquated.  The board appears to have awarded work to contractors for 
building a bridge or flood gate based solely on the lowest bid in every instance.  The 
minutes do not reflect a review of any other criteria.  The local focus remained on 
expansion and dealing with each problem as it arose instead of an integrated system of 
improvement.  
State Powers 
Flood control policies in the capital city mirrored the approach taken by the state.  
When Governor Samuel M. Ralston appointed the Indiana State Flood Commission on 20 
April 1914, the commissioners reported that “Indiana possesses no statutes applicable in 
any general way to its problem of flood control.”252  Despite recurrent flooding in the 
capital city and throughout the state, it was not until after the 1913 flood that any 
governor deemed it necessary to conduct a statewide program for flood control.  
Governor Ralston explained his reasons for appointing the Commission as follows: 
At the time of the appointment of the Commission, the flood of March, 
1913, with its enormous losses, and terrible catastrophes, was fresh in the 
minds of our people, who realized that the efforts to solve local problems 
were limited by lack of knowledge of the elements of the problem, and 
inability to move effectively. . . .  Flood plans which accomplished the 
protection of a city seemed to add to the danger of those down stream.  
These various persons looked to the State for advice.  It was plainly 
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evident that the problem of flood protection must be solved from a wider 
viewpoint than that of the city or county, and even extended to the entire 
watershed.  The line of thought was from the State to the Federal 
Government, which now through the agency of the United States Army, 
has jurisdiction over obstructions to navigable streams. . . . it was further 
realized that early action was desired.253 
The Indiana State Flood Commission worked on several projects from May to December 
of 1914, including inventorying the cities and towns affected by the 1913 flood, 
compiling a river and flood map of Indiana, reviewing work of flood commissions from 
other states, collecting information on flood protection plans implemented in various 
cities, and writing a historical account of floods in Indiana.  In its report, the commission 
stated that “plans for flood protection must be made on the basis of levee construction 
and channel improvement, and the removal of obstructions such as too narrow bridge 
openings, tree growth and dumps.”254  The commission concluded that, while state flood 
control legislation should be adopted, individual communities must protect themselves 
and form cooperative associations within river valleys.   
In December 1914, the Indiana Chief Engineer’s Office published a bulletin titled 
“Flood Protection in Indiana” summarizing the causes of floods and reporting reliable 
information on flood protection plans.  The bulletin was available for use by Indiana 
communities to prepare their own flood protection plans.255  The commission further 
concluded that the key to flood control lay in taking a scientific approach which required 
additional studies: 
We also find that several of our important cities are in peril from future 
floods, and should begin to protect themselves at once.  To many persons, 
floods appear to be visitations of Providence and to be beyond human 
provision and largely beyond human control.  They are caused primarily 
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by natural phenomena that can be readily measured and the future 
occurrence of which can, to a very considerable degree, be foreseen and 
provided against through the proper analysis of sufficient and accurate 
scientific data.256 
The economic impact of the 1913 flood directed the commission’s findings too.  
The commission noted that tangible losses exceeded $25,000,000.  In addition, the flood 
caused the loss of business goodwill, labor losses, and general welfare of the state.  Thus, 
preventing floods was a matter of “vital importance,” but the commission cautioned for  
a wise regulation of flood preventive works so that they may not, while 
benefiting the particular locality for which they are designed, work 
hardship or damage upon other localities;--and so that, by the combining 
of the resources and activities of separate localities, in many cases more 
satisfactory protection may be secured at a less cost.257   
The commission attached a Water Control Act to its report.  The Act authorized 
organization of Water Control Districts and established a State Board to oversee such 
districts and “prevent the establishment or the continuance of stream obstructions, and to 
develop means for the protection of the lands and communities of the state against 
inundation.”258  The commission’s report and the Water Control Act did not speak to the 
effects of deforestation and soil erosion on stream obstructions.  The commission clearly 
recommended levees as the sanctioned method of flood control despite the fact that 
levees had not protected the flooded communities. 
The Indiana legislature and Governor Samuel M. Ralston approved the Water 
Control Act on 6 March 1915.  Although the commission’s reports emphasized the need 
for cooperative flood control, the act laid the burden at the feet of each municipality to 
address its flooding problems: 
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Be it enacted by the general assembly of the State of Indiana, That 
whenever the board of public works of any city of the first class, being 
cities of more than one hundred thousand population . . . in protecting it 
from floods, that the construction of levees, dykes, the removal of 
obstructions and the dredging and control of any stream, the lengthening 
and reconstruction of any bridge or bridges thereover, the construction of 
walls, drains or other works either as separate pieces of work or in 
conjunction with the building of a street . . . 
The act further authorized municipalities to set tax levies, establish flood prevention 
funds, authorize bond sales, apportion costs, limit indebtedness, and give power to boards 
of public works.  Keeping a system of checks and balances, the act required approval by 
the city’s mayor for work costing more than five hundred dollars.259 
Not until Indiana lawmakers passed the Flood Control Act of 1945 did Indiana 
have a more comprehensive act to address the loss of lives and property caused by floods, 
the damage resulting from floods, and the protection of property.  Lawmakers designed 
the Flood Control Act of 1945 to prevent and limit floods by regulating, supervising, and 
coordinating the design, construction, and operation of all flood control works and 
structures and the alteration of natural or present watercourses of all rivers and streams in 
Indiana.260  This 1945 law, as amended, continues to apply to flood control in Indiana 
today. 
Federal Powers 
In 1913 the country was still in its Progressive Era, and flood control was couched 
in complex and controversial discussions of multiple-use development projects for water 
resources.  Samuel P. Hays argues that the “moral language of conservation battles 
differed markedly from the course of conservation events.”261  Hays provides historical 
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context for the conservation battles that occurred around the issue of taming the nation’s 
rivers.  President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration worked out the general principles 
and the specific elements of a multiple-purpose approach to river development, which the 
New Deal put into practice over two decades later.  Hays explains that enthusiasm for 
waterway development dovetailed nicely with the expanding views of hydrologists and 
engineers in the Roosevelt administration.  The U.S. Geological Survey brought forward 
the concept of water as a single resource with many uses—wasted flood waters could, if 
harnessed, aid navigation, produce electric energy, and provide water for irrigation and 
industrial use.   
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers disagreed violently with the new turn of 
affairs in water development and refused to consider seriously a multiple-purpose 
approach.  The Corps attacked the theory that forests retarded run-off or that engineers 
could devise an economical reservoir system.  The Chief of the Corps, Brigadier-General 
Alexander Mackenzie, argued that river planning should subordinate flood control, 
hydroelectric power, and irrigation to navigation.  He vehemently denied that federal 
river programs required greater coordination.262   
By the spring of 1913 the water power struggle in Congress had deadlocked.  
Congress had stopped the Roosevelt policy, but conservationists had also blocked 
perpetual, free grants to private corporations.  This stalemate halted all water power 
development on navigable streams.  After a decade of legislative struggle the 
compromise Water Power Act of 1920 once more permitted development.  This Act dealt 
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solely with water power and failed to realize the hopes of conservationists that power 
development would go forward as an integral part of a multiple-purpose river program.263 
The history of the federal approach to water use that Hays recounts is 
enlightening in several ways.  First, it reveals the significant federal battle that 
surrounded water use prior to the 1913 flood in West Indianapolis.  That battle took years 
to resolve, and the result was one-sided.  Conservationists were not satisfied because 
navigation was the sole survivor of the battle.  The federal government focused its 
attention on navigable rivers while ignoring rivers like White River.  Second, this history 
points out the contemporary assumption that the federal government had responsibility 
for widespread river control, development, and management.  While Indiana legislators 
talked about coordinating efforts in the watershed, the law passed in 1915 did not enforce 
this thinking.  This meant that state and local governments turned over river basin 
responsibility to the federal government and only addressed local issues without 
involving larger regional or river basin concerns.  Meanwhile, the federal government 
became embroiled in a battle that overlooked smaller-scale, local issues and non-
navigable rivers in its strategy.  Lastly, this history highlights the legislative battleground 
that existed and consumed the lives of so many policymakers, but these events happened 
beyond the view of the common person living in West Indianapolis who ultimately bore 
the results of ineffectual flood control policies.   
Powers of Citizens and Place 
Turning from the role of government officials in flood control and looking instead 
to the citizens in West Indianapolis, specifically, and Indianapolis, generally, reveals how 
the relationship the residents had with White River also played an important role in flood 
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control.  That role was in large part directed by urban geography.  Urban geographer 
Sanjoy Chakravorty argues in the case of Calcutta, India, that the spatial structure of 
cities cannot be separated from the political and economic history of the place, as 
influenced by global and local events.264  The same is true for West Indianapolis.  The 
low-lying, marshy land along the west banks of White River provided an ideal place, 
separate from the capital city’s center and early residential districts, for industry to grow.  
Despite its separation by the river, West Indianapolis was crucially connected with 
Indianapolis and the surrounding region.   
Indianapolis too had issues with swamps, ravines, and low-lying land with poor 
drainage, and the city and its residents had a long history of attempting to control these 
geographical facts.  Furthermore, the region had a long history of economic struggle.  
Mayor John Caven understandably viewed the barren, overgrown land in West 
Indianapolis as the perfect place to expand the stockyards and add a belt railroad to serve 
the economic needs of Indianapolis, and Nicholas McCarty, Jr., saw this as an 
opportunity to profit from the land left to him by his father.  The railroads established an 
anchor that attracted additional industrial ventures to the area.   
The expanding industrial district drew people from nearby states searching for 
employment.  The immigrants often chose West Indianapolis as their home as well, but a 
major component of West Indianapolis—White River—did not play a key role in their 
lives.  White River was not navigable and was not essential to the livelihood of these 
young businesses and new residents, except its use as a waste receptacle. 
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Available sources provide very little information about actions taken by the 
residents and business owners of West Indianapolis independent of Indianapolis.  The 
town of West Indianapolis was incorporated on 4 April 1882 (later incorporated as a city 
in 1894), and it was annexed to the city of Indianapolis on 15 March 1897.  Therefore, its 
independent existence was short-lived.  No local newspaper is extant and available for 
research.  The town’s ordinance book from 1883 to 1889 is available, but the ordinances 
dealt with the issues of a fledgling town instead of flood control.  The ordinance book 
contains entries for inspections of slaughter houses and rendering factories, fines for 
prostitution, licenses for peddlers, regulations for saloons and billiard halls, fines for 
throwing stones and other missiles, and fines for loitering and vagrancy.  The nearest 
mention of a matter that could have been related to flooding was an ordinance on 21 
August 1882 that required permits from the Town Clerk before digging trenches or other 
excavations for purposes of laying pipes or draining water or fluids.265  In a town of this 
size, one might assume that the general citizenry involved itself in local government and 
the ordinances reflect their concerns.266  Yet, flood prevention or control are not part of 
the ordinances.  It is possible that inhabitants took responsibility for and implemented any 
needed flood control measures to protect their property just as the earlier settlers on this 
landscape had constructed levees to control the river.  Unless the river spilled over or 
breached the levees threatening the city as a whole, city administrators did not focus on 
the river.   
The river and landscape did direct other endeavors by citizens.  Similar to other 
cities in the late nineteenth century, women’s organizations in Indianapolis stepped up to 
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address health problems and provide municipal housekeeping assistance to city officials.  
In an article written by Hester M. McClung for the Municipal Affairs, a Quarterly 
Magazine Devoted to the Consideration of City Problems from the Standpoint of the 
Taxpayer and Citizen (1898), Miss Catherine Merrill and Mrs. R. S. McKee first 
conceived of the idea of the Indianapolis Sanitary Association in 1893, “the year of the 
cholera scare.”  According to McClung, the Indianapolis Sanitary Association awakened 
“people of all classes” to the “importance of cleanliness as a health measure” and 
“marked the beginning of an era of steady advancement in the city’s ideals of 
cleanliness.”267  The association’s members formed standing committees to target 
markets, hospital and dispensaries, school buildings, garbage, clean streets, clean 
sidewalks and buildings, parks, literature, and emergencies.  The members gave 
“unremitting attention” to inspection of wells, cellars, cesspools, and vaults, which 
caused health problems related to the city’s overall challenges with potable water, poor 
drainage, and frequent flooding.  The association made great strides in conquering the 
garbage problem and eventually gained approval for a city garbage collection system 
provided at the city’s expense as well as a crematory to destroy the collected garbage 
until the end result was that “no stale garbage lurks in the back yard of even the veriest 
hovel.”  The association’s parks committee circulated petitions that were signed by 
hundreds to fight against the pollution of streams and advocate the purchase of land for 
parks along water courses.268  While all of these matters were important for the citizenry, 
the association’s agenda did not include addressing flooding problems specifically.  
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Another local concern involved the navigable status of White River.  In 1899 a 
debate ensued regarding White River’s navigable status.  In order to keep boatmen from 
traversing the backwater in Riverside Park, Park Superintendent Power made a trip to the 
U. S. Army Corp of Engineers office in Louisville, Kentucky, to argue that the river “is 
not, and never was, and of right ought not to be, a navigable stream.”  Mr. Power was 
relying on the 1876 Indiana Supreme Court decision stating: “the court had judicial 
knowledge that White river in Marion county is not and can not be a navigable stream.”  
According to U.S. Army Corps Captain Zinn, “we can pay no attention to State decisions 
. . . the United States courts and Congress are our authority.”  Captain Zinn “was so well 
fortified with historical and legal facts” that he convinced Mr. Power of the navigability 
of White River.269     
If White River was indeed navigable, the Indianapolis Commercial Club wanted 
to promote this fact and take advantage of the associated economic benefits.  The 
Commercial Club and the Indianapolis News backed an exploratory expedition of the 
river starting from the Washington Street bridge on 28 November 1899 utilizing a 
flatboat donated by the White River Sand Company.  Headed by Frank D. Norville, 
captain of the Sunshine, of Broad Ripple, the explorers recorded the average depth of the 
river along the route, noted obstructions, the height of banks and bridges, and the natural 
resources along the river.  The goal was to “prove to the Government the value of 
cleaning the stream of all obstructions, building dams and locks, and making the river 
really navigable for river craft.  The citizens of the towns en route are also to be 
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interested in the scheme, and shown how much to their advantage the running of river 
craft would be.”270    
The Commercial Club committee concluded that the river was navigable, in 
agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and recommended requesting a 
$1,000,000 appropriation from the federal government for river improvements.  The 
committee recommended building three or four dams below Gosport or Martinsville 
which would cause the upper portion of the river to be navigable at all times and 
navigable on the lower portion except at very low water.  The committee believed the 
benefits of an “unmonopolizable commercial highway following through a region so rich 
in agricultural and mineral resources, and subserving so vast a population and such large 
and manufacturing and commercial interests and leading into the Mississippi river system 
will far exceed the reasonable expenditure of money necessary to improve said river.”271  
Although the parties agreed that the river was technically navigable, these river 
improvements were neither completed nor did the river become the commercial highway 
envisioned.  This involvement by local non-governmental interests does indicate another 
hopeful moment that ended with disappointment and contributed to the relationship 
between residents and the river. 
Following the 1913 flood, the issue of navigability came up again.  Local 
physician, Dr. Edward A. Willis, contacted U.S. Senator Kern and asserted that the 
federal government should help with channel work to “eliminate conditions along White 
River that caused the recent flood in Indianapolis.”  A familiar discussion took place of 
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the 1876 Indiana Supreme Court decision and the position of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers regarding navigability.  Ultimately, President Woodrow Wilson authorized the 
U.S. Army Corps to investigate the flood problem.  Their engineers visited Indianapolis 
in late April 1913 and inspected the banks of White River with the city engineer.  
According to the letter Dr. Willis received from Washington, eleven engineer officers 
were at work and expected to make a comprehensive and accurate report with ample 
funds available for that purpose.272  Thus, the 1913 flood brought some positive attention 
and respect to the river not previously achieved. 
The lack of flood control legislation prior to 1913 is revealing.  The United States 
operates with a system of checks and balances accompanied by separation of powers 
between municipalities, counties, states, and the federal government.  In addition, the 
power and independence of individuals is a hallmark of the country.  Each person can 
purchase land and build on and modify that land with little regulation of his or her 
actions.  Courts decide disagreements between parties.  The cumulative result has led to 
disjointed and often conflicting actions.  One prime example is the federal Swamp Lands 
Act administered by the state of Indiana that vested ownership rights to individuals.  Not 
only did this approach cause chaos, the overall concept created economic conflicts.  Land 
was drained for “productive” use, but that drainage caused flood damage in other places.  
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in America are marked by economic 
struggles as part of the effort to expand, settle, and unite the country.  Cities like 
Indianapolis grasped industrialism as a means of lifting the city out of economic hard 
times.  One could argue that the overall good of the city and its citizens was the driving 
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force behind the steps taken to “improve” conditions in Indianapolis.  Others would argue 
the evils of capitalism and materialism focusing on who benefited and who did not as the 
city strove to succeed.  
In conjunction with these larger “evils,” the relationship between citizens and the 
river provided the backdrop for flooding events that unfolded in Indianapolis in 1913.  
The river in effect was not navigable and, thus, did not provide any economic stimulus.  
The river and the surrounding landscape caused health concerns with mosquito-borne 
diseases.  Residents of Indianapolis did not consider the water in White River potable; 
therefore, the river was not crucial to survival, eliminating another reason to give 
attention to the river.  As the city developed, the river was viewed as a mechanism for 
carrying away industrial and human waste creating further health concerns.   
Frequent flooding from the river did not endear it to residents either.  In the midst 
of efforts to withstand economic hard times, the relationship that grew between 
inhabitants and the river included anger, fear, and loathing.  As the unhealthy results of 
flooding increased, accompanied by increasing awareness of health issues, a social 
stigma developed for the areas most affected by flooding.  The residents of West 
Indianapolis became outliers in terms of where they fit in with the city of Indianapolis.273  
Indianapolis lost sight of what West Indianapolis and its early residents had contributed 
in terms of the original settlement and establishment of Indianapolis as an important 
player in the state and national economy.  
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City planning, or the lack of foresight with regard to planning, can create 
undesired local identities.274  A long-standing environmental concern for the residents of 
West Indianapolis was the garbage and sewage disposal plant located on property called 
Sellers Farm.  Although the stockyards, railroads, and industries in West Indianapolis 
must have caused odor concerns, it was the municipal yard that drew the ire of residents.  
The argument over odors and unhealthy conditions reached the boiling point when 
residents filed a petition (that included more than 5,000 signatures) with the Board of 
Public Works for disannexation from Indianapolis in 1921.  During a “heated discussion” 
between board members and the citizen delegation, the chairman of the Board of Public 
Works, Mark Miller, admonished the West Indianapolis citizens not to forget the flood 
prevention work that has been done for the protection of West Indianapolis property.  
Furthermore, Mr. Miller pointed out that in response to their complaints about Sellers 
Farm, a “new sewage disposal system is to be provided at a cost of millions of dollars” 
and “will be for the advantage of West Indianapolis which is at the low point in the city 
where the disposal plant must be placed”—“as sure as water must run downhill.”  The 
delegation’s attorney, Emsley W. Johnson, responded: “water will keep on running 
downhill if you don’t stop it and we are objecting to you stopping the sewage in West 
Indianapolis.”  Mr. Johnson further noted that Mr. Miller’s talk was “dignified and nice . . 
. but it rubs the fur of every man here.”  One member of the delegation, Henry Harmon, 
said he was “tired of hearing of the things that have been done for West Indianapolis” 
because he had been one of the authors of the flood prevention bill that became law and 
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knew that “this law was passed largely for the protection of big industrial plants.”  
Another member pointed out that the Board of Public Works “would not consider putting 
these [refuse wagon] barns and other nuisances on the north side.”275  The board 
promised the citizens a full hearing on their petition, and the matter was temporarily 
resolved.  A year later, the citizens of West Indianapolis threatened disannexation again 
in an argument over Sellers Farm.276 
The environmental struggles of the area of Indianapolis formerly known as West 
Indianapolis continued through the twentieth century and into the next.  Industrial zoning 
contributed to the identity of residents and reinforced the existing environmental 
inequalities.  The community, established around railroads and early industry, grew into 
an area dominated by industrial plants in the years after 1913.   
This study of the relationship between public policies and the environment in 
West Indianapolis began with the assumption that this community was unique.  We 
learned quickly that there are similarities and links that can be quickly made with other 
studies.  For example, industrial capitalism altered the relationship between citizens and 
the river similar to European and eastern American cities.  As discussed in chapter one, 
flood control efforts in West Indianapolis paralleled actions and responses in other cases 
such as Sacramento, California, and communities in the Elkhorn and Kansas River 
Basins.  Despite similarities, each case in fact working with its own set of circumstances 
and within its own culture—its own series of relationships.  Planning historian Amos 
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Rapoport notes in The Meaning of the Built Environment (1982) that “people react to 
environments in terms of the meaning the environments have for them.”277 
For residents of West Indianapolis, the environment held multiple meanings that 
often contradicted each other.  The place was home, but years of recurrent flooding, 
environmental inequalities, failing to recognize the interdependent relationship with the 
river, and ineffectual public policies impacted that sense of home.  The 1913 flood 
emphasized the meaning of the place.  People living in the Valley lost any sense of safety 
in their lives that translated into a lack of confidence and a sense of being lower-class 
citizens.  The 1913 flood separated West Indianapolis from Indianapolis and identified 
the area as undesirable. 
                                                 
277Amos Rapoport, The Meaning of the Built Environment: A Nonverbal Communication 
Approach (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), 13. 
152 
CONCLUSION: WEST INDIANAPOLIS TODAY 
The founders of Indianapolis chose a site that, although abundant with natural 
resources, promised a continual battle with its topography and water sources.  Steps taken 
to establish the city, such as clearing the land of forests and building levees and bridges, 
increased flooding problems.  The city forged ahead completing flood control projects 
one at a time and bracing itself against the storms that would come.  As the population 
grew, industry increased, and river control projects were completed, flooding and 
unhealthy water conditions multiplied as well.  In the end, flooding exacerbated by 
human actions created unhealthy conditions and assigned undesirable identities. 
The devastation from the 1913 flood and the ensuing imposed identity in West 
Indianapolis occurred because of the relationship that developed between residents and 
the river in their midst.  This relationship can be traced to regional influences or, as 
Donald Worster referred to it, the “evolving human ecology.”  Throughout the Wabash 
River Basin people acted under the general mindset that resources were limitless and 
there to be utilized for profit and developed to accommodate humans.  Furthermore, 
regional coordination of alterations did not occur and evolved into an unintended 
environmental disaster. 
The need to overcome economic hardships cultivated this mindset and conflicted 
with the need for clean water.  At the same time that people were struggling to build a 
community and make a living, they were overlooking the consequences of their 
modifications to the landscape and use of the river.  Constant expansion of the city and 
improvements to make the city modern depleted many natural resources and 
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overburdened others beyond capacity.  Attitudes about modernity and progress resulted in 
environmental degradation. 
The perceived non-navigable status of White River contributed to the conflicted 
relationship.  The fact that the river did not provide a ready mode of transportation to aid 
and improve the economy spelled further neglect and misuse for the river.  But, it is 
important to remember that the condition of the river was due in large part to runoff of 
soil and debris from cleared land.  Although the 1876 court ruling was eventually 
reversed, the river’s history as non-navigable had already solidified in the minds of the 
people.  While improvements and maintenance of the river may have allowed navigation, 
efforts by business leaders and smaller riverine cities failed to come to fruition.  
Restoring navigability would have been a costly effort if pursued, and the economic 
stress of the failed canal projects still affected these types of decisions in the basin.   
Multiple private and public interests with different goals and ideas added disorder.  
The river basin crossed not only private property lines but also city, township, county, 
and state borders.  Each entity had the right to act in its own best interest and in fact did 
so.  A swamp drained in northern Indiana resulted in rerouted runoff that flowed 
southward.  Waste dumped in streams north of West Indianapolis made its way to the low 
point in town.  Progressive Era developers argued with federal engineers about use of 
rivers and flood waters with unsatisfactory, one-sided results.  Municipal housekeepers 
pointed out violations such as musty cellars without the benefit of a remedy for the cause 
of the problem.   
In the meantime, West Indianapolis suffered from recurrent flooding due to its 
low-lying landscape and increasing modifications by residents and businesses in the 
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expanding metropolis and state.  Politicians hoped to avoid the uncomfortable topic of 
flooding.  Luckily, words of hope and endurance bolstered constituents.  The inhabitants 
of the basin were indurated to hard times, and they were proud of their ability to 
persevere.  They knew that flooding was part of living in the basin, but they ensured that 
result by continuing to perform actions that exacerbated the problem.  Misunderstanding 
of the reciprocal relationship and the multiple conflicts that existed in that relationship 
resulted in the phenomenon of the 1913 flood.  
In the last half of the nineteenth century, Indianapolis, like many other American 
riverine cities, became involved in the popular ecology-based environmental movement 
and greatly improved the quality of the water in White River.  Along with those 
improvements, cities rediscovered their rivers and integrated them into urban 
revitalization projects.278  Although Indianapolis has revived the landscape on the eastern 
banks of White River, the community of West Indianapolis has been excluded and has 
retained its identity as an unhealthy place.  That tight-knit community that launched the 
city into the nineteenth century and economic prosperity is now a forgotten residential 
area surrounded by mammoth industrial plants. 
In 2001, West Indianapolis had a population of 16,294.279  From its inception, the 
area of West Indianapolis has drawn immigrants struggling to make a start.  The current 
population is a mixture of long-time residents or their descendants and the newest wave 
of Latino immigrants in search of work.  West Indianapolis marches on as a small 
community within Indianapolis, although it has changed in many ways in the last one 
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hundred years.  The homes, many of which survived the 1913 flood, provide much 
needed low-income housing.  (See Figures 20 to 24.)  The industries that reside there, the 
affordable housing found there, and the immigrant community settling there are all 
important to the economy of Indianapolis. 
The difference between downtown Indianapolis and West Indianapolis is striking.  
Within the last twenty years, city residents and administrators have taken a different view 
of White River and attributed new meaning to the river.  The river is now an important 
component of the city’s tourism initiatives.  White River State Park, completed in the 
early 1990s, offers residents and visitors a retreat within walking distance of downtown 
Indianapolis to find recreation and exercise.  Although the view of the river has changed 
in the last 100 years, the view of West Indianapolis has not. 
Today, just outside the boundaries of West Indianapolis, the plans to beautify 
Indianapolis are on display.  White River State Park, the Indianapolis Zoo and White 
River Gardens, the revitalized downtown Indianapolis, Indiana State Museum, Eiteljorg 
Museum, and impressive minor and major league sports stadiums are some of the sights 
one encounters when first stepping foot outside of West Indianapolis.   
It seems that the landscape of West Indianapolis does not belong in the picture.  
But, it does; it is a vital part of the capital city.  The 1913 flood ensured that West 
Indianapolis would survive as an important industrial hub as well as remain a separated 
neighborhood challenged by an unhealthy environment.  As it did in the nineteenth 
century, the community also continues to serve as the entrée into the city and the country 
for many people. 
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The people who arrived in West Indianapolis came to make a start.  Some were 
landowners purchasing tracts of land for farming but keeping their ears tuned for other 
opportunities.  Some were entrepreneurs with hopes of building successful businesses.  
Many were workers that needed stable employment to support their families.  Single 
women came to West Indianapolis in search of the few jobs available to them, which 
manufactories in large cities were more likely to offer. 
Following the flood, workers in West Indianapolis had the option of remaining, 
cleaning up their homes, and continuing with their lives, which is what Adeline 
Claghorn’s family tried to do.  We know from Adeline’s account that they worked for 
days cleaning their house following the flood.  The 1914 census shows the family still 
living at 523 Coffey and that her father, John Claghorn, continued to be employed as a 
laborer.  However, by 1920, the census does not record a John Claghorn in West 
Indianapolis.  Adeline and her sister, Mina, were lodgers with the Cain family on North 
Denny on the eastside of Indianapolis.  We do not know what happened to prompt the 
rest of the family to move from their home at 523 Coffey. 
The Claghorn’s neighbors, the Vanasdals also remained in their home at 522 
Coffey following the flood.  The 1920 census shows them at the same address, although 
their household had grown.  Their son George was 12 years old now, and they had added 
a daughter Mary, age 4, as well as two sisters-in-law, a sister, and a brother-in-law.  The 
sisters-in-law both worked at a hotel, one as a waitress and the other as a cashier.  The 
brother-in-law was employed as a traveling salesman.  Likewise, the 1914 census shows 
that the Longemire family remained at 528 Coffey.  By the 1920 census William 
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Longemire had died (in his early 50s), and his widow, Lucinda, their two daughters, and 
four sons had moved to 546 Marion Street in West Indianapolis.280 
West Indianapolis is one industrial hub in Indianapolis, but its community makes 
it different from other local areas of industry.  In 1890 the population of this suburb was 
3,527.  By the 1970s, this community included approximately 10,500 people.281  The 
senior citizen group that collaborated to record the history of West Indianapolis were 
included in that number.  Despite the challenges, the residents retained pride and 
confidence in their community. 
West Indianapolis exemplifies the impact of flooding on communities.  Other 
factors, in addition to flooding, helped create the identity of West Indianapolis.  
Settlement and growth from immigrant groups, highway development, and zoning 
restrictions also contributed to the identity of West Indianapolis.  But, flooding was the 
factor that stamped it with the identity of a disposable community and left it to subsist in 
the midst of multi-million dollar industries.  Flooding devalued homes, associated 
dirtiness and unhealthiness with the people living in the area, and made living in the 
community undesirable.  The residents’ loyalty, resilience, and sense of home carried this 
community.  The view from the Valley is one of struggle.  The view from the outside 
looking in raises questions about the possibilities for reviving this community’s history. 
The “Great Flood” of 1913 confirmed the relationship between the community of 
West Indianapolis and White River and then initiated social change in West Indianapolis.  
Changes came in the form of a growing divide among the residents in the community, a 
growing divide between the residents and industrial plants, and a growing divide between 
                                                 
280Census (1920). 
281Wolfer, 1. 
163 
the area and the rest of Indianapolis.  Many of the businesses located in West 
Indianapolis today are large, national and international conglomerates in the automobile 
industry, life sciences industry, and manufacturing industries.  Industry in West 
Indianapolis has grown and prospered since 1913, while the community around these 
businesses struggled to survive.  Today, we see a radical difference between the sleek, 
modern buildings of industry and the homes in the surrounding community, many of 
which survived the 1913 flood. 
Following the 1913 flood, Indianapolis reaffirmed its decision to use West 
Indianapolis for industrial purposes.  Industrial zoning in West Indianapolis has injected 
toxins into the area via the river, ground water, and the air.  West Indianapolis has some 
of the highest levels of air pollution in the city.  Nineteen companies within a two-mile 
radius of the low-income area around Morris Street and Tibbs Avenue emitted three-
fourths of the air pollution reported in Indianapolis in 2001, including ozone-producing 
compounds.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and experts who have reviewed 
the data look at the area as a dangerous neighborhood in which to live.282  The homes and 
residents in West Indianapolis are outnumbered by the industrial plants and workers who 
only come to the area to put in their hours and then leave at the end of their shift.  
Visually, industry overshadows the landscape. 
As the struggle to find answers to questions about the plight of West Indianapolis 
continues, political ecologist Paul Robbins provides some words of comfort.  Robbins 
calls for a “happy convergence” in political ecology studies—there will be tensions but 
“they need not restrict cooperative and mutual exploration of social/environmental 
phenomena.”  He suggests approaching environmental struggles with a new language and 
                                                 
282“Toxic Air Raises Unhealthy Odds,” Indianapolis Star, 22 February 2004. 
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to “symmetrically imagine human and non-human processes in the landscape, 
surrendering a position of ‘mastery’ over the non-human world,” which is the “ultimate 
goal of mainstream environmentalism.”283 
This study provides a historical perspective on a cultural and environmental 
problem that continues to occur today, even if the details are not always the same.  Few 
Indianapolis residents know about the 1913 flood, but that flood is not only a significant 
part of our history, it is echoed in our present every time the city floods.  The relationship 
between people and the river and landscape with which they cohabitate is crucial.  
Believing that humans can master the “non-human world” or believing that natural 
resources cannot be destroyed or possibly eliminated invites undesired results.  Flooding 
has the power to create the identity of a community, but it is the interplay between the 
people and the river that gives flooding this power. 
                                                 
283Robbins, 209. 
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